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ABSTRACT 
 
The work presented in this thesis was developed at the Department of Civil Engineering 
of University of Minho. This work involves experimental and numerical campaigns and 
intends to give a contribution for a better understanding of the effect of explosions. 
 
Blast loading is a subject of much actuality and considerable lack of expertise. Europe 
has never been so rich and safe, where the violent years of the first half of the 20th 
century lead to an unprecedented period of peace and stability. Despite the terrorist 
decades, e.g. connected to ETA and IRA in Europe, the attacks of Madrid (2004), 
London (2005) and worldwide (New York, Oklahoma, Mumbai) had a major 
psychological effect in the societies. Clearly, the understanding about the effect of blast 
loading in structures and their subsystems saves lives and reduces damage in buildings. 
 
The Buncefield explosion (2005) resulted in tremendous damage to the outlying area 
and huge fires involving 23 large oil fuel tanks. Experimental and finite element 
analyses are carried out for the static and dynamic response of lightweight metal boxes 
that are similar to the steel junction boxes on the site of this explosion. During the 
Buncefield Explosion Mechanism Phase I research, the lightweight steel junction boxes 
on the site located within the area covered by the gas cloud are compared with similar 
boxes tested under a range of different loading conditions using hydrostatic pressure, 
gas explosions and high explosive charges. The residual plastic deformations for these 
boxes are recorded and used to validate a finite element based modelling approach. The 
predicted pressure-time history is in reasonably good agreement with the measurements. 
Further parametric studies are then conducted to produce iso-deformation curves which 
can be used in accident investigations to back track the blast loading from structure 
deformations. 
 
Investigation of the dynamic properties of construction materials is critical for structural 
engineering. The strain rate effect influences the properties on most constructions 
materials. This effect on materials such as concrete or steel has been intensively 
investigated. However, such studies on masonry materials such as clay bricks cannot be 
found in the open literature easily. Understanding the strain rate effect on masonry 
materials is important for proper modelling and design of masonry structures under high 
velocity impacts or blast loads. This work aims to study the behaviour of masonry and 
its individual components in compression at different strain rates. A Drop Weight 
Impact Machine is used at different heights and weights introducing different levels of 
strain rate. The strain rate effect on the compressive strength, Young’s modulus, strain 
at peak strength and compressive fracture energy is determined from the experimental 
results. Empirical relations of dynamic increase factors (DIF) for these material 
properties are also presented. 
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The vulnerability of the masonry envelop under blast loading is considered critical due 
to the risk of loss of lives. The dynamic behaviour of masonry infill walls subjected to 
dynamic out-of-plane loading is experimentally investigated in this work. In the present 
study water plastic containers, having in its centre a detonator inside a cylindrical 
explosive charge, are used as confined underwater blast wave generators (WBWG). 
Tests are performed in unreinforced walls with 1.7 by 3.5 m, which are 1:1.5 scaled, 
and the results presented. These results are used to calibrate numerical models using 
ABAQUS Explicit dynamics, allowing a detailed study on this kind of masonry panels 
under dynamic out-of-plane loading in the form of parametric studies. Two different 
reinforcement solutions are studied in the numerical model and the results are presented. 
The results are used to create pressure-impulse (P-I) diagrams which can help the 
designer to estimate the response of these elements under different loading conditions. 
 
Protection is not an absolute concept and there is a level of protection where the cost of 
the protection provided with respect to the cost of potential loss is in balance. On one 
hand, protection cannot offer full guarantee of safety and, on the other hand, too much 
protection is a waste of resources with regard to what is expected to be saved. The 
purpose of protective construction is to improve the probability of survival of people 
and other contents in a given facility for a given threat, to an adequate level. In order to 
improve this probability, one must first understand the threat and accordingly analyse 
the facility. In this work risk assessment is addressed and applied to a large Public 
Transport Operator. This assessment allows identifying potentially critical 
infrastructure, which are studied and its structural security is evaluated for different 
scenarios regarding blast loading. 
 
 
Keywords: Blast loading; Dynamic response; FE modelling; LS-DYNA; Masonry; 
Impact; Drop Weight; Strain rate; DIF; Infill walls; Out-of-plane loading; WBWG; Risk 
assessment; COUNTERACT; Structural security; ABAQUS.  
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RESUMO 
 
O trabalho apresentado nesta tese foi desenvolvido no Departamento de Engenharia 
Civil da Universidade do Minho. Este trabalho envolve campanhas experimentais e 
numéricas, e pretende ser uma contribuição para uma melhor compreensão do efeito das 
explosões. 
 
As explosões são um tema atual e de conhecimento muito reduzido. A Europa nunca 
esteve tão rica e segura, sendo que os anos violentos da primeira metade de século 20 
conduziram a um período sem precedentes de paz e estabilidade. Apesar de décadas de 
terrorismo, por exemplo da ETA e do IRA na Europa, os ataques de Madrid (2004), 
Londres (2005) e em todo o mundo (Nova York, Oklahoma, Mumbai) têm tido um 
impacto psicológico muito elevado nas sociedades. Claramente, a compreensão sobre o 
efeito da ação das explosões nas estruturas e nos seus subsistemas salva vidas e reduz os 
danos nas construções. 
 
A explosão de Buncefield em 2005 resultou num dano impressionante nas proximidades 
e fogos imensos em 23 grandes depósitos de combustível. Campanhas experimentais e 
numéricas são executadas para estudar o comportamento dinâmico de caixas metálicas 
semelhantes às encontradas em Buncefield. Durante a investigação do incidente de 
Buncefield, as caixas presentes na área coberta pela nuvem de vapor são comparadas 
com caixas semelhantes sujeitas a diferentes tipos de ações, usando pressão hidrostática, 
explosões de gás e explosivos de grau militar. As deformações permanentes são 
registadas e usadas para validar modelos numéricos com recurso ao Método dos 
Elementos Finitos. A previsão dos perfis de pressão é adequada aos dados obtidos 
durante a investigação do acidente. Os modelos numéricos obtidos são usados para criar 
curvas de iso-dano que podem ser usadas para auxiliar em investigações pós-acidente 
relacionando a deformação nessas subestruturas com o perfil de pressões atuante. 
 
A investigação das propriedades dinâmicas dos materiais de construção é considerada 
crítica para a engenharia. O efeito das velocidades de deformação influencia as 
propriedades da maior parte dos materiais de construção. Este efeito tem sido estudado 
em betão e aço. No entanto, estudos sobre este efeito em alvenaria, e seus componentes, 
são reduzidos na literatura. A compreensão destes efeitos em alvenaria é crucial para 
uma modelação e dimensionamento adequado destes materiais quando sujeitos a 
impactos ou explosões. Este trabalho pretende estudar o comportamento da alvenaria, e 
dos seus componentes individuais, em compressão a diferentes velocidades de 
deformação. Para o efeito uma torre de queda é usada com diferentes alturas e pesos de 
impacto, introduzindo no sistema diferentes velocidades de deformação. O efeito das 
velocidades de deformação é determinado pelos resultados experimentais, e estudado 
para a resistência à compressão, módulo de elasticidade, extensão em compressão 
máxima e energia de fratura em compressão. Relações empíricas sob a forma de fatores 
de incremento dinâmico (FID) são apresentadas para estas propriedades mecânicas. 
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A vulnerabilidade da envolvente em alvenaria dos edifícios quando sujeita a explosões é 
considerada crítica devido ao risco de perdas humanas. O comportamento de paredes de 
enchimento quando sujeitas a ações dinâmicas fora do seu plano é investigado neste 
trabalho. São usados reservatórios de água com uma carga explosiva no seu centro para 
atuar como geradores de onda de choque. São executados testes em paredes de 
enchimento de alvenaria com 1.7×3.5 metros (escala de 1:1.5). Os resultados obtidos 
são usados para calibrar modelos numéricos com recurso ao software ABAQUS 
Explicit. Isto permite uma análise alargada do comportamento destes elementos quando 
sujeitos a ações dinâmicas fora do plano, sob a forma de estudos paramétricos. Duas 
soluções de reforço são estudas numericamente e os resultados apresentados. Os 
resultados obtidos nas tarefas anteriores são usados para criar diagramas de pressão-
impulso (P-I) que auxiliam os técnicos que pretendam estimar a resposta deste tipo de 
paredes quando sujeitas a diferentes tipos de ação. 
 
A proteção não é um conceito absoluto e há um nível de proteção em que o custo da 
proteção em relação às perdas possíveis está em equilíbrio. Por um lado, não é possível 
garantir proteção e segurança absoluta, por outro lado, demasiada proteção pode ser um 
desperdício de recursos em relação ao que se espera proteger. O objetivo de proteção, 
no caso de estruturas, é melhorar a probabilidade de sobrevivência dos seus ocupantes e 
seu conteúdo, para uma ameaça específica, obtendo uma probabilidade adequada. Para 
isto ser possível é necessária uma compreensão detalhada da ameaça e da estrutura. 
Neste trabalho a avaliação de risco é estudada e uma metodologia é aplicada a um 
Operador de Transportes Públicos. Esta avaliação de risco permite identificar 
infraestruturas críticas, tendo sido avaliada a segurança estrutural de uma destas a 
diferentes cenários de explosão. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: 
Alvenaria; Impacto; Torre de queda; FID; Paredes de enchimento; Carregamento for a 
do plano; WBWG; Avaliação de risco; COUNTERACT; Segurança estrutural; 
ABAQUS. 
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Chapter 1 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Many countries have been victims of terrorism on a grand scale. Bombs have exploded 
inside and near buildings in several countries, causing human casualties and very high 
economic losses. As a result, these events have created a concern about the capacity of 
countries to protect themselves against such actions. Particularly relevant aspects are the 
ability to protect assets against car-bombs and the structural integrity of existing 
buildings. 
 
Despite decades of terrorism in Europe, linked for example to ETA and IRA, the recent 
attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) had a particularly severe psychological 
effect on societies. In fact, a perceived terrorist threat has become an important issue for 
EU citizens and, in an Eurobarometer survey in April/May 2007, 81% of the EU 
population would like to have a joint decision of the EU in the area of prevention 
against terrorism. 
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An explosion in the vicinity or inside a building can have catastrophic effects, damaging 
and destroying parts of the building, windows, and walls, forcing the closure of 
services, and causing fire and smoke that can injure or even cause the death of its 
occupants. The effects of an explosion in structural members can produce both local and 
global responses associated with different modes of failure. The type of structural 
response depends mainly on the explosive charge, the orientations of the structural 
element relative to the direction of the wave propagation and the support conditions. In 
general, the failure modes associated with this type of action can be through bending 
and shear. 
 
Risk reduction has to include the public understanding of the need for preventive 
measures and structural strengthening for critical infrastructures. The perception of 
architects and engineers for measures of structural integrity against collapse must be 
incorporated in the early stage of the design process. This theme is perhaps important 
enough to be considered in many new projects, depending on the consequences of 
collapse for human life, on their importance for public safety and civil protection in the 
immediate post-incident period, and on the social and economic consequences of 
collapse. Although there is some information and experience on the effect of blast 
loading on buildings it seems to be difficult to integrate this knowledge in the 
regulations and practices of construction. 
 
 
1.1 OBJECTIVES 
The present work intends to give insight on several topics related to blast loading and 
structural response to impulsive loading. The first objective of this work is to provide 
understanding on the explosion phenomenon and its interaction with structures, for both 
terrorist actions and accidental explosions. It is also intended to provide empirical tools 
to help assessing the blast load parameters for a post-disaster scenario regarding 
industrial accidents or terrorist attacks, allowing the research team responsible for the 
accident investigation to estimate the magnitude of the explosion through simple tools.  
 
Impact and blast loading introduces in the materials high strain rates which affect the 
material properties. Quantifying this influence on masonry and its components is also 
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one of the objectives of this work. Regarding the response of structural elements under 
blast loading, it is intended to develop a new test setup able to test wall panels under 
out-of-plane blast loading. From the results obtained with the out-of-plane blast test it is 
also intended to create empirical tools to help practitioners to assess the behaviour and 
design masonry infill walls under blast loading.  
 
Two different case studies on risk assessment and security evaluation are expected. It is 
intended to identify the elements, inside a public transportation network, with the 
highest risk associated to a selected range of threats. From the group identified 
previously it is intended to perform a structural evaluation under different explosion 
scenarios. Lastly, this work intends to introduce these topics at a national level, hoping 
they could lead to future developments in this field. 
 
 
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS  
Besides this introductory chapter, this thesis is composed of six additional chapters, 
each contributing to a particular subject related to this field. 
 
Chapter 2 gathers the most relevant concepts and theories needed to understand the 
work done previously in this field. This chapter addresses definitions on explosions, 
explosives, concept of blast waves, and interaction between blast waves and structure. 
The chapter also presents available methods of analysis, together with the influence of 
impulsive loading in the material behaviour as well as the most important design codes 
available. 
 
Chapter 3 intends to give insight on the determination of blast loading parameters. The 
work presented in this chapter was performed in collaboration with Kingston University 
London, UK and the Fire and Explosion Study Centre in London, UK in the framework 
of the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation. The most relevant aspect is to study the 
possibility of estimating the magnitude of explosions by using pressure indicators or 
sub-structures. Using common objects present within and in the neighbourhood of most 
of industrial buildings, such as steel switch boxes, cars or oil drums as reference 
samples, it is possible to estimate the overpressures in case of an explosion by building 
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a relation between the residual permanent deformation with pressure/impulse 
responsible for such deformation. Pressure-impulse (P-I) can help future accident 
investigations by backtracking the overpressures and impulses according to the 
observed damage in those specific sub-structures. 
 
Chapter 4 presents an experimental campaign on the influence of the strain rate on the 
mechanical properties of masonry and its components. The work presented in this 
chapter was developed in collaboration with the Mechanical Engineering Department of 
University of Minho, Portugal. The most relevant issue is to study the influence of the 
strain rate effect on handmade clay brick and mortar. Compression tests were performed 
using a Drop Weight (DW) impact machine. Empirical relations using Dynamic 
Increase Factors (DIF) were developed and can be used to improve material models 
used by advanced non-linear analysis software for proper prediction of the structural 
response under impulsive loading. 
 
Chapter 5 present a newly developed test setup for dynamic out-of-plane loading using 
underWater Blast Wave Generators (WBWG) as loading source. The work presented in 
this chapter was performed in collaboration with the Laboratory for Energetics and 
Detonics (LEDap), Condeixa-a-Nova, Portugal. This new test setup is presented 
including the development of sensors and acquisition systems. This chapter also studies 
the behaviour of masonry infill walls subjected to blast loading. Three different 
masonry walls are studied. Unreinforced masonry infill wall and two different 
reinforcement solutions. These solutions have been studied previously for seismic 
action mitigation. Lastly, empirical tools are presented to help designers to make 
informed decision on the use of these elements under blast loading. 
 
Chapter 6 present two case studies. The work presented in this chapter was performed in 
collaboration with REFER, Portugal. A risk assessment due to terrorist actions 
involving explosions is performed. The selected infrastructure for performing this 
assessment involved one of the largest transportation operators in Portugal and the 
elements in the infrastructure with the highest associated risk are highlighted. From the 
group of elements with the highest associated risk, an element is selected for safety 
evaluation under blast loading. Through numerical analysis, different explosion 
scenarios are studied and the behaviour of the structure is presented. 
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Chapter 7 summarizes the final remarks and conclusions from the previous chapters. 
Some developments regarding future research work are also presented, together with 
suggestions regarding possible research topics in this field of knowledge. 
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Chapter 2 
2  EXPLOSION AND STRUCTURES: A STATE OF THE ART 
 
Quite often we see on the news the effects of explosions. Explosions threaten people’s 
lives; threaten the integrity of buildings, industry, transportation, communications and 
services. Explosions can result from human action (Table 2.1) or unfortunate accidents 
(Table 2.2) and can vary from a nuclear explosion to a gun firing. 
 
The technical community is, in general, not prepared to deal with the design or 
evaluation of structures when subjected to this kind of actions. This happens because 
the design codes very rarely include explosions as a design load and the dynamic effects 
of explosions on buildings have been studied in a small number of laboratories. The cost 
involved in researching and experimenting on these actions on structures is very high 
and in most countries left to the armed forces, which due to security restrictions do not 
publish their research. Due to the global increase of explosions, either by terrorism or 
accidents, the need of research and development in this area is obvious. However the 
focus of this research will probably shift from the military requirements, which is the 
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present situation, to civil requirements, in order to serve the needs of the present and the 
future. 
 
Table 2.1 – Examples of recent terrorist attacks using explosions. 
Date Location Target 
March 2004 Madrid, Spain Passenger trains and train stations 
July 2005 London, UK Passenger bus and underground trains 
October 2008 Pamplona, Spain University of Navarra 
July 2011 Oslo, Norway Norwegian Prime Minister’s office 
November 2012 Tel Aviv, Israel Passenger bus near the Defence Ministry 
April 2013 Boston, USA Finish line of the 2013 Boston Marathon 
 
Table 2.2 – Examples of major industrial accidents. 
Date Location Type of fuel 
1975 Beek, Netherlands Propylene 
1989 Ufa, Russia LPG 
1991 Saint Herblain, France Petrol 
1992 Brenham, USA C2-C4 
2005 Buncefield, UK Petrol 
2005 Texas City, USA C5-C7 
 
This chapter gathers the most relevant concepts and theories needed to understand the 
work done in this field. This chapter addresses definitions on explosions, explosives, 
concept of blast waves, and interaction between blast waves and structure. Available 
methods of analysis will be presented, together with the influence of this load in the 
material behaviour as well as the most important design codes available. 
 
 
2.1 EXPLOSION PHENOMENON 
An explosion is defined as a sudden release of energy. In an explosion the gas expands 
and it is forced out of the volume it occupies, as consequence, a layer of compressed air 
– blast wave – is formed around that gas containing most of the energy released by the 
explosion (Ngo et al, 2007). An explosion can be categorized by their nature as: 
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 Physical, energy may be released from the catastrophic failure of a cylinder of 
compressed air, volcanic eruptions or even mixing of two liquids at different 
temperatures. 
 Chemical, energy may be released from the rapid oxidation of fuel elements 
(carbon and hydrogen atoms) 
 Nuclear, energy may be released from the formation of different atomic nuclei 
by the redistribution of the protons and neutrons within the interacting nuclei. 
 
This work deals with physical explosion which can be cause by High Explosive (HE) 
and Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCE). Both explosives and bombs can be categorized as 
(Bangash and Bangash, 2006): 
 Small explosive device, up to 5 kg TNT; 
 Medium explosive device, up to 20 kg TNT; 
 Large explosive device, up to 100 kg TNT; 
 Very large explosive device, up to 2500 kg TNT. 
 
 
2.1.1 High Explosives (HE) 
An explosive material is a substance capable of releasing a great amount of energy after 
ignition. According to their physical state they can be classified as solid, liquid or gases. 
Explosive materials can be also categorized according to their speed of expansion as 
high explosive (detonation, the decomposition is propagated by the explosive 
shockwave), and low explosive (deflagration, the decomposition is propagated by a 
flame front). 
 
An explosive can be ignited by impact, friction, heat, static electricity or 
electromagnetic radiation. According to the explosive sensitivity to ignition, they can be 
classified as primary explosives or secondary explosives. The first ones are very 
sensitive to ignite like ammonium permanganate or nitroglycerin, the secondary 
explosives are less sensitive and require more energy to be ignited like TNT 
(Trinitrotoluene) or RDX (cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine). This allows the secondary 
explosives to be used safely in a wider variety of applications. 
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All blast loading parameters are dependent on the quantity of energy present in the 
explosion. The charge mass, W, is expressed in kilograms of TNT (TNT is used as a 
universal reference). The first step when analysing an explosion with materials other 
than TNT is to convert the mass of explosive into mass of TNT. Table 2.3 shows the 
conversion factors for a number of explosive materials according to their specific 
energy. From the table, it can be seen that 100 kg of HMX (nitroamine high explosive) 
converts into 125.6 kg of TNT since the ratio of their specific energies is 1.256 
(5680/4520). 
 
In case of terrorist-manufactured explosives (known as Home-Made Explosives or 
HME) it is difficult to determine the TNT equivalent due to the variability of their 
formulation and the quality control used in their manufacture. Conversion factor 
ranging from 0.4 (poor HME quality) up to the unity have been suggested (Mays and 
Smith, 1995). The case is similar for fuel-air or vapour cloud explosions where TNT 
equivalents between 0.4 and 0.6 have been used (SCI, 2009). 
 
Table 2.3 – Conversion factors for explosives (Mays and Smith, 1995). 
Explosive 
Mass specific energy, Qx 
(kJ/kg) 
TNT equivalent (Qx/QTNT) 
Compound B 5190 1.148 
RDX 5360 1.185 
HMX 5680 1.256 
Nitroglycerin (liquid) 6700 1.481 
TNT 4520 1.000 
Semtex 5660 1.250 
 
 
2.1.2 Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCE) 
One of the differences between vapour cloud explosions and conventional explosions is 
that the blast from this last one has a high peak pressure over a short period of time, 
when compared to a vapour cloud explosion which generates a lower peak but of longer 
duration. Another difference between these two types of explosion is that conventional 
explosions have a point source, whereas vapour cloud explosions occupy a large 
volume. 
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There are two known mechanisms for generating an explosion in a relatively unconfined 
vapour cloud. One is a deflagration, where the flame accelerates to high speed, which 
requires a mechanism for generating the flame acceleration. It has been shown in large-
scale experiments (SCI, 2009) that this can be provided by turbulence generated as the 
explosion propagates through pipework congestion typical of a process plant. 
 
The second mechanism is a detonation, which if sustained, can be much more 
damaging. It may arise from coalescence of a strong shock wave and a fast-moving 
chemically reacting front. Together, this can undergo a transition to propagation faster 
than the speed of sound and produce overpressures at the front in excess of 1 MPa 
(Strehlow, 1973). It can also arise from the high temperatures and pressure generated by 
a shock wave in a confined volume, high flame speed deflagration or directly from 
strongly focused shock waves in a very reactive mixture. 
 
The physical properties of highly flammable liquids, such as petrol, are such that if they 
are mishandled or released there is a significant risk of fire or explosion. In this context, 
perhaps the most important properties of petrol is its high volatility. At normal ambient 
temperatures, the vapour released by simple evaporation from the fuel surface can 
readily be ignited as it mixes with air. It is classified legally as a Highly Flammable 
Liquid, meaning that it has a flashpoint below 32 ºC (Wiekema, 1984). Flashpoint is 
used to define the hazard associated with liquid fuels and to help determining safe 
working conditions. 
 
The flashpoint is defined as the minimum temperature at which a liquid fuel produces 
sufficient vapour to form a flammable or ignitable mixture with air. Petrol has a 
flashpoint of around -40 ºC, well below normal (ambient) temperatures, and can be 
ignited very easily. It is the vapour that “burns”, releasing heat, some of which is 
transferred to the surface of the fuel, thus increasing the rate of evaporation that supplies 
the flame with fuel vapour. This flashpoint can be compared with a flashpoint over +40 
ºC for diesel fuel. 
 
Not all concentrations of fuel vapour in air are flammable, meaning capable of being 
ignited by a small ignition source such as a spark or a flame. Ignition can only occur if 
the mixture of flammable vapour in air falls within certain concentrations, known as the 
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lower and upper explosion (or flammability) limits (Strehlow, 1973). For petrol vapour, 
concentrations below 1.4% in air are too lean to burn, while those above 7.6% are too 
rich. For all concentrations between these two limits, knows as the flammable range, the 
mixtures will burn, meaning that a flame will propagate away from the ignition source. 
Whether an ignition can give rise to a fire, an explosion or a combination of both 
depends on a number of factors, including the conditions prevailing at the time and the 
immediate surroundings of the release, but particularly on the amount of vapour present 
and how it is able to mix or diffuse with air. 
 
For an explosion involving petrol vapour to occur, the vapour/air mixture must be 
within its flammable range when it encounters a potential source of ignition. A flame 
will propagate rapidly, spreading spherically from the ignition source throughout the 
entire flammable mixture. The heat released as the fuel is consumed causes the gases to 
expand as a result of the associated temperature rise. If confined, the gases cannot 
expand freely and the pressure will rise until parts of the confining structure (such as 
windows of a building) fail and relieve the pressure. This is normally a violent event 
and may produce a shock wave that can cause remote damage. In general, overpressures 
are not developed if an unconfined petrol vapour/air mixture is ignited because the 
gases can expand freely (Roberts and Pritchard, 1982). However, the speed at which the 
flame travels through the flammable mixture can vary considerably, depending on a 
number of different factors, such as: a) the composition of the mixture; b) amount of 
vapour and size of the flammable cloud; c) strength of the ignition source; d) the partial 
confinement and e) the turbulence created within the mixture. If the flame speed is very 
high, some overpressures will be created as the expansion cannot occur rapidly enough.  
 
The term partial confinement is used to describe a situation in which obstacles lie in the 
path of the advancing flame. As the unburnt mixture is forced past these obstacles, 
turbulence is produced. The flame will travel much more rapidly through a turbulent 
mixture than through a quiescent one. If the flame speed is greater than the speed of 
sound the explosion is termed a detonation. A cloud of petrol vapour in the open 
without any turbulence creating obstructions, such as complex pipe racks or congested 
plant, would on ignition produce a deflagration with a relatively slow flame speed, 
around 10 m/s. Such an event would give rise to overpressures of about 1.4 kPa. For a 
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flame to accelerate beyond this and create higher overpressures, some or all of the 
previous factors would have to play a part. 
 
 
2.1.3 Blast wave 
When a blast wave is formed it increases the pressure instantly to a value higher than 
the atmospheric pressure (side-on overpressure), which later decreases as the wave 
propagates outwards from the explosion source. After a short period of time the 
pressure behind the front drops below the atmospheric pressure. During this negative 
phase a vacuum is created and the air is sucked in creating high suction winds 
responsible for carrying debris for long distances. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows a typical blast wave pressure–time history from an explosion. Initially, 
at arrival time tA, there is a peak side-on overpressure PS0 (UFC 3-340-02, 2008), higher 
than the atmospheric pressure P0. The pressure then decays to the value of the 
atmospheric pressure after the positive phase duration td, and continues to decay to a 
value lower than the atmospheric pressure PS0- (creating a vacuum). After td + td- 
(duration of the positive phase plus the duration of the negative phase) the pressure 
returns to the atmospheric conditions. Two distinct phases are thus found on the 
pressure-time profile of the blast wave, the positive phase, while the pressure is higher 
than the atmospheric pressure, with the duration td, and the negative phase, with the 
duration td- while the pressure is lower than the atmospheric pressure. The negative 
phase has a higher duration and lower intensity than the positive phase. Increasing the 
distance to the explosion source, R, results in a lower amplitude and higher duration. 
Explosive charges detonated extremely close to a structure impose a highly impulsive, 
high intensity pressure load over a localized region of the structure; explosive charges 
detonated further away from the target structure produce a lower intensity, longer 
duration pressure load over the entire structure (Ngo et al, 2007). Eventually, the entire 
structure will be engulfed in the blast wave; the reflection and diffraction effects will 
create focusing and shadow zones in a complex pattern around the structure. During the 
negative phase the structure already weakened may experience impact of debris carried 
by the suction winds present in this phase. 
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When the blast wave encounters a solid surface or an object denser than air it will 
reflect from it and, depending on its geometry and size, diffract around it. This 
reflection phenomenon will amplify the peak side-on overpressure by a reflection factor 
(Figure 2.2). These factors depend mostly on the intensity of the blast wave and the 
angle of incidence.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Pressure profile from external explosions. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Relation between the peak overpressure and the reflected pressure. 
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2.1.4 Blast loading 
It is possible to identify three different interaction classes between the blast wave and 
the target structure: the first one is usually associated to large scale explosion, the 
structure is engulfed and compressed by the blast wave, there will be a translation force 
which will attempt to move the structure laterally (drag forces) but due to the size and 
nature of the structure it will not move (Figure 2.3a); the second one is associated to 
large scale explosions but when it interacts with smaller structures, for example a 
vehicle, here the structure will be engulfed and compressed by the blast wave, there will 
be drag forces too and due to the smaller size of the structure it will move laterally. In 
this case the drag forces will be responsible for most of the suffered damage (Figure 
2.3b); the third interaction class will refer to the smaller blast charges, here the blast 
wave will have a lower intensity and in this case the structural elements should be 
analysed individually (Figure 2.3c).  
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Interaction classes for external explosions: a) large scale explosion with 
large structure; b) large scale explosion with smaller structures; c) smaller blast charges. 
 
For the first two interaction classes, and observing Figure 2.4, it can be noted that each 
structure facade will be subjected to two different types of load. First, each facade will 
experience the diffraction of the blast wave around the entire structure causing a 
compressing pressure around all facades. On a second instant, the structure will 
experience a drag force due to the dynamic pressures. In Figure 2.4a the peak 
overpressure applied to the frontal facade is the reflected pressure, PR. This pressure 
will decay in the time interval (t’-t2) until the value of pressure applied to the top and 
side facades (side-on overpressure, PS0). The time t’ can be determined as (Mays and 
Smith, 1995): 
 
U
St  3  (2.1) 
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Where S is the smaller of: half of the structure breadth or the structure height; and U is 
the blast front velocity, which can be determined as (Mays and Smith, 1995): 
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Where PS0 is the peak overpressure at the wavefront, P0 is the atmospheric pressure and 
a0 is the speed of sound at ambient conditions. 
 
In Figure 2.4b the deviation from the linear decay of pressure is due to complex 
vortexes originated in the intersections of the frontal facade with the side and top ones. 
In Figure 2.4c there is a slower increase of pressure due to the time required by the blast 
wave to complete the diffraction process travelling down the rear of the structure. 
Figures 2.4d and 2.4e show the drag forces in the frontal and back facades due to the 
dynamic pressures. The resulting drag force is given by (Mays and Smith, 1995): 
 
AtqCF SDD  )(  (2.3) 
 
Where A is the loaded area, CD is the drag coefficient of the target which depends on the 
geometry and qS(t) is the dynamic pressure with a maximum of (Liepmann and Roshko, 
1957): 
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UFC 3-340-02 (2008) suggests drag coefficients for the top and lateral facades 
according to the dynamic pressure.  
 
An explosion is usually defined using two important parameters: charge of the 
explosion W, and the standoff distance R. With these two parameters and using the 
Hopkinson-Cranz scaling laws (Brode, 1955) it is possible to define a constant of 
proportionality capable of relating charges and distances for different explosions. This 
parameter Z is called scaled distance and can be calculated as Z = R/W1/3 [m/kg1/3]. This 
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means that two different explosions with the same scaled distance value should produce 
the same overpressure, positive phase duration and impulse. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Blast wave external loading on structures: a) front façade; b) top and side 
facades; c) rear façade; d) drag load on the front façade; e) drag load on the rear facade. 
 
Since the middle of the last century many researchers study this phenomenon and 
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explosions. Estimations of the peak overpressure due to spherical blast were introduced 
by Brode (1955) as: 
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(2.5) 
 
Later Newmark and Hansen (1961) introduced an expression to calculate the peak 
overpressure for high explosive charge detonating at ground surface: 
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Other empirical solutions were introduced later on, such as Kinney and Graham (1985) 
or Mills (1987) to estimate the side-on overpressure. To estimate the positive phase 
duration, Kinney and Graham (1985) proposed: 
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(2.7) 
 
Later Bangash and Bangash (2006) introduced another equation to estimate the positive 
phase duration as a function of the charge of the explosion and the peak side-on 
overpressure: 
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(2.8) 
 
If the shock wave encounters an object it will reflect from it and, depending on the size 
and geometry, diffract around it. For an incident angle of 0º the reflected pressure will 
be given by: 
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  SSr qPP 12 0   (2.9) 
 
Where PS0 is the peak overpressure, γ is the specific heat ratio and qS is the dynamic 
pressure defined as: 
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Here, ρS is the density of air and uS is the particle velocity behind the wavefront defined 
as: 
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Knowing that for air γ is 1.4, introducing Eq. (2.11) and Eq. (2.10) into Eq. (2.9) gives: 
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When the incident angle is 90º there is no reflection and the surface is loaded with the 
peak side-on overpressure. For values between 0º and 90º there is regular reflection and 
Mach reflection (Smith and Hetherington, 1994). Regular reflection occurs for angles 
between 0º and approximately 40º after which Mach reflection takes place. Figure 2.5 
shows some reflection coefficients (relation between the reflected pressure and the peak 
side-on overpressure) for a range of peak overpressure versus the incident angle. Mach 
reflection is a much more complex phenomenon also known as ‘spurt’-type effect 
(Smith and Hetherington, 1994). 
 
For design purposes the applied pressure can be idealised as a triangular shape load 
(Figure 2.6). As we can see, there are two different approaches, one is a more 
conservative approach (I) considering the maximum pressure value and the full positive 
phase duration; the second one keeps the same impulse (II) as the original curve keeping 
the same maximum pressure value but calculating the time after which the impulse 
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would be the same with the triangular shape load. In both cases the impulse is 
calculated as the area of the triangle representing the load, given as: 
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Figure 2.5 – Influence of the angle of incidence on the reflected coefficients  
(UFC 3-340-02, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 2.6 – Idealisation of the blast loading profile. 
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2.2 STRUCTURAL RESPONSE 
The complexity in analysing blast loading lays on the high velocities of deformation, 
the non-linear response of the materials and the uncertainty in the forces and 
deformations calculations. To simplify the analysis, a number of assumptions related to 
the structural response to this kind of loading has been presented and accepted in the 
scientific community. 
 
 
2.2.1 Methods of analysis 
In assessing the behaviour of blast loaded structures it is often the case that the 
calculation of the final states is the principal requirement for a designer rather than a 
detailed knowledge of its displacement-time history. To establish the main aspects of 
this kind of analysis, the response of a Single Degree Of Freedom (SDOF) elastic 
structure is considered and the link between the duration of the blast load and the 
natural period of vibration of the structure is established. 
 
In the SDOF approach the structure is idealised as an equivalent system with a 
concentrated mass, structure damping and a spring which represents the structural 
stiffness. The structural mass, M, is affected by an external force, F(t), and the structural 
response, R, is expressed in terms of the vertical displacement, y, and the spring 
constant, K. The term c represents the structure damping coefficient and it will attenuate 
the amplitude of vibration in time, see Figure 2.7. 
 
As stated earlier the loading profile is simplified as a triangular shape loading with a 
peak Fm and a positive duration td (Figure 2.8). The Force function is now given by the 
general expression: 
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Figure 2.7 – SDOF model idealisation. 
 
Figure 2.8 – Triangular shape load. 
 
Considering c=0 (undamped structure) the general solution for the response can be 
expressed as displacement, Eq. (2.15), or as velocity, Eq. (2.16) (Biggs, 1964): 
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Here, ω is the natural circular frequency of vibration of the structure, which can be 
related to the natural vibration period of the structure, T. This relation is given by: 
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The maximum response is defined by the maximum dynamic deflection ym which 
occurs at time tm. The maximum deflection can be determined by setting Eq. (2.16) 
equal to zero.  
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The dynamic load factor, DLF, is defined as the relation between the maximum 
dynamic deformation ym and the maximum static deformation yst which would have 
resulted of the static application of the peak load Fm. 
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m
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The structural response, R(t), to blast loading is greatly influenced by the relation td /T 
or ωtd. Three loading regimes are categorized as follows (Baker et al, 1980): 
 ωtd < 0.4 : impulsive loading regime (Figure 2.9a). 
This occurs when the positive phase duration is small compared with the natural 
period of vibration. In this case the force has finish acting before the structure 
has had the time to respond significantly, meaning that most of the deformations 
will occur after td. 
 ωtd > 40 : quasi-static loading regime (Figure 2.9b). 
This occurs when the positive phase duration is large compared with the natural 
period of vibration. In the limit the force may be considered as remaining 
constant whilst the structure attains the maximum deflection. 
 0.4 < ωtd < 40 : dynamic loading regime (Figure 2.9c). 
This occurs when the positive phase duration is similar to the natural period of 
vibration. In this case the structural response is more complex to evaluate. 
 
 
Figure 2.9 – Loading regimes: a) impulsive regime; b) quasi-static regime; c) dynamic 
regime. 
 
When the structure cannot be idealised as a single degree of freedom, a multiple degree 
of freedom (MDOF) analysis using numerical techniques must be carried out. Multiple 
degree of freedom systems such as multi-story frames are based on lumped-mass 
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assumptions where the number of degrees of freedom is equal to the number of types of 
motion possible within the system (Figure 2.10). For each degree of freedom, there is a 
corresponding equation of motion. These equations of motion are used to determine the 
natural frequencies of a structure and corresponding modes. 
 
 
Figure 2.10 – MDOF model idealisation. 
 
Structural elements when subjected to blast are expected to undergo large plastic 
deformations. Considering these effects as well as strain rate effects, strain hardening 
and temperature variation is possible through numerical simulations which require 
software able to perform non-linear explicit analysis, usually associated to the use of 
Finite Elements (FE). In practice Finite Element analysis techniques provide the most 
acceptable level of accuracy for the dynamic response of structures (Yandzio and 
Gough, 1999). 
 
Table 2.4 shows most of the software used in the field of blast prediction and structural 
response. Computational methods in this area are usually divided into two large groups, 
the ones used to predict the loading profiles from explosions and the ones used to 
predict the structural response. Computational programmes for blast loading prediction 
can use both empirical solutions, based on equations from the literature, or more 
advanced numerical calculations, based on Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD). 
Computational programmes for determining the structural response use, in general 
Finite Element Method (FEM). There are some programmes allowing both analyses in a 
coupled or uncoupled form. The uncoupled analysis calculates the blast load as if the 
structure was rigid and then applies these loads to a model of the structure in order to 
obtain the response. For the coupled analysis, the blast simulation is linked with the 
structural response module. In this type of analysis the computational fluid mechanics 
(CFD) model for blast-load prediction is solved simultaneously with the computational 
solid mechanics (CSM) model for structural response. Prediction of the blast induced 
pressure field on a structure and its response involve highly nonlinear behaviour. 
y1(t) y2(t)
F2(t)
F1(t)
K2K1
M1 M2
Chapter 2 – Explosion and Structures: A State of the Art 
25 
Computational methods for blast-response prediction must therefore be validated by 
comparing calculations to experimental results. 
 
In short, there are simpler methods for predicting the blast load, like ConWep, and 
simpler methods for predicting the structural response, like SDOF or MDOF available 
which can be used for the modelling of simple components, like beams, slabs, columns 
and walls. For more complex structural components or the entire building, nonlinear 
finite element analysis using explicit dynamics should be used. 
 
Table 2.4 – Software for the blast prediction and structural response. 
Name Type of analysis Author 
BLASTX Blast prediction, CFD code SAIC 
CTH Blast prediction, CFD code Sandia National Laboratories 
FEFLO Blast prediction, CFD code SAIC 
FOIL Blast prediction, CFD code Applied Research Associates, 
Waterways Experiment Station 
SHARC Blast prediction, CFD code Applied Research Associates, Inc. 
DYNA3D Structural response + CFD 
(coupled analysis) 
Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL) 
LS-DYNA Structural response + CFD 
(coupled analysis) 
Livermore Software Technology 
Corporation (LSTC) 
Air3D Blast prediction, CFD code Royal Military of Science College, 
Cranfield University 
CONWEP Blast prediction (empirical) US Army Waterways Experiment 
Station 
AUTO-DYN Structural response + CFD 
(coupled analysis) 
Century Dynamics 
ABAQUS Structural response + CFD 
(coupled analysis) 
ABAQUS Inc. 
 
 
2.2.2 Material behaviour  
Different loading conditions lead to different strain rates. Quasi-static loading produce 
strain rates of around 10-5 s-1, while impacts and blast loading produce strain rates of 
well over 100 s-1 (Ngo et al, 2007). When subjected to dynamic loading conditions, 
materials can have a much different behaviour when compared with their static 
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behaviour (Meyers, 1994; Hiermaier, 2008; Ngo et al, 2004; Stavrogin and Tarasov, 
2001). Current design on structural response and damage under impact and blast loading 
assumes typically static material properties (Baylot et al, 2005; Moreland et al, 2005). 
This can lead to an inaccurate prediction of structural damage and fragmentation. 
 
 
Figure 2.11 – Expected strain rates for different loading conditions (Ngo et al, 2007). 
 
Concrete under dynamic loading conditions shows quite different mechanical properties 
when compared with those under static loading. While the dynamic stiffness does not 
vary a great deal from the static stiffness, the stresses that are sustained for a certain 
period of time under dynamic conditions may gain values remarkably higher than the 
static compressive strength, see Figure 2.12 (Ngo et al, 2004). Grote et al (2001) 
reported strength magnification factors as high as four in compression up to six in 
tension for strain rates ranging from 102 to 103/s. 
 
The increase in the peak compressive stress (fc), is introduced in the CEB-FIP (1990) as 
a DIF (Dynamic Increase Factor, i.e. a ratio of the dynamic to static parameters’ values) 
and can be determined as: 
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Where log γ = 6.156α – 2 and fco = 10 MPa. 
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Malvar and Ross (1998) proposed a DIF equation for tensile strength of concrete, ft: 
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Where fco = 10 MPa. 
 
 
Figure 2.12 – Stress-strain curves of concrete at different strain-rates (Ngo et al, 2004). 
 
Asprone et al (2009a) verified the accuracy of CEB and Malvar formulations using a 
modified Hopkinson bar for tensile tests. It was shown that the CEB formulation 
underestimates the tensile strength of concrete, while the Malvar and Ross formulation 
overestimates the tensile strength. Ruiz et al (2010) studied the influence of the 
displacement rate, , in the fracture energy, Gf, of high-strength concrete. It was shown 
that the compressive fracture energy is enhanced with the increase of the displacement 
rate; and this effect is more significant after the displacement rate of 7.04×102 mm/s. 
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In reinforcement steel and due to its isotropic behaviour, their elastic and inelastic 
response to dynamic loading is easier to monitor and assess. Norris et al (1959) tested 
steel with two different static yield strengths of 330 MPa and 278 MPa under tension at 
strain rates ranging from 10-5 to 0.1 s-1. An increase of strength was found in both steel 
types of 9-21% and 10-23% respectively. Dowling and Harding (1967) conducted 
tensile experiments using the tensile version of Split Hopkinton’s Pressure Bar on mild 
steel using strain rates ranging from 10-3 to 2000 s-1, and it was shown that the yield 
strength of mild steel can be almost doubled, and the ultimate tensile strength can be 
increased by about 50%. Malvar and Ross (1998) also studied this phenomenon and 
described the strength enhancement of steel reinforcing bars under the effect of high 
strain rates in terms of DIF, which can be evaluated for different steel grades and for 
yield stresses, fy, ranging from 290 MPa to 710 MPa: 
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UFC 3-340-02 (2008) also presents the stress-strain relations for concrete and 
reinforcement bars, as shown in Figure 2.13 and Figure 2.14 respectively. This 
normative document takes into account the effect of high strain rates in the form of a 
DIF. In Table 2.5 we can see the DIF values for concrete and reinforcement bars 
presented in UFC 3-340-02 (2008) according to the design range and the type of stress. 
Here, far and close-in design ranges are related to the location of the element relative to 
the explosion. 
 
In case of masonry structures and its components, the available literature is even more 
scattered. Recently Hao and Tarasov (2008) conducted an experimental study under 
dynamic uniaxial compression using a Triaxial Static-Dynamic Testing Machine. These 
authors reported a DIF for the compressive strength of around 2.3 and 1.12 for the DIF 
of the ultimate strain, for a strain rate of 150 s-1. For the Young’s modulus a DIF of 1.95 
was reported for the same level of strain rate. 
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Figure 2.13 – Stress-strain relation for concrete, UFC 3-340-02 (2008). 
 
 
Figure 2.14 – Stress-strain relation for reinforcement steel, UFC 3-340-02 (2008). 
 
Table 2.5 – DIF values for RC members, UFC 3-340-02 (2008). 
Type of Stress 
Far Design Range Close-in Design Range 
Reinforcement bars Concrete 
Reinforcement 
Bars 
Concrete 
fdy/fy fdu/fu fdc/fc fdy/fy fdu/fu fdc/fc 
Bending 1.17 1.05 1.19 1.23 1.05 1.25 
Diagonal Tension 1.00 -- 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.00 
Direct shear 1.10 1.00 1.10 1.10 1.00 1.10 
Bond 1.17 1.05 1.00 1.23 1.05 1.00 
Compression 1.10 -- 1.12 1.13 -- 1.16 
 
Burnett et al (2007) presented results from dynamic tensile experiments on mortar joint 
using a specially design Slipt Hopkinson pressure bar. Their results showed that there is 
a dynamic enhancement of the mortar strength at strain rate of 1 s-1, with a DIF of 3.1. 
Asprone et al (2009b) studied this effect on a specific Italian stone using Hydo-
Pneumatic Machine and a modified Hopkinson bar for tensile tests. The tensile strength 
of this type of stone showed an increase of three times the static reference. 
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2.3 CODES AND STANDARDS 
Federal standards and criteria in USA are widely recognized as the primary source of 
guidelines for the design of buildings to resist blast loading. Because of the uniqueness 
of each building mission, functional requirements and physical security design 
objectives, there are limited codes and standards that apply to blast mitigation design. 
Although the majority of these design guidelines were focused on military applications 
such knowledge is relevant for civil design practice. A list of the most referenced 
guidelines includes: 
 Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions, UFC 3-340-02 
(Unified Facilities Criteria, 2008) – This manual appears to be the most widely 
used publication by both military and civil organizations for designing structures 
to prevent the propagation of an explosion and to provide protection for 
personnel and valuable equipment. 
 Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, UFC 4-010-01 (Unified 
Facilities Criteria, 2012) – This document represents a significant commitment 
by USA Department of Defence (DoD) to seek effective ways to minimize the 
likelihood of mass casualties from terrorist attacks against DoD personnel in the 
buildings in which they work and live. 
 Design of Buildings to Resist Progressive Collapse, UFC 4-023-03 (Unified 
Facilities Criteria, 2009) – This document provides the design requirements 
necessary to reduce the potential of progressive collapse for new and existing 
facilities that experience localized structural damage through normally 
unforeseeable events such as explosions. 
 A Manual for the Prediction of Blast and Fragment Loading on Structures, 
DOE/TIC-11268 (U.S. Department of Energy, 1992) – This manual provide 
guidance to the designers of facilities subjected to accidental explosions and aids 
in the assessment of the explosion-resistant capabilities of existing buildings. 
 Protective Construction Design Manual, ESL-TR-87-57 (Air Force Engineering 
and Services Center, 1989) – This manual provide procedures for the analysis 
and design of protective structures exposed to the effects of conventional (non-
nuclear) weapons and is intended for use by engineers with basic knowledge of 
weapons effects, structural dynamics and hardened protective structures. 
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 Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons Effects, 
UFC 3-340-01 (Unified Facilities Criteria, 2002) – This manual provides 
procedure for the design and analysis of protective structures subjected to the 
effects of conventional weapons. It is for use by engineers involved in designing 
hardened facilities, e.g. bunkers. 
 Structural Design for Physical Security – State of the Practice Report (ASCE, 
1999) – This document is a guideline for engineers who would like to 
incorporate security aspects in their projects.  
 
 
2.4 FINAL REMARKS 
This chapter has provided a summary of blast related definitions, details on explosive 
mechanisms and explosives; methods to determine the pressure and impulse values 
originated by an explosion; and the interactions between the blast waves and the 
structure, as well as the forces applied to the structure when subjected to blast loading. 
It should be noted that the level of damage suffered by a structure cannot be determined 
solely from knowledge of the pressure and impulse values from a particular explosion. 
It is also of great importance to know the characteristics of the blasted-loaded building, 
in particular the dynamic properties of the used materials, the dynamic properties of the 
structure and the shape of the structure. There are methods available to determine the 
structure response when subjected to blast loading, ranging from simpler methods like 
SDOF up to the use of commercial software using FE to perform explicit dynamic 
analysis. 
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Chapter 3 
3 ASSESSING BLAST LOADING PARAMETERS FROM 
POST-DISASTER SCENARIOS 
 
The vulnerability of civilian buildings when exposed to explosions has been shown by 
the latest terrorist attacks or industrial accidents. A blast wave from an explosion acting 
directly on a building can cause major economic and human losses. As result, the 
number of studies in the structural response, retrofitting and repairing of structures has 
increased in the last years. As experimental full-scale test are expensive, numerical 
analysis plays a very important role in the development of knowledge in this field. 
 
When dealing with blast loading problems the first issue to be addressed is the 
magnitude of the loading, meaning overpressures and impulses. This is important when 
trying to design or protect against explosions, when it is mandatory to know the 
magnitude of what to protect or design for; and, in a post-blast phase, when dealing with 
accident investigations or to be aware of magnitudes in past incidents to protect for 
possible future incidents. 
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3.1 ASSESSING BLAST LOADING PARAMETERS THROUGH PRESSURE 
INDICATORS 
In Chapter 2 from this document different methods for assessing blast loading 
parameters were presented, being empirical or numerical. Empirical methods use mainly 
equations derived for military applications, assuming High Explosive (HE) as a point 
source explosive. Numerical methods through the use of advanced Computational Fluid 
Dynamics (CFD) formulation are able to determine the pressure distribution for both 
HE and Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCE), however these analysis are usually time 
consuming and require advanced training. 
 
Another method to assess blast load parameters in the event of an explosion, either HE 
or VCE, is to assess the damage of the explosion and relate this damage with the 
overpressures and impulses that could have damaged the structure. This becomes easier 
if smaller, simpler structures are chosen to be studied. Metal switch boxes, oil drums, 
car, tanks, trees, pipes etc, makes good pressure indicators. Metal swith boxes in 
particular are small, ductile structures capable of withstanding large deformations. 
These pressure indicators or sub-structures can also provide data on the direction of the 
blast wave, making it easier to identify the source of the blast in case of HE, or the 
ignition source in case of vapour cloud explosion. 
 
The objective is to relate the level of damage observed with the overpressures and 
impulses that could generate that level of damage. There are some commonly accepted 
damage figures from blast overpressures, such as Table 3.1, which can be used for 
comparative purposes. However, care has to be taken in using this data as it does not 
take into account the duration of the pressure wave (impulse), but only considers its 
maximum overpressure. 
 
Dealing with small, simple structures makes it easier to represent a pressure-impulse (P-
I) or a iso-damage curve, which provide the load-impulse combination that caused a 
specific level of damage to be assessed very readily, as it will be shown later in this 
document.   
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This chapter is intended to give insight on the determination of blast loading 
parameters. This work has been done in collaboration with Kingston University 
London, UK and the Fire and Explosion Study Centre in London, UK in the framework 
of the Buncefield Major Incident Investigation. The most relevant aspect is to study the 
possibility of estimating the magnitude of explosions by using pressure indicators or 
sub-structures. Using common objects present within and in the neighbourhood of most 
of industrial buildings, such as steel switch boxes, cars or oil drums as reference 
samples, it is possible to estimate the overpressures in case of an explosion by building 
a relation between the residual permanent deformation with pressure/impulse 
responsible for such deformation. Finally, pressure-impulse (P-I) diagrams can help 
future accident investigations by backtracking the overpressures and impulses according 
to the observed damage in those specific sub-structures. 
 
Table 3.1 – Commonly accepted figures for damage and harm to people from blast 
overpressure (SCI, 2009). 
Pressure (kPa) Damage 
0.7 Breakage of small windows under strain 
6.3 Roof damage to oil storage tanks 
10.3-20 People knocked down or thrown to the ground 
21-28 Rupture of oil tanks 
56-70 Brick walls demolished 
206-240 Near 100% fatality from lung haemorrhage 
490 Collapse of heavy masonry or concrete bridges 
 
 
3.2 BUNCEFIELD MAJOR INCIDENT 
The Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot is a large tank farm occupied by three 
companies (Figure 3.1): Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited a joint venture between 
Total UK Limited and Shevron Limited; United Kingdom Oil Pipelines Limited and 
West London Pipeline and Storage Limited whose site is operated by British Pipeline 
Agency Limited; and British Petroleum Oil UK Limited. 
 
The Buncefield explosion (11 December 2005) resulted in tremendous damage to the 
outlying area and huge fires involving 23 large oil fuel tanks. One important aspect of 
the incident was the severity of the explosion (Figure 3.2), which would not have been 
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anticipated in any major hazard assessment of the oil storage depot before the incident. 
The area covered by the vapour cloud was estimated to be around 120 000 m2 and the 
average height of the cloud was around 2 m giving a volume of 240 000 m3. 
Overpressures within the area of the cloud were found to be consistently high. From a 
combination of damage assessment and comparative testing and analysis it was 
concluded that the overpressure within the cloud was generally greater than 200 kPa. 
Overpressure diminished rapidly with distance away from the edge of the cloud; 
evidence suggests overpressures in the region of 5-10 kPa within 150 m (SCI, 2009). 
 
Evidence shows that the main explosion probably resulted from ignition of a vapour 
cloud emanating from Tank 912 in Bund A in the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited 
West side, see Figure 3.1, most likely resulting from an overfill of unleaded petrol.  
 
Detailed modelling of the area immediately surrounding the emergency pump house 
supports the hypothesis that the trees and undergrowth along Three Cherry Lane caused 
flame acceleration to a velocity of several hundred m/s; at such high flame speeds a 
transition to detonation is considered possible. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Schematic of Buncefield site and surrounding area (SCI, 2009). 
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a) b) 
Figure 3.2 – Damaged areas in Buncefield after explosion: a) view at ground level; 
b) view at air level (SCI, 2009). 
 
The following time line of events describes the incident in Buncefield Oil Depot from 
10th December to 15th December 2005 (SCI, 2009): 
 
10 December 2005: 
 Around 19:00, Tank 912 in Bund A at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited 
West site started receiving unleaded motor fuel from the T/K pipeline, pumping 
at about 550 m3/hour. 
11 December 2005:  
 Around 00:00 the terminal was closed to tankers and stock check of products 
was carried out. When this was completed, at around 01:30, no abnormalities 
were reported.  
 From approximately 03:00, the level gauge for Tank 912 recorded an unchanged 
reading. However, filling of Tank 912 continued at a rate of around 550 
m3/hour.  
 Around 05:20 Tank 912 would have been completely full and starting to 
overflow. From this time onwards, continued pumping caused fuel cascade 
down the side of the tank and through the air, leading to the rapid formation of a 
rich fuel/air mixture in Bund A.  
 At 05:38 vapour cloud from the escaping fuel is first visible in a CCTV footage 
from a camera looking down western edge of Bund A, flowing out of the north-
west corner of Bund A towards the west.  
 At 05:46 the vapour cloud had thickened to a depth of about 2 m and was 
flowing out of Bund A in all directions.  
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 At 05:50 the vapour cloud had started flowing off site near the junction of 
Cherry Tree Lane and Buncefield Lane, following the ground topography. It 
spread west into Northgate House (n. 2 in Figure 3.1) and Fuji car parks (n. 1 in 
Figure 3.1) and towards Catherine House (n. 13 in Figure 3.1).  
 Between 05:50 and 06:00 the pumping rate down the T/K pipeline to 
Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited West, and onwards to Tank 912, gradually 
rose to about 890 m3/hour.  
 At 06:01 the vapour cloud extended to the west almost as far as Boundary Way 
in the gaps between the 3-Com, Northgate and Fuji buildings; to the north-west 
it extended as far as the nearest corner of Catherine House. It probably extended 
to the north of the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited site as far as Tank 12, and 
probably extended south across part of the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited 
site, but not as far as the tanker filling gantry. To the west it reached the British 
Pipeline Agency Limited site. At this same time the first explosion occurred, 
followed by further explosions and a large fire that engulfed over 20 large 
storage tanks. The main explosion event appears to have been centred on the car 
parks between the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited West site and the Fuji and 
Northgate buildings. 
 At 06:08 an emergency services major incident was declared and operational 
command and control was set up near the incident site within minutes. 
 At 09:00 an extensive plume of smoke from burning fuel dispersed over 
southern England and beyond. The plume could be seen from many kilometres 
away, and was also clearly identified in satellite images. 
12 December 2005:  
 At 12:00 the peak of the fire was reached, 20 Hertfordshire pumps were on site 
with 20 support vehicles and 180 fire-fighters. 
15 December 2005: 
 “Fire all out” was declared by the fire services after 786 000 litres of foam 
concentrate and 68 millions of water were used to contain the incident during the 
period of fire-fighting operations. 
 
An explosion can be produced when a gas cloud is ignited within a confined volume 
such as a building. As the flame propagates through the gas cloud it produces hot 
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combustion products. The confinement prevents expansion of these combustion 
products and, as a consequence, the pressure increases. In general, this continues until 
the confining structure fails, in some cases catastrophically. This mechanism does not 
explain the type of explosion that occurred at Buncefield as the majority of the cloud 
was not confined. It is recognised that two “confined explosions” did occur, but these 
events alone could not explain the severity of the overall explosion. These finding lead 
to believe that in fact there was a detonation mechanism arising from the deflagration 
mechanism through the increase of the flame front velocity. A better description of 
these mechanism is given is Chapter 2. 
 
The investigation was directed by Health and Safety Commission (HSC) which 
produced several reports of the investigation process and can be assessed in 
http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/. 
 
 
3.3 ASSESSING BLAST LOAD PARAMETERS THROUGH SUB-STRUCTURES 
With the objective of aiding the Buncefield Major Incident investigation experimental 
work was performed on sub-structures. These sub-structures, such as steel drums, cars 
and metal switch boxes, were subjected to HE (High Explosives) in air blast, gas 
explosion through VCE (Vapour Cloud Explosion) and hydrostatic pressure tests. The 
results are presented in the following sections. 
 
 
3.3.1 Steel drums 
Steel drums were located in various parts of the site. These included full, partially 
empty and empty drums. In many cases the prior location of the drums could be 
determined. Overall translational displacements during the explosion were relatively 
small (less than 5 meters). 
 
The deformation characteristic of the top of the drum is a good overpressure indicator, 
including the end plate and the section of side wall near the end plate. Similar 
deformation of the top of a drum can be reproduced in a static hydraulic test. Figure 3.3 
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shows the result of a test at an imposed pressure of 300 kPa. In these tests, drums were 
filled with concrete up to the liquid level indicated by the undeformed drum part in 
Figure 3.3. This is necessary to simulate the same type of failure observed in the 
explosion due to the inertia of the liquid. The results indicate a static overpressure in 
excess of 200 kPa in this location. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – Oil drum after static hydraulic test with fully plastic longitudinal sidewall 
buckling in the ullage (SCI, 2009). 
 
Gas explosion tests carried out on empty oil drums did not produce the level of 
deformation observed in both static tests and objects in Buncefield at overpressure of up 
to 180 kPa. The deformation in those tests was largely restricted to the side (Figure 
3.4a). At the highest pressure test, the end plates of the drum exhibited a limited amount 
of distortion seen in Figure 3.4b, it did not extend through the entire circumference and 
the amount of deformation was small. The gas explosion test results on end plate 
distortion indicated an overpressure of over 180 kPa and are consistent with those from 
hydraulic tests. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 3.4 – Oil drums after gas explosion tests: a) empty oil drum after 180 kPa gas 
explosion; b) drum cap end (SCI, 2009).  
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3.3.2 Cars 
Around 20 cars were in the area covered by the vapour cloud in Buncefield. All of them 
were badly damaged (Figure 3.5). 
 
 
Figure 3.5 – Typical car damage at Buncefield (SCI, 2009). 
 
Enclosed gas explosion tests were carried out by Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) 
and Figure 3.6 shows some of the cars after the tests, sorted by increasing overpressure. 
The results of these tests show that pressure of well over 100 kPa and a rapid rise in 
overpressure are required to cause anything like the damage observed at Buncefield. 
Unfortunately during the final test it was not possible to record the overpressures so no 
better estimate can be made of the minimum overpressure. 
 
There were also tests carried out by British Petroleum involving five cars positioned at 
various distances and various orientations (Figure 3.7) and subjected to a HE charge of 
about 170 kg equivalent TNT. They were positioned so that they would be exposed to 
overpressures ranging from 170 kPa to 1 MPa peak side-on overpressure for a duration 
of the positive phase between 10 to 12 ms.  
 
As shown in Figure 3.8a one of the cars was positioned in front of a wall which 
provided a more even pressure load on the vehicle as well as increased the pressure 
impulse the car experienced. The damage observed in many cases was limited to panel 
deformation while the underlying supporting structure remained intact. Figure 3.8a 
shows the side of cars which had been exposed to a peak side-on overpressure of 200 to 
300 kPa.  
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a) b) c) 
Figure 3.6 – View of cars exposed to gas explosion, sorted by increasing overpressure 
exposure (SCI, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 3.7 – Arrangement of the cars before the test explosion (SCI, 2009). 
 
Similar pattern of damage was observer for other cars. Figure 3.8b shows a Ford Sierra 
exposed to a peak side-on overpressure of 400 kPa. Major structural damage was 
observed at a peak side-on overpressure of 1 MPa, like shown in Figure 3.9 where the 
damage was caused by a peak side-on overpressure of about 1 MPa with a positive 
duration of 11 ms. 
 
a) b) 
Figure 3.8 – Cars after HE explosion tests: a) nose oriented; b) side oriented 
(SCI, 2009). 
 
Chapter 3 – Assessing Blast Loading Parameters from Post-Disaster Scenarios 
45 
There were other tests carried out by the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI) in the UK and Engineering Research Development Centre 
(ERDC) in the USA on vehicles exposed to high blast overpressures from a range of 
explosive charges including ANFO. Details of these tests are classified. But the results 
of the BP tests described here are consistent with those by CPNI and ERDC. The results 
showed that for significant structural damage similar to the one observed in Buncefield, 
a peak side-on overpressure of well over 200 kPa is required. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 – Car damaged with a peak side-on overpressure of about 1 MPa  
(SCI, 2009). 
 
Cars are complex structures, the response of which to blast loading could be different. 
The test results showed that fairly high explosion overpressure is required to deform a 
vehicle causing its structural damage. The BP tests described were only able to deform 
the vehicle predominantly on one side, whereas, the Buncefield vehicles were uniformly 
crushed indicating that the pressure loading was uniform around the vehicles. From 
damage observed in the BP tests, the overpressure required to cause the level of damage 
observed in Buncefield was estimated to be around 1 MPa with duration of the positive 
phase of 11 ms. However, due to the different overpressure characteristics between gas 
explosion and HE, from other available data, it is likely that overpressures experienced 
by cars at Buncefield exceeded 200 kPa for durations typical of gas explosion in the 
open (around 50 ms). 
 
 
3.3.3 Steel switch boxes 
A number of switch boxes (Figure 3.10) were tested under a different range of loading 
conditions trying to reproduce the damage observed in Buncefield. A series of tests with 
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metal switch boxes in enclosed gas explosions was carried out. The switch boxes 
showed no sign of deformation or any damage except in the last test where the 
maximum overpressure was 180 kPa. The damage suffered by the box was relatively 
minor, when compared with those observed in Buncefield, with a maximum 
deformation of 11 mm. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 3.10 – Metal switch boxes (SCI, 2009). 
 
Some static hydraulic testing of small boxes (300×300×130 mm3) has been carried out 
in a diving equipment test chamber at HSL. Pressurisation used air in a cylinder 
reservoir and was completed in approximately 2 seconds. An applied overpressure of 
100 kPa caused minimal damage to the box as shown in Figure 3.11. 
 
Application of a pressure of 400 kPa over a period of 2 seconds caused substantial 
plastic deformation of the box back and sides (Figure 3.12). The front was only slightly 
deformed. The pressurisation was slow enough to allow very large amplitude 
deformation via the first observed failure. This caused an internal pressure rise and tore 
the welding, allowing rapid inflow of water. The lack of large amplitude deformation of 
the front of the box in Figure 3.12 does not mean this could not have occurred if the box 
had been exposed to a rising rapidly to 400 kPa pressure. 
 
Switch boxes were also exposed to blast overpressures from HE in a number of tests. 
Two box sizes were used, made from carbon steel. HE produces pressure waves of 
different characteristics to those from gas explosions – blast wave from HE has a much 
shorter duration when compared with a gas explosion and the wave profile is also 
different. Peak side-on overpressures ranged from 100 to 800 kPa. It was observed that 
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the panel of the box facing the blast could reproduce the damage observed in 
Buncefield. A more detailed description of this HE tests can be found in Section 3.4.1 
of this document. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 3.11 – Damaged small box after 100 kPa in the static hydraulic test: a) closed 
box; b) open box (SCI, 2009). 
 
The switch boxes were found to be unexpectly strong. The smaller boxes (300×300×130 
mm3) were much stronger than the larger ones (600×600×600 mm3) in resisting 
overpressures. Static pressure tests showed that the box can withstand 100 kPa 
overpressure with minor damage. A 400 kPa static loading was capable of crushing a 
small switch box. Both the gas explosion and the HE tests indicated that damage at 
about 200 kPa, for a range of explosion duration of about 50 ms, is minor. Results 
indicated that the pressure required to cause the level of damage at Buncefield exceeds 
200 kPa. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 3.12 – Damaged small box after 400 kPa in the static hydraulic test: a) side view; 
b) back view (SCI, 2009). 
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3.4 ISO-DAMAGE CURVES 
The damage of a structure when subjected to blast loading is dependent on the impulse 
and the pressure. It is possible to plot P-I (pressure-impulse) diagrams or Iso-damage 
curves (Figure 3.13) which allow to define in an easy way the pressure impulse 
combination that will cause a specific level of damage.  
 
 
Figure 3.13 – Generic P-I (Pressure-Impulse) diagram. 
 
These plots establish a relation between the pressure/impulse and the permanent 
deformation on a structure. To do so, either experimental tests or FE (Finite Element) 
modelling are used to predict the structural response; several experimental or numerical 
simulations are required for a selected range of overpressures and durations (impulses).  
 
In the following section, the experimental work done to calibrate the FE model will be 
shown together with the FE modelling used to generate P-I diagrams for metal switch 
boxes under blast loading from High Explosives. 
 
 
3.4.1 Experimental analysis 
A number of switch boxes were exposed to blast overpressure from HE in a number of 
tests. These boxes were carbon steel boxes. In each test, boxes were placed at locations 
to receive specific overpressure loading for the explosive charge used. Figure 3.14 
shows a typical general arrangement. It can be seen that, for each test, two boxes (one 
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large box and one small box) had the front face facing the charge and another two (one 
large box and one small box) had its side face facing the charge. 
 
Peak side-on overpressures, PS0, in tests ranged from 100 kPa to 800 kPa. The reflected 
pressure, Pr (pressure experienced by the side of the box that faced the charge) ranged 
from 320 kPa to 5 MPa. The duration of the highest peak side-on overpressure was 
about 8 ms and the duration of the lowest peak side-on overpressure was about 17 ms 
for the positive phase of the blast wave. These are within the range of pressure durations 
expected in detonations.  
 
The characteristic damage was predominantly by crushing of the side facing the blast. 
This is different from the damage observed in Buncefield where boxes were crushed on 
all faces. One of the characteristics of these HE tests is that pressure decayed rapidly at 
these levels of overpressure. Thus, the peak side-on pressure on the face closer to the 
charge is larger than the face at the back or the lateral faces. It is noted that in some 
cases the back face was pushed outwards (rather than crushed inwards). This is due to 
the effect of adiabatic compression. The crushing of the front face caused an increase in 
internal pressure which deformed the back face outwards. These factors contributed for 
the difference in observed damage patterns between the boxes tested and those in 
Buncefield. However the deformation suffered by the side facing the blast provided 
indicative overpressures required to crush boxes observed in Buncefield. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 3.14 – General scheme of the experimental study: a) two different box sizes; 
b) box orientation facing the blast (SCI, 2009). 
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Figure 3.15 shows the deformation of the panels which faced the blast wave for the 
large boxes. These four boxes were exposed to the values of peak side-on overpressure 
and reflected pressure registered in Table 3.2 for the front face and the side face.  
 
Figure 3.16 shows the deformation of the panels which faced the blast wave for the 
small boxes. No significant deformation was registered for the lower values of peak 
side-on overpressure. In Table 3.2 it is possible to identify the tests carried out and the 
respectively pressures and impulses. After the test, the boxes were measured in terms of 
residual deformation and the results were recorded.  
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 3.15 – Large boxes after HE tests: a) boxes hit on the front panel; b) boxes hit on 
the side panel (SCI, 2009). 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 3.16 – Small boxes after HE tests: a) boxes hit on the front panel; b) boxes hit on 
the side panel (SCI, 2009). 
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Table 3.2 – Reflected pressures and impulses for the experimental tests. 
Test Reflected Pressure (MPa) 
Reflected 
Impulse (kPa.s) 
T1 0.65 4.70 
T2 0.32 2.60 
T3 2.39 13.80 
T4 5.20 20.80 
 
 
3.4.2 FE modelling 
Previous studies have shown different methods to predict the structure response to blast 
loading. Studies lead to satisfactory results in the prediction of the permanent 
deformations of structures subjected to blast loading using SDOF (Single Degree of 
Freedom) models according to Yang et al (1997), Liew et al (2008), Fisher et al (2009), 
Jones et al (2009) and Schleyer et al (2009). This approach has however several 
limitations. With the increase of computers capacity and the constant development of 
software, the FE (Finite Elements) method has been getting the attention of the 
scientific community in the past few years.  
 
Several studies in metal structures modelled using FE subjected to blast loading are 
available in order to give insight on the particularities of the modelling in terms of 
software and material response. Yuen et al (2005) studied the response of quadrangular 
stiffened plates subjected to uniform blast loading. They have also investigated the 
deformation of mild steel plates subjected to large-scale explosions. According to their 
results the use of the Hopkinson-Cranz scaling laws have proven to be useful to 
evaluate pressures, time durations and impulses; and the use of proper explicit dynamic 
codes can lead to a reasonable agreement with experimental results. 
 
Baldeen and Nurick (2005), Theobald and Nurick (2007) and Bonorchis and Nurick 
(2009) studied the influence of boundary conditions of the loading of rectangular plates 
subjected to localized blast loading. They showed that axial crushing of tubes 
sandwiched between steel panels could be used to absorb significant energy from a blast 
load and studied the post-failure motion of steel plates subjected to blast loading. 
Sabuwala et al (2005) analysed beam to column connections subjected to blast loads, 
showing that the UFC 3-340-02 (2008) over-designs these elements. Krauthammer 
(1999) proposed a model to predict the behaviour of structural concrete and structural 
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steel connections subjected to blast loading conducting a series of numerical simulations 
and concluded that the current design procedures should be modified for a better 
prediction under these loading conditions. Børvic et al (2008a, 2008b) managed to 
predict the structural response of a protective structure subjected to blast loading using 
LS-DYNA achieving a good relation with the deformations verified in the experimental 
studies. Hanssen et al (2002) investigated the behaviour of aluminium foam panels 
subjected to blast loading, using an analytical approach and the non-linear finite element 
analysis provided the same conclusions. Jama et al (2009) through numerical modelling 
studied square tubular steel beams subjected to transverse blast loading using LS-
DYNA and concluded that these elements undergo local cross-sectional deformation 
followed by global beam bending deformation and highlighted the importance of the 
strain-rate hardening for proper detail in both local and global deformation. 
 
Børvic et al (2009) compared the response given using the coupled formulation and the 
pure Lagrangian formulation. The results showed a good agreement obtaining the 
pressure-time profiles of the blast when using two different approaches: a) specialized 
software, in this case ConWep (ConWep, 1991) or; b) empirical equations available in 
the literature (UFC 3-340-02, 2008; Mays and Smith, 1995; Bangash and Bangash, 
2006). To model loading conditions on the switch boxes the pressure-time recorded in 
the experimental studies was applied to the structure using a pure Lagrangian 
formulation. The steel material was modelled using an isotropic hardening model, 
pertaining to the Von Mises yield condition, and strain rate-dependent dynamic yield 
stress based on Cowper and Symonds model (Børvic et al, 2009).  
 
In this work, the Finite Element (FE) software LS-DYNA was used to model this blast 
loading problem. This software allows three different approaches: (i) Pure Lagrangian 
formulation, in which the load is idealised as a pressure-time curve applied directly to 
the surface; (ii) Running an Eulerian simulation before the Lagrangian simulation, the 
objective is to obtain the pressure-time load on all faces around the structure; (iii) The 
Eulerian formulation can be applied with the Lagrangian formulation to have a full 
coupling between the blast waves and the structure deformations, even if the use of the 
coupled Eulerian-Lagrangian formulation increases considerably the computational time 
(LS-DYNA User’s Manual, 1997).  
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To model the switch boxes the pressure-time recorded in the experimental studies was 
applied to the structure and a pure Lagrangian formulation for the explicit simulation 
was used. The box was modelled with thin-shell elements specific for explicit dynamic 
analysis, with a thickness of 1.5 mm; the dimensions are presented in Figure 3.17 for 
the small box (for the large box the design is similar but with 600×600×230 mm3). The 
FE model was based on Belytschko-Lin-Tsay quadrilateral shell elements (LS-DYNA 
User’s Manual, 1997).  
 
The steel was modelled using a piecewise linear hardening law, pertaining to the Von 
Mises yield condition with isotropic strain hardening, and strain rate-dependent 
dynamic yield stress based on the Cowper and Symonds model. According to previous 
researches on modelling metal structures under these extreme actions, the results 
obtained in the experimental work and the expected strain rates for this kind of action, 
the mechanical properties to be adopted are: a Young’s modulus of 210 GPa, a yield 
stress of 1000 MPa and a Poisson’s ratio 0.28, shown in Figure 3.18. For pratical 
purposes, the behaviour is elastic/perfectly plastic, with a very low Young’s modulus in 
the second branch. 
 
 
Figure 3.17 – Scheme of the small switch box [mm]. 
 
The applied load was modelled as a pressure time curve with a triangular shape as 
shown in Figure 3.19. In the side facing the blast the reflected pressure was applied and 
also in all other faces the incident pressure was applied. In all cases the pressure was 
applied inwards as seen in Figure 3.19 for the situation where the box has the side face 
towards the explosion. 
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Figure 3.18 – Material dynamic properties. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 3.19 – Applied load: a) generic triangular shape; b) pressures acting on the box. 
 
After defining the material properties and the geometric model of our boxes, several 
simulations were carried out. The first step was to reproduce in FEM the experimental 
results produced in the previous section. At this stage four situations were defined:  
 small box with the side panel facing the blast (SBS); 
 small box with the front panel facing the blast (SBF); 
 large box with the side panel facing the blast (LBS); 
 large box with the front panel facing the blast (LBF). 
 
Figure 3.20 represents one example of a numerical simulation of the large box with the 
front face facing the blast. The deformed shape evolution in time is such that, although 
all faces are subjected to inwards pressure, the highest value of the reflected pressure 
related to the incident pressure forces, in some cases, the side faces with a deformed 
shape in the opposite direction of the loading. This is consistent with the experimental 
tests. 
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Figure 3.20 – Deformed shape of the FE model for the large box hit on the front. 
 
Figure 3.21 shows the comparison between the numerical study of the small box hit on 
the side with the respective experimental specimen, with the evolution in time of the 
deformed shape. The same damage pattern in both numerical and experimental tests can 
be found. 
 
Condensing the results of numerical and experimental studies, a comparison can be 
established in Table 3.3. There were situations where the comparison had to be made in 
a panel other than the one facing the blast and some cases where it was not possible to 
compare at all; this is due to severe damage in some experimentally tested boxes. 
 
The results show a difference, in terms of percentage ranging from 3.8% to 32.7% and 
range of 0.2 to 32.4 mm in terms of maximum displacement. As expected, the greater 
the pressure, greater the deformation in both numerical and experimental studies. Also 
the higher differences are registered for the large boxes when compared with the small 
boxes. The boxes hit on the front also showed larger differences when compared with 
those hit on the side face. When the deformation increases, the difference between the 
numerical and experimental tests also increases.  
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 3.21 – Comparison of the FE model with the experimental data: a) FE deformed 
shape; b) small box with the side panel facing the blast. 
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Table 3.3 – Summary of the comparison between the numerical and experimental 
analyses. 
Test 
Residual 
Deformation (mm) 
Difference  
(mm)  
[%] 
Comments 
Exp. Num. 
Ir=2.6 kN.s 
(T2) 
SBF 15.7 19.0 
3.3 
 (17.1%) 
Deformation measured in 
the side facing the blast. 
LBS 20.0 23.9 
3.9  
(16.4%) 
Deformation measured in 
the front face. 
LBF 94.1 126.5 
32.4 
(25.6%) 
Deformation measured in 
the side facing the blast. 
Ir =4.7 kN.s 
(T1) 
SBF 1.6 1.4 
0.2  
(10.4%) 
Deformation measured in 
the side face. 
LBS 25.5 17.2 
8.3  
(32.7%) 
Deformation measured in 
the side face. 
LBF 32.9 30.2 
2.7  
(8.2%) 
Deformation measured in 
the side face. 
Ir =13.8 kN.s 
(T3) 
SBS 56.0 53.9 
2.1  
(3.8%) 
Deformation measured in 
the side facing the blast. 
SBF 7.4 6.6 
0.8  
(11.7%) 
Deformation measured in 
the back face. 
LBS 124.9 142.4 
17.5 
(12.3%) 
Deformation measured in 
the side facing the blast. 
Ir =20.8 kN.s 
(T4) 
SBS 16.4 13.2 
3.2  
(19.6%) 
Deformation measured in 
the side face. 
SBF 29.8 40.2 
10.4 
(25.9%) 
Deformation measured in 
the side face. 
LBF 27.1 30.2 
3.1  
(10.1%) 
Deformation measured in 
the back face. 
 
 
3.4.3 Final plots 
In order to produce the final P-I diagrams from these sub-structures when subjected to 
blast loading, a new set of numerical simulations took place. Several similar simulations 
were made by ranging both the peak side-on overpressure/reflected pressure and the 
positive phase duration (side-on impulse/reflected impulse). The maximum permanent 
deformation on the side facing the blast was recorded for each simulation and P-I 
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diagrams were created. The following plots represent all four situations for a selected 
range of reflected impulse of 0 kPa.s to 12 kPa.s: 
 small box with the side panel facing the blast (SBS); 
 small box with the front panel facing the blast (SBF); 
 large box with the side panel facing the blast (LBS); 
 large box with the front panel facing the blast (LBF). 
 
Analysing the P-I diagrams ploted it can be seen that there are two well difined regions 
(Figure 3.26). The “Impulsive region” representing the region with the high pressures 
and lower durations and the “Quasi-static region” representing the region with the lower 
pressures and longer durations.  
 
 
Figure 3.22 – P-I diagram for the small box hit on the side face.  
Iso-damage curves: 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90 mm. 
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Figure 3.23 – P-I diagram for the small box hit on the front face.  
Iso-damage curves: 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 mm. 
 
 
Figure 3.24 – P-I diagram for the large box hit on the side face.  
Iso-damage curves: 30, 50, 70, 90, 110, 130, 150 and 170 mm. 
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Figure 3.25 – P-I diagrams for the large box hit on the front face.  
Iso-damage curves: 140, 160, 180, 200 and 220 mm. 
 
 
Figure 3.26 – Regions on a P-I diagram. 
 
Knowing that a vapour cloud explosion creates pressure waves with longer duration 
when compared with HE, the region representing the situation at Buncefield is the 
Quasi-static region, with longer durations. In the particular case of Buncefield, it was 
only possible to extract one junction metal box. As shown in Figure 3.27 the box had a 
deformation of about 70 mm on the front. Using the P-I diagram for the small box hit on 
the front (Figure 3.23) and knowing that VCEs are in the Quasi-static region, the 
pressure required to damage the box at that level would be around 270 kPa. This shares 
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the same conclusions as the CFD analysis and the other pressure indicators studies. This 
indicates that the presented methodology to study the blast loading parameters through 
pressure indicators should be able to predict the range of overpressures and impulses 
capable of damaging these sub-structures. 
 
 
Figure 3.27 – Crushed junction box at Buncefield. 
 
 
3.5 FINAL REMARKS 
This chapter provided a new methodology for predicting the blast loading parameters 
through pressure indicators. Taking Buncefield Major Incident as a case study, sub-
structures were adopted to explain the severity of the explosion and the magnitude of 
the experienced overpressures. The obtained results showed a good agreement with the 
empirical and numerical solutions for estimating the blast loading parameters.  
 
Finite Element Analyses (FEA) is one of the most used techniques to predict the 
behaviour of structures. FE software like LS-DYNA has been proved capable of, with 
good accuracy, model explicit dynamic situations. In the present work the geometric 
and material properties of switch boxes were calibrated using the results from the 
experimental study. It is shown that for higher values of pressure/impulse the difference 
between the experimental and numerical becomes slightly larger. 
 
Four P-I (pressure-impulse) diagrams are presented allowing to relate the overpressures 
and the reflected impulse with the obtained deformation. It is possible to see a quasi-
static domain and an impulsive domain in all plots. These tools can help assessing the 
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magnitude of overpressures and impulses in the event of accidental explosion. This is 
possible by backtracking the loading characteristics from the damage observed in steel 
switch boxes under similar loading conditions. 
 
Explicit dynamic simulations are still in an early stage of development as many of the 
modelling possibilities for the implicit analysis are not yet available for the explicit 
analysis. Blast loading simulating still needs to concentrate the attention of researchers 
in terms of the material properties for high strain-rate situations. The commercial codes 
should be improved too in terms of available element types and material models. 
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Chapter 4 
4 MECHANICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF TRADITIONAL 
MATERIALS 
 
Different loading conditions lead to different strain rates. Quasi-static loading produce 
strain rates of around 10-5 s-1, while impacts and blast loading produce strain rates of 
well over 100 s-1. When subjected to dynamic loading conditions, materials can have a 
much different behaviour when compared with their static behaviour (Meyers, 1994; 
Hiermaier, 2008; Ngo et al, 2004; Stavrogin and Tarasov, 2001). Current research work 
on structural response and damage under impact and blast loading assumes typically 
static material properties (Baylot et al, 2005; Moreland et al, 2005). This can lead to an 
inaccurate prediction of structural damage and fragmentation. 
 
Construction materials such as concrete or reinforcement bars have been studied under 
strain rate effects (Grote et al, 2001; Malvar, 1998), phenomenon already introduced 
into some standards such as CEB-FIP (1990) or UFC 3-340-02 (2008). However, very 
limited studies can be found in the literature on masonry materials, such as clay bricks 
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or mortar. Recently Hao and Tarasov (2008) conducted an experimental study under 
dynamic uniaxial compression using a Triaxial Static-Dynamic Testing Machine. These 
authors reported a DIF for the compressive strength of around 2.3 and 1.12 for the DIF 
of the ultimate strain, for a strain rate of 150 s-1. For the Young’s modulus a DIF of 1.95 
was reported for the same level of strain rate.  
 
In this chapter, an experimental campaign on the influence of the strain rate on the 
mechanical properties of masonry and its components is described. The tests were 
conducted with a Drop Weight (DW) tower available at the Mechanical Engineering 
Department in the University of Minho. This equipment consists of a “hammer” with a 
given mass being released at a chosen height. Authors like Islam and Bindiganavile 
(2011), Zhang et al (2010) and Banthia et al (1998) have used this kind of testing 
apparatus to investigate the influence of the strain rate effect on different materials. 
 
 
4.1 TESTING EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURE 
A Drop Weight Impact Machine (DW) was used to perform the compression tests at 
different strain rates. This equipment is available in the Mechanical Engineering 
Department at the University of Minho (Figure 4.1). It allows drop heights up to 9 m 
and the weight of the hammer ranges from 40 kg to 150 kg. 
 
The load profile was measured at the base of the test specimen using a load cell 
specifically for dynamic applications – VETEK c2s (Figure 4.2a). This load cell is 
connected to a National Instruments Acquisition System (Figure 4.2b). This acquisition 
system is composed of a SCXI-1000DC chassis, a SCXI-1600 data acquisition and 
control card for PC connection and a generic input module SCXI-1520 with a SCXI-
1314 mount. The SCXI-1600 limits the sampling speed to 200 kS/s (200 samples per 
millisecond), which was found to be enough even at a later stage where 5 channels 
where used at the same time, allowing an acquisition frequency of 40 kHz per channel. 
Due to previous inexperience with acquiring such high frequency acquisitions at the 
Department of Civil Engineering, the LabView acquisition software had to be 
developed as well. Here the main concern was to keep the software as light as possible, 
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in order to minimize possible errors or data transfer failures. The software consists of a 
simple loop where the data is stored during a predetermined period of time (Figure 4.3). 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – DW tower at the Mechanical Engineering Department. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 4.2 – Load acquisition hardware: a) Vetek c2s; b) National Instruments 
acquisition system. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Acquisition software in LabVIEW 2010. 
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The deformation behaviour of the specimen was measured in two different ways. First, 
a FastCam video camera was used. It is a PHOTRON FastCam APX – RS (Figure 4.4) 
with a maximum frame rate of 250 000 frames per second. This equipment allowed the 
visualization of the test in slow motion and the measuring of the strain in one face of the 
test specimen. This strain measurement was possible using targets in the specimen at a 
specific location and performing a tracking sweep of those targets in the video. To 
perform the tracking sweep, the TEMA Tracking Software (v: 3.1-005) was used. With 
the relative position of the targets, the strain at each instance was calculated. The second 
methodology used to get the strain time history was using strain gauges. The strain 
gauges used were PFL-30-11-3L from TML and in this case, one strain gauge was 
placed in each face of the specimen. In the quasi-static tests, strain gauges were used to 
measure the strains in the specimen. In the dynamic tests, the FastCam was used to 
measure the strains. However, in order to validate and compared the results, some 
dynamic tests were also performed using strain gauges. These gauges were connected to 
the same acquisition equipment of the load cell. 
 
  
Figure 4.4 – PHOTRON FastCam APX-RS. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the schematic of the test setup. Varying the weight and the drop height 
of the impact hammer, different strain rates will be introduced in the specimen. 
Knowing the load/stress time history (Figure 4.6a) and the strain time history (Figure 
4.6b) it is possible to plot the stress-strain relations (Figure 4.7) for different strain rates. 
From these relations all properties can be derived: a) compressive strength; b) strain at 
peak strength; c) Young’s modulus and d) fracture energy in compression. As can be 
seen in Figure 4.6b the strain rate of each specimen is not necessarily constant, varying 
in time. In this case the strain rate for each specimen is taken as constant and equal to 
the gradient of the strain-time curve. This procedure was previously used also by Hao 
and Tarasov (2008). 
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Figure 4.5 – Schematic of the test setup: 1) DW tower; 2) additional masses; 
3) hammer; 4) test specimen; 5) load cell; 6) acquisition system; 7) fastcam video. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 4.6 – Examples of time histories obtained in the present work: a) stress-time; 
b) strain-time. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 – Examples of stress-strain relations obtained in the present work for 
different strain rates. 
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4.2 TEST SPECIMENS DESCRIPTION 
When testing at high strain rates, using dynamic loading, it is difficult to avoid 
resonances and inertial effects. Specimens are often kept small in order to retain the 
assumption of stress equilibrium within the deforming specimen. Lateral friction may 
also provide some confinement at the two ends of the specimen under compression 
tests. Therefore, the dimensions of specimens must be a compromise between 
maximising the size to ensure a complete representation of the material, proper height to 
base width / thickness ratio to reduce the friction effects at the ends, and minimizing the 
sample size to reduce the effect of inertia and non-uniform stress and strain in the 
specimen (Harding, 1989 and Dioh et al, 1995). 
 
In this work, handmade clay bricks and mortar were studied. The following sections 
present the procedure for preparing the specimens and the selected dimensions for each 
test. The clay brick and mortar were studied independently and, together, in masonry 
specimens.  
 
 
4.2.1 Brick specimens 
With the objective of reproducing old Portuguese masonry construction, the brick used 
was from Galveias, a village located in the central part of Portugal where handmade 
bricks can still be found. Brick specimens were prepared from a number of solid 
handmade clay bricks. The Galveias brick (Figure 4.8a) measured 20x10x5 cm in 
dimensions and the test specimen (Figure 4.8b) measured 7x3x3 cm.  
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 4.8 – Handmade clay brick: a) Galveias brick; b) test specimen. 
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From each brick, five specimens were prepared. The test specimens were cut from the 
original brick by means of a disk cutting machine (Figure 4.9a). After cutting the 
specimens, their edges were ensured to be intact and the loadbearing surfaces at both 
ends of the specimen were ground flat and parallel to each other. This was achieved 
using a grinding machine (Figure 4.9b). 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 4.9 – Preparation work: a) cutting machine; b) grinding machine. 
 
When the necessary preparation works were completed the specimens were left to dry in 
a ventilated oven at 105ºC until reaching constant mass. When constant mass was 
achieved they were moved to a non-ventilated oven at 40ºC and were kept there almost 
until testing, removed only 1 hour before testing. This procedure followed the 
recommendations of the EN 772-1 (2002). 
 
 
4.2.2 Mortar specimens 
A commercial ready-mix mortar was used, MAPEI MAPE-ANTIQUE MC (Figure 
4.10a). Several mixtures were prepared to evaluate the proper amount of water to use, 
keeping a good workability. The ratio was kept at 25 kg of product for 3.9 litres of 
water, resulting in 16 cm flow (Figure 4.10b).  
 
The test specimens’ dimensions for the mortar were kept the same as the brick 
specimens (7x3x3 cm), in order not to adapt the testing rig. After the mixture was 
placed in the moulds (Figure 4.11a), these were placed in a climatic chamber at 25ºC 
and 65% humidity for five days. After these five days, the specimens were taken out of 
their moulds and tested in that same day. The compressive strength of mortar was 
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intended to be similar to the values of old mortars and, as can be seen in Figure 4.11b, 
after five days of curing the compressive strength of this mortar is about 3 MPa. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 4.10 – Mortar: a) Mape-Antique MC; b) flow table. 
 
 
 
a) b) 
Figure 4.11 – Mortar: a) specimens’ moulding; b) compressive strength 
at different ages. 
 
 
4.2.3 Masonry specimens 
The masonry specimens were composed of clay bricks and mortar and were prepared 
according to the European standard EN 772-1 (2002). Test setup limitations lead to the 
final dimensions of 23x8x8 cm for the masonry specimens. Again, each Galveias brick 
was cut to match the required dimensions (Figure 4.12). Each masonry specimen had 
four brick units and three layers of mortar with one centimetre thickness. 
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Figure 4.12 – Brick units for the masonry specimen. 
 
In order to facilitate the placement of the masonry specimens in the test setup, they were 
built on top of an aluminium plate which connects to the load cell. There is a thin layer 
of mortar between the first brick and the aluminium plate (Figure 4.13a) making sure 
that there is full contact between those two. The specimens were built in a flat surface, 
but because the brick faces on top and bottom are irregular, on top of the specimens a 
layer of self-levelling mortar was used (Figure 4.13b). The treatment regarding the brick 
units used in the masonry specimens were the same as the specimens for the brick 
specimens, and the time of curing for the masonry specimens was the same as the 
mortar specimens. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 4.13 – Masonry specimens: a) aluminium base; b) specimens 
with self-levelling mortar. 
 
 
4.3 QUASI-STATIC REGIME 
In order to have the quasi-static reference for comparison with the results subjected to 
the dynamic regime, an experimental campaign on the behaviour of these materials 
under quasi-static uniaxial compression was performed. A physical characterization was 
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also performed on clay brick and mortar, with the objective of understanding possible 
characteristics that could affect the results under dynamic conditions. 
 
 
4.3.1 Compression tests 
For the quasi-static compression tests, the test setup consisted of a steel frame which 
supported a servo-controlled actuator, with a 25 kN (50 kN for the masonry specimens) 
load capacity. The strain in the test specimen was obtained with three LVDTs and four 
strain gauges (Figure 4.14). These tests were performed according to the EN 772-1 
(2002). 
 
 
Figure 4.14 – Quasi-static acquisition apparatus. 
 
The mechanical properties under study were: a) compressive strength (σmax); b) strain at 
peak strength (εu); c) Young’s modulus (E); and d) compressive fracture energy (Gc). 
Figure 4.15 shows the typical stress-strain relation and stress-displacement relation with 
information on how to determine these mechanical properties. The compressive strength 
is the maximum value of the stress-strain curve (Figure 4.15a). At that point the 
corresponding strain is the strain at peak strength. The Young’s modulus is calculated as 
the slope of the stress-strain diagram between 30% and 80% of the maximum stress. 
The compressive fracture energy is determined from the stress-displacement curve and 
corresponds to the marked area in Figure 4.15b. This procedure, to calculate the post-
peak fracture energy in compression has been used before by Vasconcelos (2005) and is 
similar to the one indicated by Jansen and Shah (1997).  
 
A total of 5 (five) specimens of handmade clay brick, 9 (nine) specimens of mortar and 
4 (four) specimens of masonry were tested under quasi-static uniaxial compression and 
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the results are presented in Table 4.1, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. The value 
between brackets is the coefficient of variation (CoV). The brick specimens have the 
highest compressive strength with 13.59 MPa, where the mortar has strength of 
4.46 MPa. This resulted in masonry specimens with 7.94 MPa of compressive strength. 
Also important, the Young’s modulus is 2.32 GPa for the brick specimens and 0.80 GPa 
for the masonry specimens. The fracture energy in compression is similar for both brick 
and mortar specimens, with 1.56 N/mm and 1.43 N/mm respectively, while for masonry 
the fracture energy is much larger, reaching 7.64 N/mm. The reason for this is that the 
masonry specimens showed higher deformation capacity due to the interaction between 
the masonry components. The CoV for the handmade clay brick under quasi-static 
compression is slightly high when compared to the other tests performed. This is a 
material made by hand and where the quality control of the product and the 
manufacturing procedure is not as high as those from newer materials. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 4.15 – Typical relations: a) stress – strain; b) stress – displacement.  
 
Table 4.1 – Quasi-static mechanical properties of clay brick. 
 #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 Average (CoV) 
σmax [MPa] 14.11 12.61 11.82 14.54 13.49 13.59 (14%) 
εu [mm/m] 7.62 6.00 7.23 7.21 6.69 6.95 (12%) 
E [GPa] 2.20 2.54 1.71 2.65 2.53 2.32 (20%) 
Gc [N/mm] 1.96 1.14 1.21 1.86 1.63 1.56 (31%) 
 
Table 4.2 – Quasi-static mechanical properties of mortar. 
 #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 Average (CoV) 
σmax [MPa] 4.16 4.84 4.04 4.89 3.98 4.99 4.05 4.98 4.17 4.46 (10%) 
εu [mm/m] 6.08 5.80 6.68 6.70 6.19 6.50 6.31 6.90 6.11 6.36 (6%) 
E [GPa] 1.10 1.11 0.98 1.03 1.09 0.98 1.29 0.89 1.05 1.06 (11%) 
Gc [N/mm] 1.61 1.42 1.36 1.20 1.61 1.45 1.37 1.40 1.48 1.43 (9%) 
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Figure 4.16 shows the stress-strain envelopes for the three materials under study. As it 
can be seen, the post-peak behaviour of mortar is more ductile than those of brick or 
masonry.  
 
Table 4.3 – Quasi-static mechanical properties of masonry. 
 #1 #2 #3 #4 Average (CoV) 
σmax [MPa] 8.25 7.13 8.78 7.59 7.94 (9%) 
εu [mm/m] 11.21 8.87 10.66 12.97 10.93 (15%) 
E [GPa] 0.81 0.85 0.90 0.64 0.80 (14%) 
Gc [N/mm] 7.95 7.53 7.68 7.40 7.64 (3%) 
 
a) b) c) 
Figure 4.16 – Stress-strain envelopes at quasi-static conditions: a) brick specimens; 
b) mortar specimens; c) masonry specimens 
 
The values presented in Table 4.1 to Table 4.3 are assumed next as the static properties 
for these materials and were taken as the static reference when determining the dynamic 
increase factors. 
 
 
4.3.2 Physical properties  
In order to have a deeper characterization of the materials under study, tests to obtain 
selected physical properties for clay brick and mortar were also performed. These 
results can help to justify differences in the behaviour of these materials in quasi-static 
and dynamic conditions. The following properties where studied here: a) water 
absorption coefficient due to capillarity action; b) water absorption by immersion; 
c) density; and d) porosity. 
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The tests performed to obtain the water absorption coefficient due to capillarity action 
followed the requirements in the standard EN 1015-18 (2002). Six specimens for each 
material were used. The specimens were placed in a climatic chamber at 40ºC until 
reaching constant mass. When constant mass was achieved the specimens were prepared 
for the test, which consisted in allowing only one surface to be in contact with water, 
using water resistant ink in all surfaces but the one in contact with water (Figure 4.17a). 
The specimens were then placed in a closed container during a specific amount of time. 
After 10 minutes and 90 minutes the specimens were taken out of the container and the 
mass was recorded. With the mass of each specimen after 10 and 90 minutes it is 
possible to determine the water absorption coefficient due to capillarity action C, using 
the following equation: 
 
ṥ = 0,1 × (ṹ2 −ṹ1)	ⱴⱦ/(ⅎῼ × ⅎⱪⱶΏ,ᾪ) (4.1) 
 
Where: 
M1 – mass of the specimen after 10 minutes in grams 
M2 – mass of the specimen after 90 minutes in grams 
 
Figure 4.17b shows the results obtained for clay brick and mortar. The average water 
absorption coefficient in the brick specimens was 0.55 kg/(m2.min0.5), which compares 
to the a much smaller coefficient for the mortar, equal to 0.11 kg/(m2.min0.5). 
 
 
 
a) b) 
Figure 4.17 – Water absorption coefficient: a) preparing specimens; b) results obtained. 
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The tests performed to obtain the water absorption by immersion followed the 
requirements in the standard EN 1097-6 (2000). Six specimens for each material were 
used. The specimens were placed inside a container with water (Figure 4.18a) and their 
masses were recorded every 24 hours until reaching their saturated mass. Afterwards, 
the specimens were moved to a climatic chamber at 40ºC until reaching constant mass. 
Knowing the difference in mass between the water saturated mass and the dry mass it is 
possible to determine the water absorption percentage WA for each material using the 
following equation: 
 WA = (MῺ − Mῼ)Mῼ 	× 100	(%) (4.2) 
 
Where: 
M1 – Saturated mass 
M2 – Dry mass 
 
Figure 4.18b shows the results obtained for clay brick and mortar. Again, the average 
water absorption percentage is much higher for the clay brick specimens  
(12.6 %) than the percentage for the mortar specimens (5.0 %). 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 4.18 – Water absorption: a) specimens submersed; b) results obtained. 
 
Density is the relation between the mass and the volume of the specimens. Six 
specimens for each material were used. The specimens were placed in a climatic 
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chamber at 40ºC until reaching constant mass. Knowing the mass and the dimensions of 
the specimens it is possible to determine their density  according to the following 
equation: 
 
ρ = MV 			(Kg/mᾨ) (4.3) 
 
Where: 
M – Dry mass in kilograms 
V – Volume in cubic meters 
 
Figure 4.19 shows the results obtained for clay brick and mortar. Here, the results of 
clay brick and mortar are similar, having average densities of 1795 kg/m3 and 1853 
kg/m3, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 4.19 – Density for brick and mortar specimens. 
 
Porosity is the relation between the volume of voids inside the specimens and their bulk 
volume. The procedure followed to determine the porosity of the clay brick and mortar 
specimens is described in the Standard LNEC E 394 (1993). Again, six specimens of 
each material were used. The specimens were introduced in water until reaching their 
saturated mass. Afterwards, the saturated mass and the hydrostatic mass was recorded. 
The specimens were then moved to a climatic chamber at 40ºC until reaching constant 
dry mass. Knowing the masses for these specimens, it is possible to determine the 
porosity Ai according to the following equation: 
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Aέ = ἢభିἢయἢభିἢమ × 100 (%) (4.4) 
 
Where: 
m1 – Saturated mass 
m2 – Hydrostatic mass  
m3 – Dry mass 
 
Figure 4.20 shows the results obtained for both materials. As expected the percentage of 
voids in the clay brick specimens (23 %) is much higher than the percentage for the 
mortar specimens (9 %). 
 
 
Figure 4.20 – Porosity for brick and mortar specimens. 
 
Table 4.4 summarizes the measured physical properties for the materials components. 
The value between brackets is the coefficient of variation (CoV). As expected, the clay 
brick, due to manufacturing process, has higher percentage of voids inside its volume 
and this is reflected on the water absorption properties. The pore structure is certainly 
also much different, given the enormous difference in the water absorption coefficient 
due to to capillarity action. 
 
Table 4.4 – Summary on the physical properties. 
 C  
(kg/(m2.min0.5) 
WA 
(%) 
ρ 
(kg/m3) 
Ai 
(%) 
Brick 0.55 (17%) 12.6 (2%) 1795 (2%) 23 (2%) 
Mortar 0.11 (9%) 5.0 (5%) 1853 (2%) 9 (4%) 
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4.4 DYNAMIC REGIME 
For the dynamic regime testing, the Drop Weight (DW) impact machine was used. 
Several impact tests under uniaxial compression were performed. As presented 
previously, the objective is to obtain the stress-strain relations from the data recorded at 
the load cell acquisition and the fastcam video. To facilitate the treatment of the data 
obtained, the stress-time curve was approximated to a second degree polynomial, while 
the strain-time curve was approximated to a linear function. As a result, the final shape 
of the stress-strain curves is a second degree polynomial and can be seen in Figure 4.21. 
 
Figure 4.21 – Final stress-strain curves at different strain rates for clay brick. 
 
With the stress-strain relations for each test, the mechanical properties could be 
determined and the dynamic increase factor (DIF) could be calculated as a function of 
the strain rate, according to the following equation: 
 
ṧṱṫ = ṿݎⱷ݌ⱡݎݐݕ	(ṧݕⱶẘⅎⱪẚ)
ṿݎⱷ݌ⱡݎݐݕ	(ẋݐẘݐⱪẚ) ,ⱥ(	ߝ̇) (4.5) 
 
These results were used to establish the relations between the mechanical properties and 
the strain rate. These relations are usually described as bi-log-linear relations, meaning 
that they can be written with two log-linear functions, low slope for the quasi-static 
regime and high slope for the dynamic regime. In order to simplify these relations, the 
first log-linear function for the quasi-static regime was considered constant and set as 
DIF equals to 1 (one) until the point where the regime changes to dynamic. 
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4.4.1 Brick dynamic properties 
A total of 99 specimens of handmade clay brick were tested under uniaxial 
compression, with strain rate ranging from 4 s-1 to 199 s-1. Due to errors in the 
acquisition system only 58 tests gave good results and were used to characterize the 
behaviour of clay brick under increasing strain rates. Figure 4.22 shows some typical 
failure modes of the specimens under impact testing. 
 
   
Figure 4.22 – Typical failure modes for brick specimens under impact testing. 
 
For these tests the acquisition frequency for the strain-time curve was set at 20 kHz and 
the acquisition frequency for the stress-time curve was set at 40 kHz. The acquisition 
frequency on the video equipment was greatly dependant on the lighting conditions and 
was set as the maximum possible at the time of the tests. In order to facilitate the 
convergence of both acquisitions, the acquisition frequency on the load cell was set as a 
multiple of the frequency on the video equipment. Figure 4.23 shows a typical sequence 
of the impact test recorded with the fast video equipment.   
 
Table 4.5 shows the results obtained on the impact tests for clay brick specimens. Only 
some of the results are shown here, however, to establish the DIF relations all 58 tests 
were used and can be seen in Annex A.1. Five additional tests using strain gauges were 
performed in order to cross-check the results obtained with the targets and video 
equipment. These five tests actually represent 20 tests, meaning that strain gauges were 
placed in all four faces of the test specimen and the average was taken for each test. In 
the video equipment, only one face of the test specimen was measured, meaning that 
rotation of the specimen is not captured and the single strain value has to be considered 
carefully. 
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Figure 4.23 – Typical test sequence for clay brick. 
 
Table 4.5 – Impact tests on clay brick. 
 
Strain 
rate  
(s-1) 
Compressive  
Strength 
Young’s 
Modulus 
Strain at  
Peak Strength 
Fracture 
Energy  
Sp
ec
im
en
 (#
) 
σu 
(MPa) DIF 
E 
(GPa) DIF 
εu 
(mm/m) DIF 
Gc 
(N/mm) DIF 
Static 13.31 -- 2.32 -- 6.95 -- 1.56 -- ref. 
T
ar
ge
ts
 
4 14.45 1.09 2.69 1.16 7.27 1.05 2.98 1.91 26 
6 19.85 1.49 3.23 1.39 8.39 1.21 4.48 2.87 64 
10 21.28 1.60 3.83 1.65 7.76 1.12 4.96 3.18 93 
21 21.92 1.65 4.86 2.09 5.55 0.80 3.70 2.37 24 
23 22.02 1.65 3.22 1.39 8.85 1.27 5.57 3.57 3 
29 22.80 1.71 3.82 1.65 7.76 1.12 4.72 3.03 35 
33 26.07 1.96 6.27 2.70 4.29 0.62 2.89 1.85 78 
34 27.13 2.04 4.07 1.75 8.78 1.26 6.65 4.26 31 
40 27.62 2.08 6.22 2.68 5.83 0.84 4.86 3.12 42 
46 27.81 2.09 6.30 2.72 5.85 0.84 5.00 3.21 63 
73 28.86 2.17 5.87 2.53 7.25 1.04 6.76 4.33 56 
176 30.59 2.30 5.04 2.17 8.34 1.20 9.10 5.83 22 
St
ra
in
 G
au
ge
s 
5 15.60 1.17 2.85 1.23 6.45 0.93 2.54 1.63 104 
10 21.70 1.63 3.47 1.50 7.30 1.05 5.18 3.32 100 
11 18.71 1.41 3.06 1.32 8.25 1.19 3.92 2.51 102 
20 24.08 1.81 3.28 1.41 9.46 1.36 5.73 3.67 101 
29 25.51 1.92 4.66 2.01 7.46 1.07 4.90 3.14 103 
 
Figure 4.24 shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the compressive strength of clay brick. As expected the strain rate influences the 
compressive strength of this material and the dynamic increase factor for a strain rate of 
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200 s-1 is 2.5, meaning that the compressive strength is two and a half times the static 
value at that strain rate. 
 
 
Figure 4.24 – DIF (compressive strength) for clay brick. 
 
The equations that describe these relations for the compressive strength as function of 
the strain rate can be written as: 
 
ṧṱṫ(ߪ௨) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1ṩ − 5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 2	ݏିῺ0,3344 ln(ߝ̇) + 0.7682										ⱪⱥ								2	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 200	ݏିῺ																 (4.6) 
 
This log-linear trend-line has a R2 higher than 70%, which for this material was 
considered good. The results obtained with the strain gauges also showed a good 
agreement with the results from the targets. Comparing the results with Hao and 
Tarasov (2008), who tested clay brick with different equipment, there is also a good 
agreement. Those authors obtained a compressive strength DIF of 2.31 at a strain rate of 
150 s-1, and with the proposed relations a DIF of 2.44 is obtained for the same strain 
rate. 
 
Figure 4.25 shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the Young’s modulus of clay brick. Again, the strain rate influences the Young’s 
modulus of this material and the Young’s modulus for a strain rate of 200 s-1 is 2.4 
times greater than the static reference. 
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Figure 4.25 – DIF (Young’s modulus) for clay brick. 
 
The equations that describe these relations for the Young’s modulus as function of the 
strain rate can be written as: 
 
ṧṱṫ(ṩ) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1ṩ − 5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 2	ݏିῺ0,3105 ln(ߝ̇) + 0.7848										ⱪⱥ								2	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 200	ݏିῺ																 (4.7) 
 
For this mechanical property the results are more scattered, with a very low 
determination coefficient, but the results obtained with the strain gauges seems to be in 
agreement with the obtained trend-line. The Young’s modulus seems to be less affected 
by the strain rate when compared with the compressive strength. The relation between 
these two properties was also reported by Hao and Tarasov (2008), although slightly 
more pronounced. These authors reported a DIF for the Young’s modulus of 1.95 for a 
strain rate of 150 s-1, and with the proposed relations a DIF of 2.21 is obtained for the 
same strain rate.  
 
Figure 4.26 shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the strain at peak strength of clay brick. Here, the results show that this property is 
less dependent on the strain rate. At a strain rate of 200 s-1 the strain at peak strength is 
only 1.31 times greater than its static reference. 
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Figure 4.26 – DIF (strain at peak strength) for clay brick. 
 
The equations that describe these relations for the strain at peak strength as function of 
the strain rate can be written as: 
 
ṧṱṫ(ߝ௨) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1ṩ − 5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 2	ݏିῺ0,0673 ln(ߝ̇) + 0.9533										ⱪⱥ								2	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 200	ݏିῺ																 (4.8) 
 
Again, these results are more scattered when compared with the results obtained for the 
compressive strength, and the results obtained with the strain gauges seems to be in 
agreement with the obtained trend-line. The strain at peak strength seems to be least 
affected by the strain rate of the studied properties. This was also reported by Hao and 
Tarasov (2008). These authors reported a DIF for the strain at peak strength of 1.12 for 
a strain rate of 150 s-1, and with the proposed relations a DIF of 1.29 is obtained for the 
same strain rate.  
 
Figure 4.27 shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the compressive fracture energy of clay brick. As the results show, the fracture 
energy is greatly influenced by the strain rate, and again a large scatter was found. For 
strain rates of 200 s-1 the fracture energy is 5.95 times greater than the static reference. 
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Figure 4.27 – DIF (fracture energy) for clay brick. 
 
The equations that describe these relations for the compressive fracture energy as 
function of the strain rate can be written as: 
 
ṧṱṫ(ṭᾣ) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1ṩ − 5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 5	ݏିῺ1,3419 ln(ߝ̇) − 1.1597										ⱪⱥ								5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 200	ݏିῺ																 (4.9) 
 
Although it was not possible to find similar results in the literature for comparison, the 
results obtained with strain gauges are close to those obtained with the targets and the 
video equipment. 
 
Figure 4.28 shows a summary of the results obtained for the handmade clay brick 
specimens. As it can be seen, the strain at peak strength appears to be the least affected 
by the strain rates. The compressive strength and the Young’s modulus have similar 
behaviour, which is consistent with the fact that the strain at peak strength is lightly 
affected. The fracture energy have a high increase with the strain rate, more than twice 
the increase of the compressive strength, meaning that the post-peak behaviour of this 
material is greatly influenced by the increase of strain rate. 
 
Security Evaluation and Design of Structures Subjected to Blast Loading 
88 
 
Figure 4.28 – DIFs for clay brick mechanical properties. 
 
 
4.4.2 Mortar dynamic properties 
A total of 63 specimens of mortar were tested under uniaxial compression, with strain 
rate ranging from 2 s-1 to 224 s-1. Again, due to errors in the acquisition system only 54 
tests gave good results and were used to characterize the behaviour of mortar under 
increasing strain rates. Figure 4.29 shows some typical failure modes of the specimens 
under impact testing. 
 
   
Figure 4.29 – Typical failure modes for mortar specimens under impact testing. 
 
For these tests the acquisition frequency for the strain-time curve was set at 15 kHz and 
the acquisition frequency for the stress-time curve was set at 30 kHz. The reason for 
different acquisition frequencies was already explained previously. At the time of 
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testing the lighting conditions were not the same as the ones available at the time of the 
tests on clay brick. Figure 4.30 shows a typical sequence of the impact test recorded 
with the fast video equipment.   
 
   
Figure 4.30 – Typical test sequence on mortar. 
 
Table 4.6 shows the results obtained on the impact tests for mortar specimens. Only a 
few selected results are shown here, however, as stated previously, to establish the DIF 
relations all 54 tests were used and can be seen in Annex A.2. Six additional tests using 
strain gauges were performed in order to cross-check the results obtained with the 
targets and video equipment. These six tests actually represent 24 tests, meaning that 
strain gauges were placed in all four faces of the test specimen and the average was 
taken for each test. In the video equipment, only one face of the test specimen was 
measured, meaning that rotation of the specimen is not captured. 
 
Figure 4.31  shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the compressive strength of mortar. As expected, the strain rate influences the 
compressive strength of this material and the dynamic increase factor for a strain rate of 
200 s-1 is 4.13, which means that for this level of strain rate the compressive strength of 
this kind of mortar is four times greater than its static reference. 
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Table 4.6 – Impact tests on mortar. 
 
Strain 
rate  
(s-1) 
Compressive  
Strength 
Young’s 
Modulus 
Strain at  
Peak Strength  
Fracture 
Energy  
Sp
ec
im
en
 (#
) 
σu 
(MPa) DIF 
E 
(GPa) DIF 
εu 
(mm/m) DIF 
Gc 
(N/mm) DIF 
Static 4.46 -- 1.10 -- 6.36 -- 1.44 -- REF. 
T
ar
ge
ts
 
7 4.90 1.10 1.00 0.91 5.67 0.89 1.80 1.25 70 
17 7.68 1.72 1.32 1.20 7.20 1.13 1.72 1.19 83 
22 9.34 2.09 1.63 1.48 7.20 1.13 2.05 1.42 75 
27 11.61 2.60 2.24 2.04 5.17 0.81 2.43 1.69 108 
30 12.33 2.76 2.81 2.55 7.10 1.12 2.24 1.56 79 
38 12.72 2.85 2.49 2.26 6.30 0.99 2.50 1.74 107 
40 12.98 2.91 2.16 1.96 4.00 0.63 3.14 2.18 62 
61 13.70 3.07 2.69 2.45 5.10 0.80 2.91 2.02 106 
113 14.45 3.24 2.69 2.45 7.00 1.10 3.52 2.44 91 
141 16.15 3.62 3.57 3.25 7.50 1.18 3.89 2.70 87 
177 16.99 3.81 3.21 2.92 7.80 1.23 3.64 2.53 112 
193 19.53 4.38 3.25 2.95 6.00 0.94 5.20 3.61 102 
St
ra
in
 G
au
ge
s 
6 6.22 1.39 1.31 1.19 6.72 1.06 1.66 1.15 119 
10 8.01 1.80 1.66 1.51 5.82 0.92 1.58 1.10 120 
23 9.54 2.14 1.93 1.75 6.61 1.04 2.03 1.41 122 
31 11.10 2.49 1.98 1.80 6.74 1.06 2.35 1.63 121 
37 13.52 3.03 2.53 2.30 5.48 0.86 2.87 1.99 124 
74 14.01 3.14 2.88 2.62 5.52 0.87 2.75 1.91 123 
 
Figure 4.31 – DIF (compressive strength) for mortar. 
Chapter 4 – Mechanical Characterization of Traditional Materials 
91 
The equations that describe the relations for the compressive strength as function of the 
strain rate can be written as: 
 
ṧṱṫ(ߪ௨) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1ṩ − 5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 4,35	ݏିῺ0,8166 ln(ߝ̇) − 2,005										ⱪⱥ						4,35	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 200	ݏିῺ																 (4.10) 
 
This log-linear trend-line has a R2 of 85 %, which for this material was considered 
good. In addition, the results obtained with strain gauges have a good agreement with 
this log-linear relation. 
 
Figure 4.32 shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the Young’s modulus of mortar. Just as for the brick specimens, the Young’s 
modulus is also influenced by the increase in strain rate. For a strain rate of 200 s-1 the 
Young’s modulus should be 3 times greater than its static reference. 
 
Figure 4.32 – DIF (Young’s modulus) for mortar. 
 
The equations that describe the relations for the Young’s modulus as function of the 
strain rate can be written as: 
 DIF(ṩ) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1E − 5	sିῺ < 	 ε̇ < 4,35	sିῺ0,5275 ln(ε̇) + 0.2245										ⱪⱥ								4,35	sିῺ < 	 ε̇ < 200	sିῺ																 (4.11) 
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The Young’s modulus appears to be less sensitive to the strain rate when compared with 
the compressive strength. The results from the strain gauges have a good agreement 
with this function. At this time it is possible to notice that the results for this kind of 
mortar have a smaller dispersion when compared with the results obtained for the 
handmade clay brick. 
 
Figure 4.33 shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the strain at peak strength of mortar. Like previously, for the brick specimens, the 
strain at peak strength is the least affected property by the strain rate. For a strain rate of 
200 s-1 the strain at peak strength has a dynamic increase factor of 1.11. 
 
Figure 4.33 – DIF (strain at peak strength) for mortar. 
 
The equations that describe the relations for the strain at peak strength as function of the 
strain rate can be written as: 
 DIF(εῆ) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1E − 5	sିῺ < 	 ε̇ < 4,35	sିῺ0,0286 ln(ε̇) + 0.9579									ⱪⱥ								4,35	sିῺ < 	 ε̇ < 200	sିῺ																 
 
(4.12) 
Similar to the results obtained for the clay brick specimens, the strain rate has a little 
influence on this property and the results are more scattered when compared with the 
compressive strength. However, the results obtained with the strain gauges were able to 
confirm this log-linear relation. 
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Figure 4.33 shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the compressive fracture energy of mortar. Unlike the results obtained for clay brick, 
the strain rate has a smaller influence in the fracture energy of this kind of mortar. The 
results show that for strain rates of 200 s-1 the dynamic increase factor, for the fracture 
energy, is 2.73. 
 
Figure 4.34 – DIF (fracture energy) for mortar. 
 
The equations that describe the relations for the compressive fracture energy as function 
of the strain rate can be written as: 
 
ṧṱṫ(ṭᾣ) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1ṩ − 5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 9	ݏିῺ0,5582 ln(ߝ̇) − 0,2269									ⱪⱥ								9	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 200	ݏିῺ																 (4.13) 
 
Although it was not possible to find similar results in the open literature for comparison 
the relation here presented  shows similar results for the strain gauges and the video 
equipment. 
 
Figure 4.35 shows a summary of the results obtained for the mortar specimens. As it can 
be seen, the strain rate seems to have little influence on the strain at peak strength. There 
is a more pronounced difference between the dynamic increase factor of the 
compressive strength and the Young’s modulus. The results obtained for the fracture 
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energy show that the influence of the strain rate in the post-peak behaviour is smaller 
when compared with the handmade clay brick. 
 
Figure 4.35 – DIFs for mortar mechanical properties. 
 
 
4.4.3 Masonry dynamic properties 
A total of 12 specimens of masonry were tested under uniaxial compression, with strain 
rate ranging from 2 s-1 to 54 s-1. Figure 4.36 shows some typical failure modes of the 
specimens under impact testing with increasing strain rates. 
 
For these tests the acquisition frequency for the strain-time curve was set at 10 kHz and 
the acquisition frequency for the stress-time curve was set at 40 kHz. The reason for the 
lower acquisition frequency for the masonry specimens was the size of the specimens. 
There is a relation between the resolution of the video and the maximum frame rate 
available, due to the memory buffer of the equipment. Figure 4.37 shows a typical 
sequence of the impact test recorded with the fast video equipment. 
 
Table 4.7 shows the results obtained for all impact tests on masonry specimens. 
Allthough four targets can be seen in the masonry specimens, the uniaxial strain was 
calculated between the two centered targets. For these tests only video tracking was 
used to calculate the strain during each test. 
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Figure 4.36 – Typical failure modes for masonry specimens under impact testing. 
 
    
Figure 4.37 – Typical test sequence on masonry. 
 
Figure 4.38  shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the compressive strength of masonry. As expected, the compressive strength of 
masonry increases with the increase of strain rate. According to these results and for a 
strain rate of 200 s-1, the compressive strength of these masonry specimens is more than 
two times greater than its static reference. 
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Table 4.7 – Impact tests on masonry. 
 
Strain 
rate  
(s-1) 
Compressive  
Strength 
Young’s 
Modulus 
Strain at  
Peak Strength  
Fracture 
Energy 
Sp
ec
im
en
 (#
) 
σu 
(MPa) DIF 
E 
(GPa) DIF 
εu 
(mm/m) DIF 
Gc 
(N/mm) DIF 
Static 7.94 -- 0.80 -- 10.93 -- 7.64 -- REF. 
T
ar
ge
ts
 
2.1 7.37 0.93 0.88 1.10 10.73 0.98 6.29 0.82 5 
2.3 8.77 1.10 1.26 1.58 10.80 0.99 9.46 1.24 11 
3.0 7.94 1.00 0.92 1.15 10.64 0.97 9.41 1.23 8 
4.4 7.75 0.98 0.95 1.19 10.64 0.97 8.96 1.17 7 
5.0 8.89 1.12 1.44 1.80 10.80 0.99 7.89 1.03 10 
9.0 10.99 1.38 1.07 1.34 10.60 0.97 13.53 1.77 13 
10.6 9.44 1.19 0.88 1.10 13.95 1.28 13.53 1.77 16 
17.5 11.55 1.45 1.49 1.86 12.96 1.19 14.21 1.86 15 
22.0 11.32 1.43 1.00 1.25 9.71 0.89 16.46 2.15 12 
25.6 12.46 1.57 1.47 1.84 10.66 0.98 18.77 2.46 14 
26.0 11.76 1.48 1.15 1.44 12.05 1.10 13.89 1.82 6 
54.0 16.61 2.09 1.01 1.26 14.80 1.35 18.75 2.45 9 
 
Figure 4.38 – DIF (compressive strength) for masonry. 
 
The equations that describe the relations for the compressive strength as function of the 
strain rate can be written as: 
 
ṧṱṫ(ߪ௨) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1ṩ − 5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 3	ݏିῺ0,2798 ln(ߝ̇) + 0,6863									ⱪⱥ								3	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 200	ݏିῺ																 (4.14) 
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These log-linear relations have a R2 of 80 %. Which is good considering the type of 
materials involved. However these results are limited to the amount of specimens tested. 
Comparing this results with the results obtained for its components, it can be seen that 
these are closer to the results presented for the handmade clay brick. 
 
Figure 4.39 shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the Young’s modulus of masonry. The Young’s modulus is also influenced by the 
increase in strain rate. For a strain rate of 200 s-1 the Young’s modulus should be two 
times greater than its static reference. 
 
Figure 4.39 – DIF (Young’s modulus) for masonry. 
 
The equations that describe the relations for the Young’s modulus as function of the 
strain rate can be written as: 
 
ṧṱṫ(ṩ) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1ṩ − 5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 1.7	ݏିῺ0,2409 ln(ߝ̇) + 0,8701										ⱪⱥ								1.7	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 200	ݏିῺ																 (4.15) 
 
Comparing this results with the results obtained for its components, it can be seen that 
these are closer to the results presented for the handmade clay brick, similar to the 
observation made for the compressive strength. 
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Figure 4.40 shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the strain at peak strength of masonry. Similar to what was observed for its 
components, the strain at peak strength is the least influenced by the strain rate. For a 
strain rate of 200 s-1 the strain at peak strength is 1.26 times its static reference. 
 
Figure 4.40 – DIF (strain at peak strength) for masonry. 
 
The equations that describe the relations for the strain at peak strength as function of the 
strain rate can be written as: 
 
ṧṱṫ(εu) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1ṩ − 5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 4	ݏିῺ0,0678 ln(ߝ̇) + 0,9036										ⱪⱥ								4	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 200	ݏିῺ																 (4.16) 
 
The observations regarding this properties are similar to the ones already presented for 
the other materials. The strain rate has little influence in the strain at peak strength for 
masonry, as well as for its components. 
 
Figure 4.41 shows the relation between the dynamic increase factor and the strain rate 
for the fracture energy of masonry. Again, similar to the components of these masonry 
specimens, the compressive fracture energy has a considerable increase with the 
increase of strain rates. For a strain rate of 200 s-1 the fracture energy should be three 
times greater than its static reference. 
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Figure 4.41 – DIF (fracture energy) for masonry. 
 
The equations that describe the relations for the compressive fracture energy as function 
of the strain rate can be written as: 
 
ṧṱṫ(ṭᾣ) 	= 	 ൜ 1																																									ⱪⱥ									1ṩ − 5	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 2	ݏିῺ0,4716 ln(ߝ̇) + 0,5968										ⱪⱥ								2	ݏିῺ < 	 ߝ̇ < 200	ݏିῺ																 (4.17) 
 
Comparing these results with the results obtained for its components, it can be seen that 
these are closer to the results presented for the mortar specimens. 
 
Figure 4.42 shows a summary of the results obtained for the masonry specimens. As it 
can be seen, the strain rate seems to have little influence on the strain at peak strength. 
The reported behaviour for the compressive strength and the Young’s modulus is 
similar. The fracture energy have a high increase with the strain rate, greater than the 
compressive strength, meaning that, similar to the brick observations, the post-peak 
behaviour of this material is greatly influenced by the increase of strain rates. 
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Figure 4.42 – DIFs for masonry mechanical properties. 
 
 
4.5 COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION 
Figure 4.43 shows the influence of the strain rate on the three different materials tested. 
At a strain rate of around 200 s-1 the DIF regarding the compressive strength for brick, 
mortar and masonry are 2.54, 4.13 and 2.17 respectively. The results show that the 
behaviour of the masonry specimens is similar to the behaviour of the clay brick. For 
the mortar specimens this influence is more pronounced with a DIF for mortar of 
around double of the brick. This difference could be explained with the existence of 
synthetic fibres in the mortar composition. Authors such as Zhou et al (2013) and Tran 
et al (2014) suggested that the presence of fibres in the composition of cementitious 
composites have a direct influence in the strain rate effect of these materials. 
 
Figure 4.44 summarizes the results obtained for the Young’s modulus for all three 
materials. For a strain rate of around 200 s-1 the DIF regarding the Young’s modulus for 
brick, mortar and masonry are 2.43, 3.02 and 2.15 respectively. Although less 
pronounced than the compressive strength, the comparison between all three materials is 
similar.  
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Figure 4.43 – DIF for compressive strength of brick, mortar and masonry. 
 
Figure 4.44 – DIF for Young’s modulus of brick, mortar and masonry. 
 
Figure 4.45 shows the results obtained for the strain at peak strength for all three 
materials. At a strain rate of around 200 s-1 the DIF regarding the strain at peak strength 
for brick, mortar and masonry are 1.31, 1.11 and 1.26 respectively. As can be seen, the 
influence of the strain rate in this property is almost negligible, which is consistent with 
the behaviour observed for other geo-materials, such as rock and concrete (Zhao et al, 
1999 and Hao & Tarasov, 2008). 
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Figure 4.45 – DIF for strain at peak strength of brick, mortar and masonry. 
 
Regarding the compressive fracture energy, the results are summarized in Figure 4.46. 
Here the results obtained for mortar and masonry are closer with DIF of 2.73 and 3.10 
respectively, for a strain rate of 200 s-1. The DIF for brick at the same strain rate is 5.95. 
These results suggest that the post-peak behaviour of the handmade clay brick is more 
influenced by the strain rate. One possible explanation is related to the porosity of both 
materials. The porosity of these clay bricks (23 %) is higher than the porosity of this 
kind of mortar (9 %). In fact, Vasconcelos (2005) suggested that the posority of 
materials could be one of the physical properties with direct inflence in its post-peak 
behaviour. 
 
A large experimental campaign was performed on different loading regimes and 
different materials. Almost 250 impact tests were performed during this research and 
more than 60 handmade clay brick were cut in order to prepare the specimens. Masonry 
specimens and its components, clay brick and mortar, were tested under quasi-static 
regime – strain rate of 10-5 s-1 – and dynamic regime with strain rates ranging from 2 s-1 
up to 200 s-1. It was found that the mechanical properties of these materials increase 
with the increase in strain rate, having DIFs ranging from 2 to 6 for a strain rate of 200 
s-1. Equations 4.6 to 4.17 represent the empirical relations obtained and they can be used 
to estimate the response of this kind of materials under different strain rates. 
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Figure 4.46 – DIF for compressive fracture energy of brick, mortar and masonry. 
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Chapter 5 
5 MASONRY INFILL WALLS UNDER BLAST LOADING 
 
The vulnerability of the masonry envelop under blast loading is considered critical due 
to the risk of loss of lives. Very few numerical or experimental studies have been 
conducted on impact and blast on structural components of building structures, 
characterized by strain rates well over 1 s-1, with quasi-static tests characterized by 
strain rates in the range 10-5 to 10-7 s-1.  There is a need for more research to obtain an 
accurate representation of the effect of blasts, as high nonlinear behaviour and possible 
brittle failure has been observed. The out of plane vulnerability of the masonry envelop 
under dynamic loading is considered critical due to the risk of loss of lives, emphasized 
by many studies, particularly in the case of earthquakes (Calvi and Bolognini, 2001), 
and explosion debris (Wu and Hao, 2007). Still, only a few laboratory experimental 
investigations are available, simulating vehicles impacts on parapets (Gilbert et al, 
2002) and air-blasting (Mayrhofer, 2002). 
 
A key issue on the mechanical behaviour under blast is the strength increase due to 
high-strain rate. Explosions produce very high strain rates, usually around 102 – 104 s-1. 
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Reinforced concrete structures, for example, are highly affected by this phenomenon; its 
resistance can increase greatly due to the high strain rate effect, dynamic increase 
factors as high as 4 in compression and 6 in tension have been reported (Grote et al, 
2001; Ngo et al, 2004). In the case of masonry and its components the available studies 
are very limited in number. Recently, dynamic increase factors higher than 2 in 
compression for clay brick were reported (Hao and Tarasov, 2008) and Chapter 4 from 
the present document specifically addresses this issue. 
 
This work intends to present a newly developed test setup for dynamic out-of-plane 
loading using underWater Blast Wave Generators (WBWG) as loading source. 
Underwater blasting operations have been, during the last decades, subject of research 
and development of maritime blasting operations (including torpedo studies), aquarium 
tests for the measurement of blasting energy of industrial explosives and confined 
underwater blast wave generators. WBWG allow a wide range for the produced blast 
impulse and surface area distribution. It also avoids the generation of high velocity 
fragments and reduces atmospheric sound wave (Tavares et al, 2012; Ambrósio et al, 
2013). 
 
One objective of this work is to study the behaviour of masonry infill walls subjected to 
blast loading. Three different masonry walls are to be studied, namely unreinforced 
masonry infill walls and two different reinforcement solutions. These solutions have 
been studied previously for seismic action mitigation (Pereira, 2013). Finally, there is an 
intention to create tools to help designers to make informed decisions on the use of 
infills under blast loading. 
 
 
5.1 TEST SETUP FOR DYNAMIC OUT-OF-PLANE LOADING 
This work was performed in collaboration with LEDap (Laboratory of Energetics and 
Detonics) in Condeixa-a-Nova, Figure 5.1a. The developed test setup was constructed at 
LEDap facilities and comprises several elements. A support steel structure holds the 
specimen in place and provides sufficient reaction to the wall’s reinforced concrete 
frame, Figure 5.1b. Additional details on the design of the support structure can be 
found in Annex B.1. 
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On one side of the wall a number of large (one cubic metre) water containers are placed 
to act as WBWG and apply the desired load. On the other side of the wall, measuring 
equipment is placed is order to characterize the behaviour of the wall. The maximum 
deflection is measured using laser equipment and high speed video cameras are used to 
record the wall during the test. All the area is surrounded by protection walls and a safe 
area was defined to provide safe hosting for the acquisition equipment and personal 
during the tests, Figure 5.2. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.1 – Test setup: a) LEDap facilities; b) support steel structure. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Final configuration of the test setup. 
 
 
5.1.1 Blast wave generator 
The original blast wave generators (BWG), from the direct application of an explosion 
in air with high explosives, have the inconvenient of producing hot polluted gases, 
providing a reduced area of induced pressure, allowing the possibility of generation of 
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high velocity fragments and producing a very intense sound wave. Using confined 
underwater blast wave generators (WBWG), applying the extremely high rate 
conversion of the explosive detonation energy into the kinetic energy of a thick water 
confinement, allows a surface area distribution. This also avoids the generation of high 
velocity fragments and reduced the atmospheric sound wave (Plaksin and Campos, 
2007).  
 
Since the physical properties of water and air are different, the characteristics of the 
shock waves (in air and water) are also different, mainly due to density and shock wave 
velocity (shock impedance) of the materials. The density of water is about 800 times 
greater than the density of air, while the sound velocity in water is 1500 m/s and the 
sound velocity in air is about 330 m/s (4.5 times faster). Therefore, the shock wave in 
water is 4.5 times faster than in air, and the pressure impulse for the shock wave in 
water is 15-20 times higher than in air (Tavares et al, 2012). After the detonation of an 
explosive charge under water, the detonation products expand generating shock wave in 
water and forming a gas bubble. This gas bubble expands and the pressure inside the 
bubble decreases. Because of inertia of water flow in front of the bubble, the expansion 
of the gas bubble continues even after the pressure inside the bubble decreases slightly 
below the pressure of the surrounding water. Afterwards, the pressure inside the gas 
bubble drops below the pressure of the surrounding water and the gas bubble movement 
stops (Plaksin and Campos, 2007). However, the phenomenon does not fully stop as the 
gas bubble contracts under the action of surrounding pressure. The contractions and 
expansions continue  for several cycles, which generates pulsating movement in the gas 
bubble and additional compression waves in the water (Tavares et al, 2012).  
 
In the tests carried out here, the explosive charge was place in the centre of the water 
container (Figure 5.3). The explosive used in the tests was PETN (pentaerythritol 
tetranitrate), a highly explosive organic compound. For the first level of loading, 7.2 g 
of PETN were used in each water container. 
 
The generic one cubic metre containers have a metallic protection mesh surrounding 
them, which needed to be cut on the side facing the wall, in order to have full contact. 
The metallic mesh on the remaining sides was left in place to help keeping the water 
volume (Figure 5.4a). Due to the size of the wall under study (3.5×1.7 m) six water 
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containers were used, being two rows of 3 water containers on top of each other. The 
procedure for placing the water containers was the following: a) prepare all metallic 
meshes as indicated; b) place the first row of containers in their final position; c) place 
the explosive charge in the centre of the container (using a thin tube to guide and to 
keep the charge in place); d) fill the first row of containers with 3000 litres of water 
(Figure 5.4b); e) place a wooden board on top of the first row to help distributing the 
weight of the second row; f) place the second row of containers (Figure 5.4c); repeat 
steps c) and d).  
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.3 – Water container: a) schematic view; b) photo. 
 
   
a) b) c) 
Figure 5.4 – Preparing the WBWG: a) cutting the metallic mesh; b) filling the first 
containers; c) both levels in place. 
 
 
5.1.2 Pressure/deflection acquisition 
One of the main issues regarding dynamic testing, in this case blast loading, is the 
proper acquisition of signals. The measuring equipment needs to have capacity for high 
acquisition frequencies. In this work there were two signals that needed to be recorded: 
a) the pressure profile acting on the wall; and b) the deflection profile of the wall.  
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For the pressure acquisition, a new sensor was developed. The mechanism used to 
measure the pressure consists of an assembled instrumental stainless steel plate between 
the wall and the water container. The pressure is measured using a tube connected to a 
sensor. This tube contains thin oil and is connected in a closed loop, Figure 5.5. The 
pressure device works like a force multiplier that provides hydrostatic pressure 
transmission. The pressure sensors used were 4-20 mA GemsTM Sensors and Controls 
3100B0016G01B and 3100B0010B01B. The connection of the sensor to the peripheral 
equipment can be seen in Figure 5.6. In order to plot the acquired pressure signal, these 
sensors were connected to a Tektronix TDS 320 oscilloscope, Figure 5.7. This sensor 
was previously tested and calibrated (Tavares et al, 2012 and Ambrósio et al, 2013). 
 
Figure 5.5 – Pressure sensor schematics (left) and construction (right). 
 
 
Figure 5.6 – Pressure sensors and connections to the peripheral equipment. 
 
 
Figure 5.7 – Tektronix TDS 320 oscilloscope and printer. 
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For the deflection acquisition, a Keyence CMOS Multi-Function analogue laser sensor 
IL-2000 with a signal amplifier IL-1000 (Figure 5.8a) was used. This sensor was 
connected to a National Instruments acquisition system composed of a SCXI-1000DC 
chassis, a SCXI-1600 data acquisition and control card for PC connection and a generic 
input module SCXI-1520 with a SCXI-1314 mount, Figure 5.8b. In this case the 
sampling rate was limited by the laser sensor and was set at 3 kHz. With this system, it 
is possible to measure only the deflection of one point in the wall. The selected point 
was the centre point of the wall, Figure 5.9. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.8 – Deflection acquisition: a) laser sensor and amplifier; b) acquisition system. 
 
Besides the usage of pressure and displacement transducers, high speed video 
equipment was used to study the behaviour of the wall during the test. Three different 
cameras were used, marked in Figure 5.1b as camera A, B and C. Camera A (Figure 
5.10) is a PHOTRON APX-RS and was placed to have a full view of the wall. This 
camera was set with an acquisition frequency of 1 kHz. Cameras B and C (Figure 5.11) 
are Casio EX-FH25 and were placed with different angles. Camera B was placed on the 
side of the wall in order to capture the profile of the wall. Camera C was placed in order 
to capture the WBWG and their behaviour during the test. Both cameras were set with 
an acquisition frequency of 0.4 kHz. To help having a better view of the movement of 
the wall, a regular mesh was drawn in the wall using black tape, Figure 5.9. 
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a) b) 
Figure 5.9 – Laser sensor: a) final position; b) support system. 
 
   
a) b) c) 
Figure 5.10 – Camera A: a) PHOTRON APX-RS; b) rear view of the protection case; 
c) front view of the protection case. 
 
   
a) b) c) 
Figure 5.11 – Camera B and C: a) Casio EX-FH25; b) rear view of the protection case; 
c) front view of the protection case. 
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5.1.3 Test specimens 
The test setup was developed for testing the dynamic out-of-plane behaviour of infill 
masonry walls. The adopted solutions for the infill masonry represent the single leaf 
infill walls in modern construction. The masonry infill is built inside a reinforced 
concrete (RC) frame that provides the boundary conditions. The final dimensions of the 
test specimens can be seen in Figure 5.12a, which are made in a 1:1.5 scale. Three 
different solutions (Figure 5.12b) were planned: a) unreinforced single leaf infill with 
30×20×15 cm brick (label URM); b) single leaf infill with 30×20×15 cm brick with bed 
joint reinforcement (label JAR); c) single leaf infill with 30×20×15 cm brick with 
external reinforcement in the plaster (label RAR). All three solutions have 15 mm cover 
on each side. M5 plaster is used on one side and projected lime is used on the other side, 
with the exception of the solution with the external reinforcement which has plaster on 
both sides. Here, due to the difficulties in preparing this experimental set-up, only one 
test is presented. Additional details regarding the design of the masonry specimens can 
be found in Annex B.2. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.12 – Masonry specimens: a) geometry; b) schematics [mm]. 
 
The construction process of the walls consists of the following steps: 1st) construction of 
the RC frames; 2nd) construction of the masonry infill panel with or without 
reinforcement; 3rd) execution of plaster with or without reinforcement. The placement of 
the masonry is done by successive horizontal rows, always from the columns. For the 
first masonry unit, mortar is applied on the bed and head faces. The unit is then pressed 
against lower beam and column. The last unit in each horizontal row is usually cut in 
order to ensure dimensional compatibility. In situations where the panels’ geometry 
makes the cut unreasonable, the spaces are filled with mortar (Pereira et al, 2011). 
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5.2 UNREINFORCED INFILL WALL UNDER BLAST LOADING 
The traditional construction process for building these masonry walls was already 
described. In this specific work, additional steps had to be taken because the wall could 
not be built already in its final position. First, the reinforced concrete frame was built 
outside the testing site (Figure 5.13a). After curing, the frame was transported and 
placed in front of the support structure (Figure 5.13b). At that location, the masonry 
infill was built with the process described before (Figure 5.13c). After curing the wall, 
the plaster and the projected lime were applied to the wall (Figure 5.13d). With the 
masonry wall built, it had to be slightly moved towards the support structure using 
heavy machinery (Figure 5.13e). With the wall in its final position, the reinforced 
concrete frame was bolted to the steel support structure in 11 marked places along its 
perimeter (Figure 5.13f). 
 
With the wall specimen ready to be tested, the loading containers and data acquisition 
equipment needed to be put in place. As shown before, the water container were placed 
and filled in two phases. Meanwhile all the sensors and acquisition systems are mounted 
and tested (Figure 5.14a). The final step before the test itself is connecting the 
detonators (Figure 5.14b). Due to the dangerous nature of these tests, all systems need 
to be triple checked before this final step. After placing the detonators, no one is 
allowed into the test site and every system is controlled from the designated safe area. 
The acquisition systems start and a countdown is set until detonation. 
 
After the test, the acquired signals need to be processed. The oscilloscopes provided the 
applied pressure on the wall and the final pressure profile was plotted, Figure 5.15. The 
pressure arises to 149 kPa in the first 6 ms, then decays and reaches 119 kPa at 17.5 ms 
and stops acting after 29 ms. From the laser sensor, the deflection on the central point of 
the wall was obtained, Figure 5.16. The deflection on the wall has an expected profile, 
increasing until its maximum of 14.6 mm after 24 ms and has a residual value of around 
11 mm.  
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a) b) 
  
c) d) 
  
e) f) 
Figure 5.13 – Building process and aspect of the specimen in the test setup. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.14 – Unreinforced wall test: a) all systems mounted; b) connecting the 
detonators. 
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a) b) 
Figure 5.15 – Acquired pressure: a) from the oscilloscope; b) final pressure profile. 
 
Figure 5.16 – Displacement at midpoint acquired with laser. 
 
Besides these profiles, the video acquired with the high speed cameras was also 
analysed. Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 show some pictures taken from those videos at 
specific times. Due to the magnitude of the deformations (small when compared with 
the dimensions of the wall) it is difficult to perceive the evolution of deformations in 
just a few static pictures. However, analysing the slow motion video, it is possible to see 
the full behaviour of the wall. The maximum displacement is achieved at the centre 
point of the wall, which behaves as a plate supported in its four edges. 
 
After the test, a visual inspection of the wall was also performed. The cracks were 
marked in order to have a view of the crack pattern (Figure 5.19a). There is a large 
concentration of large horizontal cracks at the centre of the wall (Figure 5.19b) and 
these spread to the corner, as they move away from the centre. There are also some 
large cracks at the top support edge. 
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Figure 5.17 – Pictures from video at Camera A at different instances. 
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Figure 5.18 – Pictures from video at Cameras B and C at different instances. 
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Figure 5.19 – Damaged wall after blast test: a) full panel; b) zoom on the centre of the 
panel (2nd row and 3rd column quadrant, from bottom-left corner). 
 
 
5.3 NUMERICAL MODELLING 
The global field of structural analysis of masonry structures encompasses several 
different approaches and a review is given by Lourenço (2008). In general, the approach 
towards the numerical representation of masonry can address the micro modelling of the 
individual components: unit (brick, block, etc.) and mortar; or the macro modelling of 
masonry as a composite. Depending on the level of accuracy and the simplicity desired, 
it is possible to use the following modelling strategies: a) detailed micro-modelling, 
where units and mortar in the joints are represented by continuum elements whereas the 
unit-mortar interface is represented by discontinuum elements; b) simplified micro-
modelling, where expanded units are represented by continuum elements whereas the 
behaviour of the mortar joints and unit-mortar interface is lumped in discontinuum 
elements; c) Macro-modelling, where units, mortar and unit-mortar interface are 
smeared out in a homogeneous continuum. Many approaches involving different 
approximations and ingenious assumptions have been sought, e.g. Gambarotta and 
Lagomarsino (1997), Massart et al (2004), Calderini and Lagomarsino (2006), where 
simplified non-linear homogenization techniques were used. 
 
This numerical analysis was performed using a Finite Element Model (FEM). The 
geometry model was based on the description provided in section 5.1.3. Only the infill 
panel was modelled and a perfect connection was considered between the infill panel 
and the reinforced concrete frame (Figure 5.20a). A macro-modelling strategy was 
adopted, where the panel is considered a homogeneous continuum.  
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The FEM model was built in the ABAQUS software (ABAQUS User Manual, 2010), 
where the Explicit solver was used. This software has been used successfully in 
previous situation regarding similar loading conditions (Cabello, 2011; Jacinto et al, 
2001; Heidarpour et al, 2012) and similar materials (Zheng et al, 2010; Al-Gohi et al, 
2012). The wall was discretized with 8-node solid elements (C3D8R) with reduced 
integration and hourglass control (ABAQUS User Manual, 2010). The final mesh was 
automatically generated by ABAQUS, and is rather refined. The edges were considered 
constrained in all degrees of freedom. The thickness of the wall was set as 180 mm 
(brick plus plaster on both sides). The final mesh has 4872 elements and 6844 nodes 
(Figure 5.20b). 
 
 
 
a) b) 
Figure 5.20 – FEM model: a) geometry; b) FE mesh. 
 
 
5.3.1 Material model 
The CDP (Concrete Damaged Plasticity) model used in ABAQUS software is a 
modification of the Drucker-Prager model by Lubliner et al (1989), Lee and Fenves 
(1998).  In particular, the shape of the failure surface in the deviatoric plane (Figure 
6.12) needs not to be a circle and it is governed by parameter Kc. This parameter can be 
interpreted as a ratio of the distances between the hydrostatic axis and, respectively, the 
compression meridian and the tension meridian in the deviatoric plane. This ratio is 
always higher than 0.5 and when it assumes the value 1, the deviatoric cross section of 
the failure surface becomes a circle (Kmiecik and Kaminski, 2011). The CDP model 
requires four additional parameters to be defined: a) the dilatation angle, the flow 
potential eccentricity, the ratio of initial equibiaxial compressive yield stress to initial 
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uniaxial compressive yield stress and the viscosity parameter. For all these five 
parameters the default values suggested in ABAQUS User’s Manual were used (Table 
5.1). Additional information regarding this model can be found in ABAQUS User 
Manual (2010), Kmiecik and Kaminski (2011), and Jankowiak and Lodygowsky 
(2005). 
 
 
Figure 5.21 – Failure surface in CDP model, represented in the deviatoric plane S1, S2 
and S3 (Kmiecik and Kaminski, 2011). 
 
Table 5.1 – Default parameters of CDP model. 
Parameter Value 
Dilatation angle (Ψ) 40º 
Eccentricity (ε) 0.1 
fb0/fc0 1.16 
Kc 0.667 
Viscosity parameter (µ) 0.0 
 
The CDP model assumes that the failure for tensile cracking and compressive crushing 
of the material is characterized by damage plasticity. The model uses the concept of 
isotropic damage evolution in combination with isotropic tensile and compressive 
plasticity to represent the inelastic and fracture behaviour of the material. The model 
also allows the definition of strain hardening in compression and strain softening in 
tension. The adopted stress-strain curves in tension and compression can be seen in 
Figure 5.22. 
 
As stated previously, these masonry walls were tested and mechanically characterized 
under quasi-static conditions. The data collected from Pereira (2013) regarding the 
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quasi-static mechanical properties for the single leaf infill wall with plaster on both 
sides can be seen in Table 5.2. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.22 – Stress-strain relations: a) in tension; b) in compression  
(Lubliner et al, 1989). 
 
Table 5.2 – Quasi-static mechanical properties (Pereira, 2013). 
Parameter Static 
ft [MPa] 0.125 
fc [MPa] 1.24 
E0 [GPa] 3.6 
GfI [N/mm] 0.012 
 
The CDP model allows the definition of the mode-I fracture energy instead of the 
definition of the stress-strain relation in tension. The quasi-static properties obtained 
from the tests serve as a base for the calibration of the numerical model. The mechanical 
properties under dynamic conditions will be subsequently obtained by matching the 
deflection of the numerical model with the experimental data. 
 
 
5.3.2 Explicit analysis 
ABAQUS Explicit was used to solve the non-linear equations of this problem. In order 
to keep this problem within a pure Lagrangian formulation, the blast loading was 
defined as a pressure profile. The blast loading applied was derived from the obtained 
experimental data (Figure 5.15b). The calibration process started with the application of 
the static reference mechanical properties. After realizing that the displacement obtained 
was much higher than the obtained experimentally, the mechanical properties were 
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increased gradually until there was a good agreement between the numerical model and 
the experimental data. The final dynamic properties and the respective dynamic increase 
factor (DIF) can be seen in Table 5.3. This process is not fully objective but, although 
these materials are not the same as the materials studied in Section 4, the obtained 
results are in agreement with the conclusions obtained for the masonry specimens. 
Dynamic increase factors between 2 and 3 for the compressive strength and the Young’s 
modulus. The tensile behaviour was not studied in Section 4. 
   
Table 5.3 – Dynamic mechanical properties. 
Parameter Static Dynamic DIF 
ft [MPa] 0.125 0.375 3 
fc [MPa] 1.24 3.78 3 
E0 [GPa] 3.6 7.2 2 
GfI [N/mm] 0.012 0.025 2 
 
Figure 5.23a shows the result from the numerical model in terms of displacement vs. 
time and compares it with the experimental data. There is a good initial agreement up to 
12 mm in deformation. At this instant the experimental curve changes its slope, 
probably due to appearing cracks. The maximum displacement has a difference of 3%. 
In the post-peak behaviour there is some difference between the experimental and the 
numerical model. In the experimental test the wall was able to set its residual 
deformation at 76% of the maximum deformation. In the numerical model the residual 
deformation was 91%. In the experimental test, when the blast wave from the WBWG 
reaches the wall it generates an expansion wave that travels through the thickness of the 
wall. When this expansion wave reaches the opposite edge of the wall it will start 
moving in the opposite direction creating a “negative” wave profile, which was not 
considered in the numerical model. This can justify part of the difference. It is possible 
that there is some sliding in the test, particularly, in the top crack, which is not 
considered in the model.  
 
A proper definition of the mechanical properties through adoption of dynamic increase 
factors is crucial in this type of analysis. As can be seen in Figure 5.23b, where a 
comparison of the dynamic increase factor is performed, using the static properties 
(DIF=1) in this model results in excessive deformation, which would lead to the 
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collapse of the wall. On the other hand, using a dynamic increase factor of 5 in all 
mechanical properties means that the wall behaves mostly in its elastic regime, having a 
neglectable residual deformation. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.23 – Numerical results: a) comparison between the numerical model and the 
experimental data; b) DIF’s influence in the response. 
 
Besides the comparison of the deflection profile, the damage on the wall was also 
compared. The maximum principal plastic strains are a reasonable indicator of cracking 
and were plotted in Figure 5.24 for the face on the back of the explosion. As expected, 
according to this model, there is a concentration of cracks at mid height of the wall that 
will start to spread to the corners as we move further from the centre point. There is also 
some damage at the bottom and top edge of the wall. These results are in agreement 
with the observed damage in the experimental test (Figure 5.19). 
 
 
Figure 5.24 – Maximum principal plastic strain in the external face of the wall 
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5.3.3 Reinforcement 
Although it was not possible to test experimentally reinforced solutions for the infill 
masonry walls, as done by Pereira (2013), numerical models for the planned reinforced 
solutions were prepared. The first reinforcement solution under study – JAR: bed joint 
reinforcement – has BEKAERT MURFOR RND .4/100 every two horizontal joints. 
The adopted geometry for the numerical model can be seen in Figure 5.25 and 
comprises the previous model with the addition of 8 reinforcement bars embedded in 
the masonry region. Each reinforcement bar has a cross section area of 12.57 mm2. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.25 – JAR solution: a) geometry; b) assembly view from the numerical model. 
 
The second solution for reinforcement under study – RAR: external mesh reinforcement 
– has BEKAERT – ARMANET Ø1.05 mm 12.7×12.7 mm in both sides of the wall, 
embedded in the plaster. An equivalent reinforcement grid with 87.55×87.55 mm 
openings was added to the unreinforced model (Figure 5.26). Each reinforcement bar 
has a cross section area of 5.97 mm2. The reason for changing the grid size and not 
using the original one is the computational time to run the analysis. With the original 
grid, the final FE mesh was composed of more than 150 000 elements and with this 
equivalent grid have only 21472 elements, from the masonry region and the truss 
elements from the reinforcement.  
 
The reinforcement elements, for both models, were truss elements T3D2 which is a 2 
node linear 3D truss for explicit analysis (ABAQUS User Manual, 2010). For the 
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material properties an elastic – ideal plastic model was adopted. The static mechanical 
properties for the reinforcement were collected from the product datasheets, available in 
Annex B.3. Because there was no experimental work performed on the material 
properties at high strain rates for these reinforcement bars, the recommended DIF in 
UFC 3-340-02 (2008) was used. This standard indicates a DIF of 1.23 for the tensile 
strength of reinforcement steel in bending. The dynamic properties for this material can 
be seen in Table 5.4.  
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.26 – RAR solution: a) geometry model; b) reinforcement grid. 
 
Table 5.4 – Dynamic mechanical properties for reinforcement. 
Parameter Static Dynamic DIF 
fy [MPa] 320 394 1.23 
E0 [GPa] 210 210 1 
 
Figure 5.27 shows the result obtained for the displacement at the centre point of the wall 
considering both reinforcement solutions and compares it with the unreinforced model. 
As can be seen, both solutions show an improvement in the response of the structure. 
The solution considering bed joint reinforcement decreases the maximum displacement 
of the wall in 25% and the solution with the grid reinforcement decreases the maximum 
displacement in 50%. These solutions have been studied for seismic action mitigation 
and the results reported for that specific application suggest that both reinforcement 
solutions improve the response of the out-of-plane behaviour of masonry walls (Pereira 
et al, 2011). However, the obtained response seems to be similar for both reinforcement 
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solutions under cyclic combined in-plane and out-of-plane loading using airbags 
(Pereira et al, 2011). The results are hardly comparable as there is no in-plane action in 
the present case. The numerical analysis for impulsive loading carried out suggests a 
considerable difference between both reinforcement solutions but it must be kept in 
mind that the results were not validated with experimental data.   
 
 
Figure 5.27 – Influence of reinforcement in the response of the wall. 
 
Certainly, higher improvements in the response of the wall could be obtained by 
increasing the amount of reinforcement added. Figure 5.28 shows the maximum 
displacement for the URM wall and compares it with three different solutions for the 
bed joint reinforcement: JAR 4mm – bed joint reinforcement with .4/100 in every two 
horizontal joint; JAR 5mm – bed joint reinforcement with .5/100 in every two 
horizontal joint; and JAR all joints – bed joint reinforcement with .4/100 in every 
horizontal joint. 
 
 
Figure 5.28 – Influence of the amount of reinforcement in the response of the wall. 
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As can be seen in Figure 5.28 the improvement with increasing the amount of 
reinforcement isn’t proportional to the reinforcement ratio. Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that the behaviour is rather dependant on the compressive behaviour of 
masonry. This can be seen in Figure 5.29, where another analysis was performed with 
the minimum JAR reinforcement and a masonry with double compressive strength (fc = 
7.5 MPa). Doubling the compressive strength of masonry, the response (in terms of 
maximum displacement) is less than half.  
 
 
Figure 5.29 – Influence of the compressive strength of masonry in the reinforced 
solutions. 
 
In order to have a better grasp on the influence of these minimum reinforcement 
solutions, additional model were studied for different wall thickness. Thickness of 
140 mm and 230 mm were studied, the selected values for the thickness of the wall 
were determined assuming the use of 30×20×11 cm3 and 30×20×20 cm3 bricks plus 
same plaster on both sides, even if plaster is usually not considered for design purposes. 
Figure 5.30 shows the obtained results for the minimum reinforcement solutions for 
these two different thickness walls. The grid reinforcement was the same for both 
models, but due to construction restrictions, the bed joint reinforcement needed to be 
different. RND .4/80 and RND .4/150 trusses were used for the 140 mm and the 
230 mm respectively. It can be seen that the grid reinforcement has a higher 
improvement in the response of the wall for both models. These results show that the 
response of the wall to these impulse loadings is highly influenced by its thickness. The 
same loading profile resulted in maximum deformations of about 400 mm, 15 mm and 
3 mm for increasing thickness of 140 mm, 180 mm and 230 mm respectively.   
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a) b) 
Figure 5.30 – Minimum reinforcement solutions: a) 30×20×11 cm3 brick; 
b) 30×20×20 cm3 brick. 
 
 
5.4 PARAMETRIC STUDY 
In order to discuss the influence of the mechanical and geometric properties of masonry 
infill panels on the blast response, a parametric study was performed. For this kind of 
analysis it is important to understand this influence as a function of the impulsive 
loading. This can be obtained by varying the applied load according to the scaled 
distance Z (Z = R/W1/3 [m/kg1/3]) which depends on the weight of the explosive (W) and 
the standoff distance (R).  
 
Knowing the weight of the explosive and its standoff distance it is possible to determine 
the applied reflected pressure for different loading scenarios using equations 5.1 – 5.3 
developed for point source explosions. 
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Here PS0 is the side-on overpressure, Pr is the reflected pressure and td is the positive 
duration. A detailed description of these equations is given in Chapter 2.  
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Table 5.5 shows the range of properties selected for this parametric study. The tensile 
and the compressive strength range from the static reference value up to a DIF equal to 
5. The Young’s modulus ranges from its static reference up to a DIF equal to 3 and the 
fracture energy ranges from its static reference up until a DIF equal to 4. The selected 
values for the thickness of the wall were determined assuming the use of 30×20×11 cm3 
and 30×20×20 cm3 bricks plus same plaster on both sides, even if plaster is usually not 
considered for design purposes. The reinforcement can either be absent (URM), in the 
bed joint (JAR) or in the plaster (RAR). Unless stated otherwise, when varying a 
selected property the remaining properties are kept at their mid values. 
 
Table 5.5 – Properties range in the parametric study. 
Parameter Min Mid Max 
ft [MPa] 0.125 0.375 0.650 
fc [MPa] 1.26 3.78 6.30 
E0 [GPa] 3.6 7.2 10.8 
GfI [N/mm] 0.012 0.025 0.050 
Thickness [mm] 140 180 230 
Reinforcement JAR URM RAR 
 
The compressive strength, Figure 5.31a, has a considerable influence on the maximum 
displacement of the wall, for smaller scaled distances. This influence appears to fade 
once a certain level of compressive strength is achieved, which means that from a 
certain point there is no real advantage on increasing the compressive strength. The 
Young’s modulus, Figure 5.31b, influences the maximum displacement of the wall at all 
levels of scaled distance. When analysing the tensile strength, Figure 5.31c, it is 
possible to see the same behaviour of that the compressive strength, with a similar 
conclusion. When varying the tensile strength, the fracture energy was also changed in 
the same proportion as the tensile strength. The Mode I-fracture energy, Figure 5.31d, 
only influences the maximum displacement at smaller scaled distances. Here, the tensile 
strength was kept the same for all models. The thickness of the wall, Figure 5.31e, is 
one of the parameters with larger influence on the maximum displacement of the wall. 
As seen before, the use of reinforcement solutions decreases the maximum displacement 
of the wall, but only to moderate extent for the (low) amounts of reinforcement used. 
Figure 5.31f shows that this influence is inversely proportional to the scaled distance. 
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a) b) 
c) d) 
e) f) 
Figure 5.31 – Parametric study on the properties of infill walls subjected to blast 
loading: a) compressive strength; b) Young’s modulus; c) tensile strength; d) mode-I 
fracture energy; e) thickness of the wall; f) reinforcement solution. 
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5.5 PRESSURE-IMPULSE DIAGRAMS 
Pressure-Impulse diagrams (Figure 5.32) are empirical tools that allow a given load-
impulse combination, which will cause a specific level of damage, to be assessed 
readily (Cormie et al, 2009). These diagrams can be used to assess a specific loading 
profile which caused certain damage to an element, in a post-disaster scenario, as shown 
in Chapter 3. On the other hand, these tools can be used at an early design stage to get 
an approximation of the damage to an element given a specific loading profile. 
 
 
Figure 5.32 – Generic pressure-impulse (P-I) diagram. 
 
In order to make it easier for the designer to use these tools, for the structural elements 
under study, it is better to have damage criteria (Table 5.6) instead of pure deflection 
curves. For the present work, the criteria defined by UFC-3-340-02 (2008) will be 
applied, meaning that instead of iso-deflection curves, the P-I diagrams were plotted 
with two levels of damage, reusable and non-reusable. With the FE model calibrated, 
several simulations were performed for different levels of overpressures and impulses. 
For these numerical models a 1:1 scale was used, meaning that the masonry infill panels 
have an area of 5250 by 2550 mm2. Two different masonry infill panels were studied, 
with 180 mm thickness and 230 mm thickness. 
 
Table 5.6 – Masonry damage criteria (UFC-3-340-02, 2008). 
Element Yield pattern Maximum support rotation 
Masonry Reusable 
One-way 0.5º 
Two-way 0.5º 
Masonry Non-reusable 
One-way 1.0º 
Two-way 2.0º 
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Figure 5.33 to Figure 5.35 present the obtained pressure-impulse diagrams for the three 
constructive solutions under study. As expected, the reinforced solutions are able to 
accommodate somewhat larger loading profiles and have the non-reusable and the 
reusable curves further away. This becomes clear when analysing Figure 5.36 for the 
180 mm thickness and Figure 5.37 for the 230 mm thickness, where a comparison for 
the three constructive solutions under study is performed for both levels of damage. Of 
course, higher percentages of reinforcement can be used to obtain a specified 
performance but, here, the focus is given to the minimum amounts of reinforcement. 
 
a) b) 
Figure 5.33 – P-I diagram for unreinforced masonry infill panel: a) 180 mm; 
b) 230 mm. 
 
a) b) 
Figure 5.34 – P-I diagram for masonry infill panel minimum with bed joint 
reinforcement: a) 180 mm; b) 230 mm. 
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a) b) 
Figure 5.35 – P-I diagram for masonry infill panel with minimum grid reinforcement in 
the plaster: a) 180 mm; b) 230 mm. 
 
Figure 5.36 and Figure 5.37 show that if the damage level required is the reusable stage, 
there is no real advantage in using the minimum reinforcement solutions, for weak 
masonry infills and large panels. Only at the non-reusable stage the minimum 
reinforcement solutions have a relevant contribution for the wall’s response.  
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.36 – P-I diagrams comparing three solutions for 180 mm: a) reusable stage; 
b) non-reusable stage. 
 
These P-I diagrams can be used to select the proper constructive solution regarding a 
specific level of blast loading under design. As can be seen from Figure 5.33 to Figure 
5.37, the thickness of the wall is one important aspect to account for. The grid 
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reinforcement is the solution with the highest mechanical improvement regarding the 
maximum displacement of the wall. Another important aspect regarding this 
reinforcement solution is that it also protects against the appearance of flying debris 
into, possibly, occupied areas. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 5.37 – P-I diagrams comparing three solutions for 230 mm: a) reusable stage; 
b) non-reusable stage. 
 
 
5.6 FINAL REMARKS 
A newly developed test setup for dynamic out-of-plane testing on walls was presented, 
including the developed sensors and acquisition apparatus. Using underwater blast wave 
generators (WBWG) it was possible to have a surface area distribution of pressure 
avoiding the generation of high velocity fragments and reducing atmospheric sound 
wave. Also the required test site area can be greatly reduced using these WBWG as 
opposes to traditional air blast, where to have a full surface distribution the charge need 
to be far away from its target. 
 
One unreinforced masonry infill panel was tested under blast loading using underwater 
blast wave generators and the results were presented. The obtained results were used to 
calibrate a numerical model using ABAQUS Explicit dynamics software. A good 
agreement between the numerical model and the experimental data was obtained, 
allowing a detailed study on this kind of masonry panels under dynamic out-of-plane 
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loading in the form of a parametric study for different loading conditions and different 
properties of masonry. This parametric study showed that there is a point where the 
increase of the compressive and tensile strength is no longer effective (as the response 
becomes elastic), while the Young’s modulus and the wall thickness are the parameters 
with the higher influence on the behaviour of the wall panel. Two different 
reinforcement solutions were analysed numerically and the results show that both 
solutions improve the response of the wall, to a moderate extent, as the amounts of 
reinforcement are close to the minimum values (only for crack control). The 
reinforcement solution with the best performance under blast loading was the grid 
reinforcement in the plaster of the wall, as the amount of reinforcement is slightly 
higher. 
 
These results were used to create empirical tools – Pressure-Impulse diagrams – which 
can help the designer to estimate the response of the element under different loading 
conditions. It was shown that the use of these (low percentage) reinforcement solutions 
is more effective considering the non-reusable stage of the element. If the requirement is 
the reusable stage there is no real advantage in the use of these (low percentage) 
reinforcement solutions, and the best way to improve the response of the wall would be 
increasing its thickness or designing the reinforcement according to the performance 
sought. More experimental data is required to confirm these findings and additional 
masonry infill walls should be tested. 
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Chapter 6 
6 PROTECTING INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Protection is not an absolute concept and there is a level of protection where the cost of 
the protection provided with respect to the cost of potential loss is in balance. On one 
hand, protection cannot offer full guarantee of safety and, on the other hand, too much 
protection is a waste of resources with regard to what is expected to be saved. The 
purpose of protective construction is to improve the probability of survival of people 
and other contents in a given facility for a given threat. In order to improve this 
probability, one must first understand the threat and accordingly analyse the facility. In 
this chapter Risk Assessment will be addressed and applied to a large Public Transport 
(PT) Operator. This assessment will allow identifying potentially critical infrastructure, 
which will be studied and its security will be evaluated for different scenarios regarding 
blast loading. 
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6.1 TERRORISM 
Terrorism is defined by the U. S. Department of State in the United States Code as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets 
by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” 
(DoS, 2007). The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines 
Terrorism as “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, 
intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do 
or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as 
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no 
circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature”. There are four key distinguishing 
elements of terrorism: (a) It is premeditated – planned in advance and not conducted as 
an impulsive act of rage; (b) It is political – designed to change the existing political 
order; (c) It is aimed at civilians – not military personnel or facilities; (d) It is carried 
out by subnational groups – not a country’s army (TTSRL, 2008). 
 
In terrorism, physical assets including people, products, services, information, and 
property are viewed as targets. Terrorist attacks are often spectacular, designed to 
disturb and influence a wide audience beyond the victims of the attack itself. Terrorists 
can operate individually or in large groups and can perpetrate their attacks in different 
ways for different goals: (a) Causing casualties; (b) Damaging or destroying critical 
infrastructure; (c) Disrupting the economy; (d) Harassing, weakening, or embarrassing 
the government; (e) Discouraging tourism or investments due to perceived insecurity 
(Bennett, 2007). 
 
Armed attacks and bombings constituted nearly 80% of all terrorist attacks in 2011 
(Figure 6.1a). Suicide attacks accounted for just 2.7% of terrorist attacks in 2011 but 
21% of all terrorism-related fatalities, a fact that underscores their extreme lethality. 
IEDs (Improved Explosive Devices) were the most frequently used and deadliest 
terrorist weapon employed (Figure 6.1b). The number of bombing attacks has remained 
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relatively consistent over the past five years, ranging between approximately 4000 and 
4500 annually (NCC, 2012).  
 
Over 12000 people were killed by terrorist attacks in 2011. More than half of the people 
killed in 2011 were civilians and 755 were children (Figure 6.2). Although civilians 
were the largest single group of victims killed in terrorist attacks, their numbers, 
between 2007 and 2011, in proportion to the total number of deaths have decreased. The 
number of government employees and contractors, government officials and police has 
increased from the previous year (NCC, 2012).   
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 6.1 – Number of attacks and deaths by terrorism in 2011: a) by attack type and 
b) by weapon type (NCC, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 6.2 – Deaths by victim categories in 2011 (NCC, 2012). 
 
Security Evaluation and Design of Structures Subjected to Blast Loading 
146 
In the year of 2011, over two-thirds of all terrorist attacks struck infrastructure or 
facilities. Of those, transportation assets and public places were the most frequently 
targeted. Transportation facilities – such as vehicles, buses and transportation 
infrastructure – incurred damage in about 39% of the attacks, while public places – 
including communal areas, markets, polling stations, religious institutions, schools and 
residences – incurred damage in about 28% of the attacks (Figure 6.3). 
 
 
Figure 6.3 – Attacks damaging facilities by facilities category in 2011 (NCC, 2012). 
 
In summary, bombing is the weapon of choice for terrorist attacks, being used in 40% of 
the terrorist attacks worldwide (in the year of 2011) and responsible for most of 
fatalities and injuries related to terrorism. Looking at the damaged infrastructure it is 
possible to see transportation infrastructure as the most targeted type of infrastructure. 
 
 
6.2 RISK ASSESSMENT 
Terrorism has been described as the deliberate use of violence to create a sense of 
shock, fear and outrage in the mind of the target population. One of the reasons that 
make this easy to achieve is that developed societies have become very dependent on 
complex and fragile systems (railways, airlines, gas pipelines, electricity infrastructure, 
large shopping areas and business centres, etc.) which are both vulnerable and critical to 
society’s functions, and provide the terrorist with many suitable targets. Attackers can 
use various weapon systems in different combinations and such events cannot be 
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predicted. However, reliable information and objective threat and risk assessment can 
produce effective estimates of such incidents. 
 
Risk Assessment must be understood as a step or a process inside the Risk Management 
model. Figure 6.4 shows a simplified representation of the Risk Management model. 
Risk Management is a systematic and analytical process by which an organization 
identifies, reduces, and controls its potential risks and losses (Homeland Security, 
2011). This process allows organizations to determine the magnitude and effect of the 
potential loss, the likelihood of such loss actually happening, and the countermeasures 
that could lower the probability or magnitude of loss.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 – Risk management model. 
 
The first step is to conduct a threat assessment where the threat or hazard is identified, 
defined and quantified. The next step of this model is to identify the values of the asset 
that need to be protected. After performing the asset values assessment, the next step is 
to conduct a vulnerability assessment where there is an evaluation of the potential 
vulnerability of the critical assets against the identified threats or hazards. The next step 
is the risk assessment: analysing the threat, asset value, and vulnerability it is possible to 
ascertain the level of risk for each critical asset against applicable threat. The final step 
of this model is to consider mitigation options. Risk assessment on its own incorporates 
the first four steps described: threat, impact and vulnerability assessment which allow 
assessing the risk. In the following topics each of these steps will be addressed briefly. 
 
There are a number of methods available to conduct an organization’s risk assessment, 
and the steps can be accomplished in different sequences. Examples are given in: 
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 FEMA 452, from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, USA, How-To 
Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings – considers a 
comprehensive methodology to prepare a risk assessment, providing means to 
assess the risk to the assets and to make risk-based decisions on how to mitigate 
those risks. The primary use of this methodology is for buildings, although it 
could be adapted for other types of critical infrastructure (FEMA 452, 2005). 
 ISO 31000, International Standards Organization, International Standard: Risk 
Management – provides organizations with guiding principles, a generic 
framework, and process for managing risk. It gives emphasis to considering risk 
in terms of the effect of uncertainty on objectives, rather than the risk incident 
(ISO 31000, 2009). 
 DEMA (The RVA model), from the Danish Emergency Management Agency, 
Approach to Risk and Vulnerability Analysis for Civil Contingency Planning – 
has developed a generic scenario-based model for risk and vulnerability 
analysis. The model is developed for government agencies with responsibilities 
for society’s critical functions (DEMA, 2006). 
 UFC 4-020-01, from the Department of Defence, USA, DoD Security 
Engineering Facilities Planning Manual – it includes a procedure for risk 
analysis as a part of a preliminary design criterion (UFC 4-020-01, 2008). 
 
All the previous methodologies have one common objective: to apply a quantitative 
assessment process that identifies the assets at highest risk. One key factor that can lead 
to an effective risk assessment is the selection of the entities/people brought into the 
process. These assessments should have inputs from, but not limited to, police agencies, 
intelligence agencies, structural engineers and national emergency management 
agencies. 
 
 
6.3 TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Modern society is heavily dependent on transportation networks. In the past 60 years, 
these networks have been seen as an appropriate target for terrorists (Muhlhausen and 
McNeil, 2011). They allow easy access and they provide suitable cover for escape. They 
also provide concentrations of civilians and their slaughter never fails to generate high 
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levels of public interest, both national and international. The attacks on the Spanish 
railway network in Madrid in March 2004, the Metro and Bus strikes in London in July 
2005, the Mumbai train attacks in July 2006 and the bombing in the international arrival 
hall of Moscow's busiest airport in January 2011, among many others, all point to public 
passenger transport networks as being suitable terrorist targets.  
 
COUNTERACT (Cluster Of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to anti-
terrorist ACTivities) was an European research project set up to improve security 
against terrorist attacks aimed at public passenger transport, intermodal freight transport 
and energy production and transmission infrastructure (COUNTERACT, 2006). The 
project focused on the protection of critical transport infrastructures, public transport 
passengers and goods. It reviewed the existing security policies, procedures, 
methodologies and technologies to identify the best practices, which in turn have been 
promoted throughout the relevant security community in the EU. One of the main 
objectives of the project was to develop generic guidelines for conducting risk 
assessment in public transport networks. These guidelines will be presented briefly in 
the next sections. 
 
 
6.3.1 Identify key infrastructure 
In order to identify possible targets for attacks it is necessary to structure the whole PT 
(Public Transport) system in an operational diagram. To structure the system it is 
important to address, namely, the following aspects: 
a) How attractive is the city/region for terrorists compared to others? 
b) How attractive is the PT system for terrorists compared to other potential targets 
in the city/region? 
c) Which system elements are most attractive for terrorists? 
d) Which parts of the network are most critical to the operation? 
e) What is the number of passengers in interchange/stations/stops, vehicles (at peak 
times)? 
f) Is there special/ large events organized nearby that could temporarily raise the 
risk level? 
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g) Are there institutions/ organizations nearby that generate a group of passengers 
which is at special risk? 
 
By structuring the PT system taking into consideration the aspects above, it will be 
possible to assess the key infrastructure in the system. The combination of the two 
components, Probability of Occurrence and Impact/Severity, in a portfolio allows the 
user to identify risks easily. 
 
 
6.3.2 Probability of occurrence 
The probability of occurrence is the possibility of a threat being executed, which is 
measured in escalating categories. COUNTERACT suggest a 5-level scale (Table 6.1), 
where the criteria for differentiation between the different steps focus mainly on the 
frequency that the threat has been executed in their own or in other PT operations. 
 
Table 6.1 – Probability of occurrence (COUNTERACT, 2009). 
Very 
High 
5 
The threat can be executed at any time and/or has been executed within the organization 
repeatedly. 
High 4 
It has to be reckoned with the threat being executed repeatedly. The threat has been 
executed within the own organization once. 
Possible 3 
An execution of the threat has to be reckoned with. The threat has been executed 
repeatedly within other PT operations world-wide, or at least once within a PT operation 
in the own/ neighbouring country. 
Low 2 
The threat is executed rarely, but has been executed in isolated cases in other 
organizations (world-wide). 
Very 
Unlikely 
1 
An execution of the threat is extremely unlikely, and the threat has never been executed 
in other PT operations before. 
 
 
6.3.3 Severity of occurrence 
Impact/Severity stands for the damage to an asset arising from the execution of a threat, 
which is measured in escalating categories. COUNTERACT suggest a 4-level scale 
(Table 6.2), where the criteria for differentiation between the different steps focus 
mainly on the consequences of the various threats for persons, property and PT 
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operator. The final classification for the Impact would be the maximum of the three 
consequences. 
 
Table 6.2 – Impact/Severity (COUNTERACT, 2009). 
  
Consequences for 
Persons 
Consequences for 
Property/Environment 
Consequences for PT Operator 
and Services 
Disastrous 4 
Several deaths and/or 
numerous severe injuries 
Most severe damage to 
property and/or 
environment 
Loss of vital functions and/or 
operation over a long period of 
time 
Critical 3 
Low number of deaths 
and/or severely injured 
Severe damage to property 
and/or environment 
Loss of vital functions and/or 
operation over a short period 
of time 
Marginal 2 Light casualties 
Notable damage to 
property and/or 
environment 
Minor impact on functions 
and/or operation. 
Uncritical 1 
Possibility of few light 
casualties 
Small damage to property 
and/or environment 
No impact on functions and/or 
operation 
 
 
6.3.4 Risk categories 
The combination of Probability of Occurrence and Impact/Severity results in the Risk 
categories applying the following formula: 
 
Risk = Probability of Occurrence × Impact/Severity (6.1) 
 
COUNTERACT suggests four risk categories according to their score (Table 6.3) and 
the subsequent required action. 
 
Table 6.3 – Risk categories (COUNTERACT, 2009). 
Categories Score Action Required 
Intolerable 15 – 20 Must be avoided or Impact must be mitigated as far as possible 
Precarious 8 – 12 Shall only be accepted if the efforts for prevention and/or mitigation of 
impact is unreasonably high 
Tolerable 4 – 6 Shall be accepted, but threat needs to be assessed regularly 
Negligible 1 – 3 Shall be accepted 
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6.4 CASE STUDY – “LISBON DISTRICT” 
As stated previously, transportation infrastructure is the most targeted type of 
infrastructure when it comes to terrorist attacks. A risk assessment was performed on 
the largest Public Transportation Operator in Portugal – REFER. REFER was created in 
1997, through Law-Decree 104/97, of 29 April, as a public company responsible for 
providing the public service of managing the national railway network infrastructure in 
Portugal. REFER manages an operational network of 2800 km with a daily average of 
trains of 1776 and comprises 561 train stations, Administration Offices (AO) and 
Operational Command Centres (OCC) (REFER, 2012).  
 
Performing a risk assessment analysis allow to identify the elements in the network with 
the highest risk regarding a specific threat and provides the decision makers with 
essential tools to prioritize possible interventions. The COUNTERACT methodology 
was chosen for its specific character regarding Public Transportation Operators. 
Because of time constrains only the District of Lisbon was considered in this study. In 
this part of Portugal REFER serves a population of two million residents plus 
commuters, including the Portuguese Capital.  
 
 
6.4.1 Key infrastructure 
The first step in the analysis is to identify all the elements present in this geographic 
area and, following predefined criteria, identify those where the probability of 
occurrence and the severity will be determined. In this geographic area, REFER has five 
railways (Figure 6.5), one Operational Command Centre (OCC) and one Administrative 
Office (AO). The railways being: a) “Linha de Sintra”; b) “Linha de Cascais”; c) “Linha 
de Cintura”; d) part of “Linha do Norte” and e) part of “Linha do Oeste”. Identifying all 
the elements resulted in 71 train stations plus an OCC and an AO.  
 
The next step consists in an element classification following five distinct criteria. The 
choice of the selected criteria took into account the internal methodology for 
characterization of stations used by REFER. The criteria selected were: C1 – Passenger 
flow; C2 – Service provided; C3 – Mobility; C4 – Significance; and C5 – Location. 
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Figure 6.5 – Railways in the selected area for the risk assessment. 
 
C1 – Passenger flow: 
The number of passenger starting or ending a journey at a station is an important 
indicator. This influences the design and maintenance of the element, and regarding this 
specific study, provides a direct relation with the potential victims of a possible attack. 
For each station a value of C1 is assigned based on the following equations: 
 
C1i =  
ẑ௜ < 10	000 ṥ1௜ = ൬ ẑ௜ −ẑ௠௜௡10	000 −ẑ௠௜௡ × 25 
(6.2) 
10	000	 ≤ ẑ௜ < 50	000 ṥ1௜ = ൬ ẑ௜ − 10	00050	000 − 10	000 × 25 + 25 50	000	 ≤ ẑ௜ < 250	000 ṥ1௜ = ൬ ẑ௜ − 50	000250	000 − 50	000 × 25 + 50 
ẑ௜ ≥ 250	000 ṥ1௜ = ൬ ẑ௜ − 250	000ẑ௠௔௫ − 250	000 × 25 + 75 
Where: 
C1i – Value of criteria C1 for the station i; 
Vi – Monthly passenger flow for the station i; 
Vmin – Minimum monthly passenger flow for all stations under analysis; 
Vmax – Maximum monthly passenger flow for all stations under analysis. 
 
The values defined for each interval were defined according to the internal manuals of 
the PT Operator. 
 
C2 – Service provided: 
The service provided at a specific element affects the distance covered during the 
journey, the amount of time a passenger stays in the station, and the frequency of trains, 
among other aspects. The service reflects the area of influence associated with the 
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station. The services considered are: Suburban, Regional, Inter-Regional, Inter-City, 
Alfa Pendular (faster strains North-South connecting Lisbon to Porto and other main 
cities) and International. For each station a value of C2 is assigned based on the 
following equation: 
 
ṥ2௜ = Ѷẋ௣௜ (6.3) 
Where, 
Spi =  
ẋݑẙݑݎẙẘⱶ 0.225 
ẉⱡⱦⱪⱷⱶẘↄ 0.100 
ṱⱶݐⱡݎ − ẉⱡⱦⱪⱷⱶẘↄ 0.100 
ṱⱶݐⱡݎ − ṥⱪݐݕ 0.225 
ṡↄⱥẘ	ṿⱡⱶẛݑↄẘݎ 0.225 
ṱⱶݐⱡݎⱶẘݐⱪⱷⱶẘↄ 0.125 
 
The weights of each service were defined according to the internal manuals of the PT 
Operator. 
 
C3 – Mobility: 
The complementary services and the offered transport conditions at a specific station 
should take into account the mobility regarding other transport modes (soft modes, 
highway, railway, sea, aerial, etc.). The connection with other services affects the 
station capacity and construction layout. This criterion takes into account all the 
different services provided at each station. For each station a value of C3 is assigned 
based on the following equation: 
 
ṥ3௜ = Ѷṹ௜ (6.4) 
Where, 
Mi =  
ẋⱷⱥݐ	ⅎⱷẛⱡ 0.04 
ṿݎⱪݒẘݐⱡ	ẚẘݎݏ 0.08 
ẍẘݔⱪݏ 0.08 
ṣݑݏⱡݏ 0.15 
ẍݎẘⅎ 0.15 
ṣⱷẘݐݏ	ⱷݎ	ṫⱡݎݎⱪⱡݏ 0.25 
ẏⱶẛⱡݎⱦݎⱷݑⱶẛ	ṹⱡݐݎⱷ 0.25 
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C4 – Significance: 
This criterion reflects the significance of each station according to its nature, and it is 
one of the most difficult criteria to define. However a few parameters (Table 6.4) are 
defined to help verifying if a station gathers the necessary conditions to be labelled as 
significant for each level. Five levels of significance were defined, namely: National, 
Regional, Touristic, Architectural and Rail network. For each station a value of C4 is 
assigned based on the following equation: 
 
ṥ4௜ = Ѷẋ௜ (6.5) 
Where, 
Si =  
ṻẘݐⱪⱷⱶẘↄ 0.30 
ẉⱡⱦⱪⱷⱶẘↄ 0.25 
ẍⱷݑݎⱪݏݐⱪẚ 0.15 
ṡݎẚℎⱪݐⱡẚݐݑݎẘↄ 0.15 
ẉẘⱪↄ	ⱶⱡݐݓⱷݎⱴ 0.15 
 
C5 – Location: 
This criterion takes into account the location of the station. The selected stations for this 
study are located in 12 municipalities of the Lisbon district. The value of this criterion is 
proportional to the population of each municipality and ranges from 1.0 to 0.0 for the 
highest population to the lowest population, respectively. The number of inhabitants for 
each municipality was taken from the national census of the year 2011 (INE, 2012). 
 
Final score: 
Other criteria could be selected in this first step. Events such as large concerts, sports 
events, every outdoor activity that implies a large volume of people using a specific 
element at a specific time could lead to a different classification of the element. This 
dynamic property of this process is an important feature and shows how “real time” 
monitoring is so important. In order to achieve the final ranking score of each element 
in the network the following equation was applied: 
 
ṥ௜ = 0.51 × ṥ1 + 0.13 × C2 + 0.13 × C3 + 0.13 × C4 + 0.10 × C5 (6.6) 
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The weights selected for each criterion can be different according to the specific 
network under study or taking into account different selected criteria. It should be noted 
that the passenger flow is taken as the most important parameter, with about 50% of the 
weight. 
 
Table 6.4 – Significance justification parameters. 
Significance Justification parameters 
National 
Highlighted station with a high hierarchical national level. Placed with special 
relevance as an image of the Portuguese rail network for the Portuguese and foreigner 
passenger.  
Regional 
Highlighted station at regional level. Placed with special relevance as representative 
of its region. 
A station with National significance has cumulatively Regional significance. 
Also applies if the station in a district capital. 
Touristic 
Station with particular interest from the tourist point of view as it provides 
accessibility to the tourist area in which it operates. 
Station belonging to a particular railway with a touristic character. 
Connections with touristic routes, namely with other transport modes. 
Architectural Station with recognised historical and architectural significance. 
Station with relevant aesthetics or cultural elements. 
Rail network Station with unique conditions or services regarding an operational point of view. 
Station with historic value regarding the development of the national railway network. 
 
These five criteria were applied to all elements of the network and a ranking score was 
achieved. An acceptable threshold should be defined by the team selected to perform the 
risk assessment, in order to proceed with the analysis. Here, a threshold of 0.6 was 
selected, meaning that every element with this score and higher was taken to the next 
steps of the COUNTERACT process. Table 6.5 shows the individual scores for selected 
examples of elements in this network. The full list of scores can be seen in Annex C.1. 
 
As a result of the first step 12 stations were selected with scores higher than 0.6 (Table 
6.7). These stations will join the CCO and the AO for the next steps. These last two 
elements were immediately moved to the following steps due to their specificity. 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 – Protecting Infrastructure 
157 
Table 6.5 – Selected examples of key infrastructure scores. 
# Railway Station C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C 
10 Cascais Oeiras 0.78 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.30 0.49 
15 Cascais Estoril 0.68 0.88 0.20 0.15 0.37 0.54 
17 Cascais Cascais 0.78 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.37 0.51 
23 Cintura Chelas 0.18 0.23 0.12 0.4 1.00 0.29 
30 Norte Bobadela 0.43 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.36 0.32 
35 Norte Vila Franca de Xira 0.75 0.65 0.2 0.15 0.24 0.54 
43 Oeste Telhal 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.68 0.12 
46 Oeste Mafra 0.01 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.08 
58 Sintra Lisboa Rossio 1.00 0.23 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.85 
62 Sintra Amadora 0.89 0.23 0.20 0.60 0.31 0.62 
 
 
6.4.2 Probability of occurrence 
In this step, each element is crossed with the selected threats. For the purpose of this 
study, only threats involving explosions were selected. Five levels were selected 
according to the capacity of the delivery system: 
 Suicide vest (9 kg TNT) 
 Luggage (20 kg TNT) 
 Car (500 kg TNT) 
 Van (1 500 kg TNT) 
 Truck (25 000 kg TNT) 
 
The calculation of the probability of occurrence for each threat and each element 
implies a research on previous and similar attacks and attempts. Table 6.6 shows some 
of the previous attacks on PT Operators after the year 2000.  
 
After crossing the information of previous attacks on similar PT Operators and their 
delivery systems, a value of Probability of Occurrence (Table 6.1) is assigned to each 
threat and for each element, with the results shown in Table 6.7. As can be seen the 
highest value for Probability of Occurrence is 3. No threat has been executed within the 
own organization, but similar threats has been executed repeatedly within other PT 
Operators worldwide, including neighbouring countries. 
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Table 6.6 – Previous terrorist attacks on PT Operators using explosives (examples). 
Place Year Fatalities Description 
Angola 2001 252 Used an explosive device to derail a train and attack the 
passengers with fire weapons. 
Refiganj, India 2002 130 Derail a trail over a bridge. 
Stavropol Krai, 
Russia 
2003 46 Suicide bomber in a train. 
Moscow, Russia 2004 41 Suicide bomber at the subway station Avtozavodskaya. 
Madrid, Spain 2004 191 Several explosions in the railway system. 
London, UK 2005 56 Three explosions at subway stations and one explosion in a bus. 
Mumbai, India 2006 209 Several explosions in the suburban system. 
Moscow, Russia 2010 40 Two suicide bombers at subway stations, Lubyanka and Park 
Kultury. 
Moscow, Russia 2011 35 Suicide bomber at Domodedovo airport. 
 
Table 6.7 – Probability of occurrence. 
# Railway Station Vest Luggage Car Van Truck 
1 Cascais Cais do Sodré 3 3 2 2 1 
5 Cascais Algés 3 3 2 2 1 
19 Cintura Campolide 3 3 2 2 1 
20 Cintura Sete Rios 3 3 2 2 1 
21 Cintura Entrecampos 3 3 2 2 1 
22 Cintura Roma-Areeiro 3 3 2 2 1 
25 Norte Santa Apolónia 3 3 2 2 1 
27 Norte Oriente 3 3 2 2 1 
58 Sintra Rossio 3 3 2 2 1 
59 Sintra Benfica 3 3 2 2 1 
62 Sintra Amadora 3 3 2 2 1 
66 Sintra Agualva-Cacém 3 3 2 2 1 
72 CCO CCO-Lisboa 1 1 1 1 1 
73 AO Administration 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
6.4.3 Severity of occurrence 
As shown before in Table 6.2, the consequences can be separated in three categories: 
consequences for persons, property and PT Operations. In the case of consequences for 
persons, the impact/severity is measured by the numbers of injured people and fatalities. 
This was estimated according to previous attacks with similar delivery systems and the 
number of passengers at peak time for each station. The consequences for property were 
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estimated studying the layout of the station. Figure 6.6 shows the maximum pressure for 
the threats under study for different standoff distances. Each threat has a minimum 
standoff distance for each station layout, meaning that, as an example, it is not possible 
for a truck carrying 25 000 kg of TNT equivalent to get closer than 10 meters from the 
Cais do Sodré main building, while a vest carrying 9 kg of TNT equivalent can get 
virtually anywhere. Following this procedure for each station layout it is possible to 
establish minimum standoff distances for each threat and each station. With this 
information and the data from Figure 6.6 it is possible to determine the maximum 
pressure each threat can develop for every station. There are reference charts, such as 
FEMA 426 (2003) or Elsayed and Atkins (2008), where pressure thresholds are 
presented for different construction materials. In reality, the damage from blast loading 
depends on the maximum pressure and the positive duration (impulse), however, for 
this simple estimation only the maximum pressure was considered sufficient. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 – Maximum pressure as a function of the standoff distance. 
 
The consequences for the PT Operator were estimated according previous attacks on 
similar size stations. Studying the time while the attacked PT Operators ceased 
functions on a similar size station due to similar threats, it is possible to have an 
estimation of the required time for this PT Operator. 
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Table 6.8 – Severity of occurrence. 
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Cais do Sodré 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Algés 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 
Campolide 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 
Sete Rios 3 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 
Entrecampos 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 4 4 3 
Roma-Areeiro 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 
Santa Apolónia 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 
Oriente 3 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 
Rossio 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 2 3 4 2 4 4 2 
Benfica 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 
Amadora 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 
Agualva-Cacém 3 1 1 4 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 4 3 
CCO-Lisboa 2 1 3 2 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 4 2 4 4 
Administration 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 3 
 
 
6.4.4 Risk matrix 
With the scores for the Probability of Occurrence and the Severity of Occurrence is 
possible to plot the Risk Matrix shown in Table 6.9. Because the Portuguese PT 
Operator has no previous occurrences of attacks, there is no combination with disastrous 
classification. Some combinations scored a critical classification (8 – 12) due to similar 
attacks on neighbouring countries and the respectively delivery systems (9 – 20 kg 
TNT), with easy “infiltration” and possibility to achieve low standoff distances.  
 
This methodology is relatively easy to apply and provides the PT Operator with tools to 
quantify the relative risk for its elements. It must be kept in mind that this is a dynamic 
process and requires “real time” updates whenever there is a change in the network. A 
public event nearby one of the elements could lead to a higher risk value on that element 
at that specific time. 
 
 
Chapter 6 – Protecting Infrastructure 
161 
Table 6.9 – Risk matrix. 
# Railway Station Vest Luggage Car Van Truck 
1 Cascais Cais do Sodré 9 12 6 6 4 
5 Cascais Algés 6 9 6 6 4 
19 Cintura Campolide 6 9 6 6 3 
20 Cintura Sete Rios 9 9 6 6 4 
21 Cintura Entrecampos 9 12 6 6 4 
22 Cintura Roma-Areeiro 6 9 6 6 3 
25 Norte Santa Apolónia 6 9 6 6 4 
27 Norte Oriente 9 9 6 8 4 
58 Sintra Rossio 9 12 6 8 4 
59 Sintra Benfica 6 9 6 6 4 
62 Sintra Amadora 9 12 6 6 4 
66 Sintra Agualva-Cacém 9 12 6 6 4 
72 CCO CCO-Lisboa 3 3 3 4 4 
73 AO Administration 2 2 2 3 4 
Where, 
Intolerable: 15-20  Precarious: 8-12 Tolerable: 4-6 Negligible: 1-3 
 
As stated before, Risk Assessment in only one of the steps in the Risk Management 
model and the following step should be a detailed analysis of the highest risk elements, 
where prevention and mitigation measures would be studied. Comparing the risk values 
with and without those prevention and mitigation measures and the required investment 
costs, the PT Operator could make informed decisions on where and how to act. If a 
more detailed study on the behaviour of a specific element is required, a security 
assessment could be performed. In the next section a Security assessment, regarding the 
structural behaviour, will be performed on one of highest risk elements. 
 
 
6.5 PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Rossio station (Figure 6.7a) was selected for this study. Formerly known as Central 
Station, this building was design between 1886 and 1887 by the Portuguese architect 
José Luís Monteiro. This building is classified since 1971 as Property of Public Interest 
by IGESPAR. The three-story building is constructed in limestone stonework. The 
building “L” shape can be seen in Figure 6.7b. This is a high value element in the PT 
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Operator Network, not only because of its effect on public opinion but due to its high 
passenger flow. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 6.7 – Rossio station: a) front façade (East) and side façade (North); b) top view 
schematic. 
 
Two different scenarios (Figure 6.8) were studied in this analysis:  
 Scenario A – corresponds to an explosion at a square on the South side of the 
building (at 4 meters from the building). The luggage size IED (around 20 kg 
TNT) was the selected delivery system for this scenario. 
 Scenario B – corresponds to an explosion at the East façade of the building (at 5 
meters from the centre of the façade). The vehicle size IED (around 1500 kg 
TNT) was the selected delivery system for this scenario. Another situation was 
analysed – Scenario B’ – where the access to vehicles up until 25 meters from 
the East façade was closed. The same delivery system (1500 kg TNT) would 
still be possible but only at 25 meters from the centre of the façade. 
 
 
Figure 6.8 – Different explosion scenarios: scenario A on the South side and scenario B 
on the East side. 
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6.5.1 FEM model 
The FEM model was built in the ABAQUS software, where the Explicit solver was 
used. The definition of the geometric model was based on available drawings but 
without access to the detailed project of the building. This lack of information leads to 
some assumptions, which will be presented in this section. 
 
Figure 6.10 shows the adopted geometry of the building. It is an “L” shaped building 
with around 2300 m2 per floor and external walls having a thickness of 1.0, 0.8 and 
0.6 m for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd floor, respectively. The stone columns were assumed with 
0.8×0.8 m2 and 0.4×0.8 m2, for the front section and side section, respectively. The 
dimensions used to construct this model can be seen in Figure 6.10a. The story heights 
are about 7.7, 6.8 and 6.8 m, from the ground level to the top (Figure 6.10b). The lower 
ends of the walls at the 1st floor are considered fixed to the ground (0.0 m level). Due to 
lack of information regarding the floors of the building, different models were prepared, 
neglecting and considering the contribution of pavements.  
 
 
Figure 6.9 – Building schematic. 
 
The walls were modelled as shell elements and the columns were modelled as beam 
elements. The model was discretized in several parts creating a mesh (Figure 6.11). This 
mesh was automatically generated by ABAQUS, and then manipulated and controlled 
in order to obtain a good quality mesh. The walls are discretized with quadrilateral 4 
nodes (S4R) and 3 nodes (S3R) shell elements. These are three-dimensional, iso-
parametric, doubly curved thin or thick shell element. These elements have five degrees 
of freedom at each node, reduced integration, hourglass control, and finite membrane 
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strain (ABAQUS User Manual, 2010). The columns are discretized with 2-node linear 
beam elements (B31). The final mesh has 27968 nodes and 24491 elements. 
 
 
 
a) b) 
Figure 6.10 – Adopted geometry: a) first floor; b) wall section. 
 
 
Figure 6.11 – FEM mesh of the building. 
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2.5.1.1 Material model 
The material model adopted is the CDP (Concrete Damaged Plasticity) model available 
in ABAQUS software and it is a modification of the Drucker-Prager model. A more 
detailed description of this model is given in section 5.3.1 of this document. 
 
The mechanical properties for the masonry are presented in Table 5.2 and were 
collected from Oliveira (2003) and Tassios (2010). The data collected from these two 
sources corresponds to the static properties of limestone stonework (Static label). It 
should be noted that for this kind of analysis a DIF must be introduced. UFC-3-340-02 
(2008) suggests a DIF of 1.19 for the compressive strength of masonry and a DIF of 1.0 
for the other properties. The work presented in Chapter 4 of this document and other 
researches lead to assume that the suggested value in the UFC-3-340-02 for the DIF of 
masonry could be far from reality. Another set of properties was introduced with a DIF 
of around 1.7 (DIF1.7 label). 
 
Table 6.10 – Mechanical properties. 
Parameter Static UFC-3-340-02 DIF1.7 
σt0 [MPa] 0.2 0.2 0.4 
σc0 [MPa] 4.5 5.2 7.5 
σcu [MPa] 6.0 7.0 10.0 
E0 [GPa] 4.5 4.5 7.5 
ρ [kN/m3] 24 24 24 
 
Due to the lack of information regarding the constitution of the pavements, two 
different situations were considered: a) neglecting the contribution of the pavements, 
meaning that the masonry panels are only constrained at ground level and at the 
connections with the other panels; and b) considering a generic pavement assuming 
perfect connections to the walls, introducing intermediate constrains at the masonry 
panels.  This pavement was assumed as a reinforced concrete slab recent addition, 
modelled as elastic, with a Young’s Modulus of 30 GPa and a density of 2400 kg/m3. 
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2.5.1.2 Blast loading  
In order to keep this problem as a pure Lagrangian formulation, the blast loading was 
defined as pressure profiles. Knowing the position and the weight, in TNT equivalent, it 
is possible to estimate the pressure profile acting on a specific surface. Chapter 2 
provides the interaction between the blast wave and the structure. Figure 6.12 shows the 
blast loading distribution for Scenario B. Due to the size of the East façade, three zones 
of loading were defined (L1, L2 and L3) each having different standoff distances (R1, 
R2 and R3). Regarding the North and South sides as well as the roof, the standoff 
distance was measured at one meter distance from the edge (Cormie et al, 2009) into the 
surface itself, and the pressure profile was considered constant throughout all the façade 
(L4). 
 
 
Figure 6.12 – Blast loading distribution. 
 
Knowing the weight of the explosive and the distances for each loading zone, it is 
possible to plot each pressure profile, using equations 6.7 – 6.10: 
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In Chapter 2 there is a more detailed description of the previous equations. As an 
example, Figure 6.13 shows the pressure profiles for a Scenario B’ situation with 
1500 kg @ 25 m. The same procedure was applied to Scenario A, in which eleven 
different pressure profiles were developed. 
 
As expected, the maximum pressure is highly dependent on the distance to target. For a 
building with such high dimensions, the effects from both scenarios will be mostly 
localized. In order to decrease the computational time on the analysis, the whole 
structure was divided into two parts (Figure 6.14): a) Front section, regarding Scenario 
B and B’; and b) Side section, regarding Scenario A. 
 
 
Figure 6.13 – Pressure profiles acting on the building for 1500 kg @ 25 m. 
 
 
Figure 6.14 – Sections of the building for different scenarios. 
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6.5.2 Explicit analysis 
ABAQUS Explicit was used to solve the non-linear equations of this problem. This 
software has been used successfully in previous situation regarding similar loading 
conditions (Cabello, 2011; Jacinto et al, 2001; Heidarpour et al, 2011) and similar 
materials (Zheng et al, 2010; Al-Gohi et al, 2012). It must be noted that this analysis 
focuses only on the structural response of the building. Non-structural parts of the 
building, door frames, glazing systems, or occupants were not taken into consideration 
in the present analysis. 
 
For this kind of analysis it is necessary to define a damage criterion that can be applied 
to categorize the damage on the masonry panels. UFC-3-340-02 (2008) classifies the 
damage to unreinforced masonry walls according to the support rotation (Table 5.6). 
Other authors (Doherty et al, 2002; Zapata and Weggel, 2008; UFC-3-340-01, 2002) 
state that collapse would occur if the maximum deflection reaches the wall thickness. 
Varma et al (1996) reported a 4-level qualitative damage criterion based on observation 
of the wall. For the present work, the criteria defined by UFC-3-340-02 (2008) will be 
applied, meaning that the support rotations will be checked in order categorize the 
damage on the masonry panels.  
 
Table 6.11 – Unreinforced masonry damage criteria (UFC-3-340-02, 2008). 
Element Yield pattern Maximum support rotation 
Masonry Reusable 
One-way 0.5º 
Two-way 0.5º 
Masonry Non-reusable 
One-way 1.0º 
Two-way 2.0º 
 
2.5.1.3 Scenario A 
Scenario A corresponds to an explosion at a square on the South side of the building 
(Figure 6.8). It is a place with possible high concentration of people due to the presence 
of outdoor cafes. An explosion with 20 kg TNT at 4 meters from a surface will create a 
reflected pressure of around 1.5 MPa with duration of 1.4 ms (Figure 6.15). The 
adopted methodology for applying the load was already described previously and 
resulted in eleven different pressure profiles applied to the masonry panels according to 
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the distance from the explosion centre. The reflection angle was considered constant at 
90º for all panels. For the present analysis, the initial instant corresponds to the moment 
when the blast wave first touches the building.  
 
Scenario A was studied with material properties labelled as UFC-3-340-02 (Table 5.2) 
and considering the contribution of pavements. As it will be shown this scenario 
represents a low impact loading in the structure, and in order to easily see the results, 
only part of the structure (the closest part to the explosion), will be presented (Figure 
6.16).  
 
 
Figure 6.15 – Pressure profiles for scenario A. 
 
 
Figure 6.16 – Side section final mesh. 
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Table 6.12 shows the time histories for the deformation and the maximum principal 
plastic strains for this part of the building. The panel on the left, which is closest to the 
explosion, is the first to be loaded. Then the blast wave reaches the panel on the right. 
At this time, the first panel is already unloaded and it is still moving due to the structure 
inertial forces.  
 
Although the structure has small displacements, the loading is enough to reach the 
nonlinear behaviour of the masonry. As given in Table 6.12 there is a concentration of 
plastic strains on the right side of the panel on the left. It is possible to have in that area 
some cracking, although it should be negligible.  
 
This level of loading is very low for this structure. The closest panel to the explosion 
has a maximum displacement of around 2.75 mm, keeping a 1.5 mm permanent 
displacement after the loading (Figure 6.17a). The analysis of the support rotations 
(Figure 6.17b) shows that these are still far away from the failure criteria described 
before. Although only the results from these two panels are shown, the rest of the 
structure was analysed and, as we move further away from the explosion, the maximum 
deformation of each panel decreases. In fact, apart from the area described above where 
there is a concentration of plastic strains, the rest of the structure stay in its elastic 
regime. 
 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 6.17 – Time histories: a) displacement; b) rotations at supports. 
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Table 6.12 – Scenario A: deformed mesh and location of the maximum principal plastic 
strains. 
 Deformed mesh Location of the max. principal plastic strain 
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2.5.1.4 Scenario B 
Scenario B corresponds to an explosion at the East façade of the building, at 5 meters 
from the centre of the façade (Figure 6.8). An explosion with 1500 kg TNT at 5 meters 
from a surface will create a reflected pressure of around 34.5 MPa with duration of 
1.7 ms in the L1 region and around 2.5 MPa in the L2 region (Figure 6.18). The adopted 
methodology for applying the load was described previously and resulted in four 
different pressure profiles applied to this building.  
 
 
Figure 6.18 – Pressure profile for scenario B in the L1 and L2 regions of the front 
section. 
 
Scenario B is a close-range large blast, and it will generate very high strain rates in the 
masonry, for this reason this scenario was studied with the material properties labelled 
as DIF1.7 (Table 5.2), which are assumed closer to the actual physical characteristics. 
Due to the presence of large span masonry panels, both situations regarding the 
pavements (neglecting and considering its contribution) were considered and the results 
were compared. Only the first 30 ms of analysis are presented here. Although being 
possible to capture the complete behaviour of the structure, 30 ms are enough to reach 
the collapse of the structure considering the damage criteria defined previously. 
 
Table 6.13 shows the evolution of deformation for this model. As can be seen, regions 
L1 to L3 are loaded in order due to their proximity to the explosion. The global 
response of the structure changes if we neglect or consider the contribution of 
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pavements. In the first case, the East facade panel behaves as one large masonry panel 
being supported at ground level and on its side edges. In the second case, considering 
the contribution of the pavements, the East façade behaves with intermediate supports 
along its height, similar to three “independent panels”. Due to the dimensions of these 
panels (very long) it is almost as if they were only supported at the bottom and at the 
top. 
 
Table 6.13 – Deformed mesh time history for scenario B: with and without pavements. 
 Without pavements With pavements 
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Security Evaluation and Design of Structures Subjected to Blast Loading 
174 
The load resulting from this explosion is quite high and the structure response is quite 
fast. In the first 30 ms the masonry reaches a velocity of around 10 m/s resulting in 
around 300 mm of maximum displacement in the L1 region after 30 ms (Figure 6.19). 
The difference, in the maximum displacement for the L1 region after 30 ms, neglecting 
or considering pavements in the model is around 17%. When we increase the distance 
from the explosion this difference increases. 
 
 
a) b) 
Figure 6.19 – Displacement time histories for scenario B: a) neglecting pavements; 
b) considering pavements. 
 
Analysing the support rotations (Figure 6.20) it is clear that, in both situations, the 
masonry panel rotates beyond the non-reusable state defined in UFC-3-340-02 (2008). 
At this point, it was considered that this part of the structure would have collapsed. The 
contribution of pavements in the model leads to lower values of rotations at ground 
level (Figure 6.20b). However, the behaviour of the panel in the first floor is closer to 
one-way yield pattern which lowers the limit to 1.0º.   
 
Table 6.14 shows the evolution of the maximum principal plastic strains. In both cases 
the collapse would occur close to the boundaries of the L1 region. The supports at 
ground level sustain high levels of strains in both cases, but considering pavements, the 
area at the 2nd floor pavement also presents itself with large plastic strains. This is due to 
the intermediate support originated by that pavement. 
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a) b) 
Figure 6.20 – Rotations time histories for scenario B: a) neglecting pavements; 
b) considering pavements. 
 
Table 6.14 – Time history of the location of the maximum principal plastic strains for 
scenario B: with and without pavements. 
 Without pavements With pavements 
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2.5.1.5 Scenario B’ 
Scenario B’ corresponds to an explosion at the East façade of the building, at 25 meters 
from the centre of the façade (Figure 6.8). This simulates the possibility of closing to 
traffic the road right in front of this façade and the application of bollards preventing 
vehicles to get closer to the building. An explosion with 1500 kg TNT at 25 meters from 
a surface will create a reflected pressure of around 0.45 MPa with duration of 9.5 ms in 
the L1 region (Figure 6.21). The adopted methodology for applying the load was 
already described and resulted in four different pressure profiles applied to this building.  
 
 
Figure 6.21 – Pressure profiles for scenario B’.  
 
In this scenario all three sets of material properties were studied and compared for both, 
neglecting and considering the pavements contribution. Different analysis times were 
considered due to the different behaviour of neglecting or considering the contribution 
of pavements. The analysis neglecting the contribution of pavements had duration of 
1000 ms (1 s). Considering the contribution of pavements, 150 ms are enough to capture 
the complete behaviour of the structure. 
 
Table 6.15 and Table 6.16 show the evolution of deformation and the maximum 
principal plastic strains, neglecting and considering the contribution of pavements. 
These results were plotted with the material properties labelled as DIF1.7. The 
behaviour of the masonry panels is similar to the one observed in Scenario B. Without 
pavements, the east façade behaves as one large masonry panel supported at ground 
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level and on its sides. With pavements, it is clear the “independent panel” behaviour at 
the 3rd floor (Table 6.16). 
 
Figure 6.22 shows the displacement in the L1 region and at 3rd floor. The behaviour for 
both possibilities regarding pavements is different. In the first case (Figure 6.22a) the 
maximum displacement at 3rd floor is achieved at around 0.75 seconds after the blast 
wave reaching the structure while in the second case (Figure 6.22b) the maximum 
displacement at 3rd floor is reached at around 0.055 s after the arrival of the blast wave. 
 
 
a) b) 
Figure 6.22 – Displacement time histories for scenario B: a) neglecting pavements; 
b) considering pavements. 
 
In both models the support rotations (Figure 6.23) are kept under the Reusable limit 
established by UFC-3-340-02 (2008). In the model considering the contribution of 
pavements an additional point was analysed. As can be seen in Table 6.16 the maximum 
displacement will take place in the 3rd floor, meaning that the maximum rotation is at 
the 3rd floor level. This last rotation is still under the reusable limit (Figure 6.23b). 
Although it is not shown here, the rotations at the side edges of the East façade were 
also analysed and its value are also under safe levels. 
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Table 6.15 – Scenario B’ neglecting pavements: deformed mesh and location of the 
maximum principal strains. 
 Deformed mesh Location of the max. principal strains 
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Table 6.16 – Scenario B’ considering pavements: deformed mesh and location of the 
maximum principal strains. 
 Deformed mesh Location of the max. principal strains 
t =
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a) b) 
Figure 6.23 – Rotations time histories for scenario B’: a) neglecting pavements; 
b) considering pavements. 
 
The distribution of stresses and strains for both models is quite different. Table 6.15 and 
Table 6.16 show the maximum principal plastic strains for both models. While in the 
model neglecting the contribution of pavements there is a concentration of plastic strain 
at ground level, along the horizontal support (Table 6.15), in the other model that is not 
observed. In the second model, because the maximum deformation occurs at the 3rd 
floor, there is a concentration of plastic strain at the 3rd floor mid-level (Table 6.16). 
 
In order to evaluate the influence of the suggested material properties, a comparison was 
made and the results can be seen in Figure 6.24. As expected the maximum 
displacement is achieved with the static properties. The maximum displacement with 
DIF1.7, which represents an increase of 70% in the strength and modulus of the 
material, is around 68% of the static reference. The dynamic increase factor suggested 
by UFC 3-340-02 (2008) leads to a maximum displacement of around 92% of the static 
reference. The selection of material properties has a large influence on the structural 
response. Clearly, the UFC 3-340-02 standard wants to suggest an underestimated 
dynamic increase factor for materials, although recent researches suggest otherwise. 
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Figure 6.24 – Maximum displacement for different material properties. 
 
 
6.6 FINAL REMARKS 
A specific risk assessment model for public transport networks was applied to a case 
study in a Portuguese region and the elements with the highest risk due to external 
explosions were identified. It was argued that this model is dynamic and highly 
dependable on the risk assessment team responsible for conducting it.  
 
From the highest risk group, one element was selected for a detailed analysis, Rossio 
Station. This structure was modelled using explicit non-linear dynamics and the results 
were presented for different explosion scenarios. It was shown that a small package 
explosion would have a small impact on the structure while a large package explosion 
would lead to the collapse of the structure. Increasing the standoff distance, as a 
measure for mitigating the impact of the explosion, was analysed and proven to be an 
effective measure.  
 
Considering or neglecting the contribution of the pavements affects the behaviour of the 
structure and assessing the real conditions of the pavements and their connections to the 
wall panels is important in order to have quality results. A comparison was also made 
for different material properties. Selecting the material properties also has an important 
role, due to the large impact on the final results. If possible, in situ assessment of 
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material properties should take place to properly grasp the condition of existing 
buildings. Recent research, including the one in this work, suggests that the available 
codes could be outdated regarding the dynamic increase factor for material properties. 
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Chapter 7 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis studied several topics related to blast loading and the response of structures 
under such impulsive loading. To do so, a literature review was performed on the 
explosion phenomenon and its interaction with structures, for both terrorist actions and 
accidental explosions. The main issues regarding explosions with High Explosives (HE) 
and Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCE) were addressed and the available methodologies 
to assess the blast loading parameters from these two different types of explosions were 
presented. In addition, the available methods for analysing structures under blast 
loading were presented and research on the material behaviour under high strain rates 
was performed. This developed background supported the research work performed. 
The main achievements found in each chapter are summarized below.  
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7.1 SYNTHESIS AND RESULTS 
In Chapter 3 a new methodology for predicting the blast loading parameters through 
pressure indicators was provided. This methodology was applied to lightweight switch 
boxes and Pressure-Impulse (P-I) diagrams were presented. These tools, developed 
using ANSYS/LS-DYNA, can help assessing the magnitude of overpressures and 
impulses in the event of accidental explosions, by backtracking the loading 
characteristics from the damage observed in lightweight switch boxes under similar 
loading conditions. Taking Buncefield Major Incident as a case study, sub-structures 
were adopted to explain the severity of the explosion and the magnitude of the 
experienced overpressures. The obtained results showed a good agreement with the 
empirical and numerical solutions for estimating the blast loading parameters. The lack 
of powerful material models and element types available in explicit dynamics analysis 
was also highlighted.  
 
In Chapter 4 a large experimental campaign was performed on different loading regimes 
and different materials. Masonry specimens and masonry components, clay brick and 
mortar, were tested under quasi-static regime – strain rate of 10-5 s-1 – and dynamic 
regime with strain rates ranging from 2 s-1 up to 200 s-1. Almost 250 impact tests 
allowed finding that most mechanical properties under compression of these materials 
increase with the strain rate, having Dynamic Increase Factors (DIFs) ranging from 2 to 
6 for a strain rate of 200 s-1. It was found that the strain at peak strength can be 
considered constant and unchanged with the strain rate. For the compressive strength 
and the Young’s modulus, both masonry and clay brick presented similar behaviour 
while the mortar specimens were more sensitive to the strain rate. The presence of fibres 
in the composition of the mortar adopted in the tests could help explain this difference. 
For the compressive fracture energy, both masonry and mortar presented similar results, 
while the handmade clay brick specimens, probably due to their high porosity, 
presented a much higher increase of fracture energy with the strain rate. Lastly, 
empirical relations of Dynamic Increase Factors (DIF) for each property and material 
were developed and presented. 
 
In Chapter 5 a newly developed test setup for dynamic out-of-plane testing on walls was 
presented, including the developed sensors and acquisition apparatus. Advantages such 
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as, having a surface area distribution, avoiding the generation of high fragments and 
reducing the atmospheric sound wave, lead to the adoption of underwater blast wave 
generators (WBWG) as opposed to the traditional air blast. The results obtained from 
the test on one unreinforced masonry infill panel allowed calibrating numerical models 
using ABAQUS Explicit software. Parametric studies showed that there is a point where 
the increase of the compressive and tensile strength is no longer effective (as the 
response becomes elastic), and the Young’s modulus and the wall thickness are the 
parameters with the higher influence on the behaviour of the wall panel. Although there 
was no experimental test performed on reinforced masonry infill panels, two different 
(low percentage) reinforcement solutions were studied with the numerical models. 
Finally, these results were used to create empirical tools – Pressure-Impulse diagrams – 
which can help the designer to estimate the response of the element under different 
loading conditions. It was shown that the use of these (low percentage) reinforcement 
solutions for crack control purposes is more effective considering the non-reusable stage 
of the element. If the requirement is the reusable stage there is no real advantage in the 
use of these (low percentage) reinforcement solutions, and the best way to improve the 
response of the wall would be increasing its thickness or designing reinforcement 
according to the sought performance level. 
 
In Chapter 6 a specific risk assessment model for public transportation networks was 
applied to a case study in a Portuguese region and the elements of the infrastructure 
with the highest risk due to external explosions were identified. Risk assessment 
methodologies proved to be highly dependent on the assessment team witch should be 
composed of professionals with different expertise. One of the infrastructure elements 
identified previously was selected for a detailed structural safety analysis using non-
linear dynamics available in ABAQUS Explicit. Different external explosion scenarios 
were studied and the behaviour of the structure under blast loading was presented. It 
was shown that increasing the standoff distance for an explosion is always a good 
measure to improve the structural response, more so in the case of historical buildings, 
where the possibility of structural retrofitting is more limited. The importance of proper 
material characterization under dynamic loading was also highlighted.    
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The work presented in this thesis is composed of experimental and numerical 
campaigns, which gave a contribution for better understanding the effects of impact and 
blast loading on civil engineering structures and materials.   
 
 
7.2 FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
In the scope of material behaviour under dynamic loading some aspects that deserve 
further attention are highlighted: 
 The empirical relations obtained for the material properties under different strain 
rates can and should be used to improve the available material models for 
numerical analysis. Regarding this aspect, different researchers have been 
implementing strain rate dependent non-linear material models in explicit 
dynamic structural analysis software. 
 The evaluation of the effect of the strain rates for the selected materials in this 
thesis under tension is needed. The DIF characteristics of these materials under 
tension are likely to be different from the behaviour under compression. This 
study requires changes in the adopted test set-up or the use of different testing 
equipment, such as a large modified Split-Hopkinson pressure bar. 
 The evaluation of the effect of the strain rates on strengthening materials for 
masonry walls. Regarding this aspect a new drop-weight tower was designed 
and built (Figure 7.1) to study the influence of the strain rates on the bond 
behaviour of FRP sheets and clay brick. 
 
  
a) b) 
Figure 7.1 – New drop-weight tower for pull-out dynamic testing: a) schematics; 
b) building process. 
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In the scope of structural behaviour under dynamic loading some aspects that deserve 
further attention are highlighted: 
 The results obtained numerically for the reinforced masonry infill panels should 
be validated experimentally with the developed test setup. Additional wall 
panels for testing are part of a current research project at University of Minho. 
 Additional methodologies for modelling these masonry infill panels, such as 
micro-modelling, should be investigated.  
 Strain rate dependent non-linear material models should be tested and validated 
with the experimental results from these masonry panels, for different impacts. 
 
In the scope of risk assessment and structural safety evaluation some aspects that 
deserve further attention are highlighted: 
 For increasing the value of the developed risk matrix, additional detailing of the 
transportation network and related infrastructure should be provided and the 
incorporation of knowledge from additional sources, such as national crisis 
management agencies and police is advised. 
 Additional geometric and mechanical detailing of the structures is required for a 
more reliable safety assessment. 
 The use of different modelling techniques, such as Discrete Element (DE) or 
Applied Element (AE) should also be investigated. These techniques allow for 
proper visualization of the crack propagation and progressive collapse, and their 
performance can be compared with explicit finite elements.  
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ANNEX A.1  
ANNEX A.1 – Complete list of impact tests on clay brick 
 
Strain 
rate  
(s-1) 
Compressive  
Strength 
Young’s 
Modulus  
Strain at  
Peak Strength 
Fracture 
Energy 
Sp
ec
im
en
 (#
) 
σu 
(MPa) DIF 
E 
(GPa) DIF 
εu 
(mm/m) DIF 
Gc 
(N/mm) DIF 
Static 13.31 -- 2.32 -- 6.95 -- 1.56 -- ref. 
T
ar
ge
ts
 
4 14.45 1.09 2.69 1.16 7.27 1.05 2.98 1.91 26 
4 18.82 1.41 3.15 1.36 7.07 1.02 3.05 1.96 46 
5 19.35 1.45 5.00 2.16 4.95 0.71 1.99 1.27 15 
5 18.74 1.41 2.77 1.19 8.26 1.19 0.71 0.45 45 
5 16.08 1.21 1.98 0.85 10.86 1.56 4.89 3.13 84 
5 17.30 1.30 1.85 0.80 12.13 1.75 7.07 4.53 94 
6 19.85 1.49 3.23 1.39 8.39 1.21 4.48 2.87 64 
6 21.83 1.64 4.74 2.04 5.84 0.84 2.68 1.72 76 
6 16.91 1.27 3.82 1.65 3.71 0.53 1.60 1.02 80 
7 18.32 1.38 2.87 1.24 8.71 1.25 6.80 4.36 12 
7 17.54 1.32 3.33 1.43 7.53 1.08 2.82 1.81 44 
7 18.99 1.43 4.35 1.87 5.66 0.81 3.45 2.21 66 
7 22.13 1.66 5.17 2.23 5.76 0.83 3.58 2.29 68 
8 17.64 1.33 4.99 2.15 4.95 0.71 2.16 1.38 83 
9 21.20 1.59 3.06 1.32 10.29 1.48 1.58 1.01 85 
10 21.28 1.60 3.83 1.65 7.76 1.12 4.72 3.03 93 
11 19.37 1.46 5.46 2.35 3.40 0.49 1.86 1.19 17 
11 20.28 1.52 5.49 2.37 4.88 0.70 2.76 1.77 29 
12 18.90 1.42 5.41 2.33 4.76 0.68 2.61 1.67 82 
13 21.84 1.64 2.54 1.09 11.27 1.62 1.34 0.86 57 
14 23.44 1.76 5.27 2.27 5.41 0.78 2.92 1.87 8 
15 21.17 1.59 5.04 2.17 5.70 0.82 2.71 1.74 5 
15 17.85 1.34 2.47 1.06 9.43 1.36 2.69 1.73 51 
17 17.35 1.30 2.42 1.04 9.55 1.37 7.98 5.11 4 
18 21.46 1.61 6.92 2.98 4.37 0.63 3.11 1.99 52 
18 29.84 2.24 5.06 2.18 8.45 1.22 1.39 0.89 99 
19 19.41 1.46 6.81 2.93 4.00 0.58 2.03 1.30 81 
21 25.53 1.92 5.35 2.31 6.62 0.95 4.80 3.08 16 
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ANNEX A.1 – Complete list of impact tests on clay brick (cont.) 
 
Strain 
rate  
(s-1) 
Compressive  
Strength 
Young’s 
Modulus 
Strain at  
Peak Strength  
Fracture 
Energy  
Sp
ec
im
en
 (#
) 
σu 
(MPa) DIF 
E 
(GPa) DIF 
εu 
(mm/m) DIF 
Gc 
(N/mm) DIF 
Static 13.31 -- 2.32 -- 6.95 -- 1.56 -- ref. 
T
ar
ge
ts
 
21 21.92 1.65 4.86 2.10 5.55 0.80 3.70 2.37 24 
21 23.99 1.80 7.73 3.33 4.13 0.59 2.62 1.68 25 
22 22.70 1.71 5.00 2.16 5.98 0.86 3.73 2.39 28 
22 21.88 1.64 3.91 1.69 7.81 1.12 4.33 2.77 39 
22 22.93 1.72 3.42 1.47 9.10 1.31 2.92 1.87 77 
23 22.02 1.65 3.22 1.39 8.85 1.27 5.57 3.57 3 
24 25.35 1.90 4.25 1.83 7.77 1.12 6.59 4.23 90 
29 22.80 1.71 3.82 1.65 7.76 1.12 4.96 3.18 35 
33 26.07 1.96 6.27 2.70 4.29 0.62 2.89 1.85 78 
34 27.13 2.04 4.07 1.76 8.78 1.26 6.65 4.26 31 
34 30.84 2.32 7.54 3.25 5.36 0.77 3.87 2.48 37 
38 26.77 2.01 3.40 1.47 10.50 1.51 8.20 5.25 89 
39 30.46 2.29 3.79 1.63 10.80 1.55 9.29 5.96 9 
40 27.62 2.08 6.22 2.68 5.83 0.84 4.86 3.11 42 
42 31.36 2.36 8.00 3.45 5.22 0.75 4.66 2.99 18 
43 24.53 1.84 3.27 1.41 10.66 1.53 10.19 6.53 2 
44 25.71 1.93 7.15 3.08 5.17 0.74 3.40 2.18 70 
46 27.81 2.09 6.30 2.71 5.85 0.84 5.00 3.20 63 
46 25.87 1.94 2.83 1.22 12.33 1.77 8.03 5.15 69 
56 25.08 1.88 3.92 1.69 8.79 1.26 7.32 4.69 88 
57 36.51 2.74 7.59 3.27 5.96 0.86 5.78 3.71 40 
69 21.52 1.62 4.07 1.75 7.71 1.11 9.17 5.88 55 
73 29.57 2.22 3.57 1.54 11.36 1.63 9.35 5.99 34 
73 28.86 2.17 5.87 2.53 7.25 1.04 6.76 4.33 56 
103 35.77 2.69 4.46 1.92 10.17 1.46 10.14 6.50 20 
111 26.21 1.97 4.63 2.00 7.91 1.14 8.42 5.40 27 
113 36.74 2.76 3.83 1.65 12.60 1.81 10.72 6.87 7 
135 34.53 2.59 4.38 1.89 10.69 1.54 7.50 4.81 14 
150 38.91 2.92 5.41 2.33 10.15 1.46 10.55 6.76 95 
176 30.59 2.30 5.04 2.17 8.39 1.21 9.10 5.83 22 
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ANNEX A.1 – Complete list of impact tests on clay brick (cont.) 
 
Strain 
rate  
(s-1) 
Compressive  
Strength 
Young’s 
Modulus 
Strain at  
Peak Strength 
Fracture 
Energy 
Sp
ec
im
en
 (#
) 
σu 
(MPa) DIF 
E 
(GPa) DIF 
εu 
(mm/m) DIF 
Gc 
(N/mm) DIF 
Static 13.31 -- 2.32 -- 6.95 -- 1.56 -- ref. 
St
ra
in
 G
au
ge
s 
5 15.60 1.17 2.85 1.23 6.45 0.93 2.54 1.63 104 
10 21.70 1.63 3.47 1.50 7.30 1.05 5.18 3.32 100 
11 18.71 1.41 3.06 1.32 8.25 1.19 3.92 2.51 102 
20 24.08 1.81 3.28 1.41 9.46 1.36 5.73 3.67 101 
29 25.51 1.92 4.66 2.01 7.46 1.07 4.90 3.14 103 
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ANNEX A.2  
ANNEX A.2 – Complete list of impact tests on mortar 
 
Strain 
rate  
(s-1) 
Compressive  
Strength 
Young’s 
Modulus  
Strain at  
Peak Strength 
Fracture 
Energy 
Sp
ec
im
en
 (#
) 
σu 
(MPa) DIF 
E 
(GPa) DIF 
εu 
(mm/m) DIF 
Gc 
(N/mm) DIF 
Static 4.46 -- 1.10 -- 6.36 -- 1.44 -- REF. 
T
ar
ge
ts
 
3 4.81 1.08 0.87 0.82 7.80 1.23 1.05 0.73 69 
3 5.48 1.23 1.29 1.22 6.40 1.01 1.65 1.15 116 
4 4.40 0.99 1.00 0.95 5.67 0.89 0.68 0.47 64 
4 5.73 1.29 1.29 1.22 5.20 0.82 1.07 0.74 104 
6 5.86 1.31 1.44 1.36 5.33 0.84 0.91 0.63 63 
7 4.90 1.10 1.25 1.18 5.00 0.79 1.80 1.25 70 
9 7.57 1.70 1.80 1.71 5.40 0.85 0.83 0.58 95 
10 6.68 1.50 1.01 0.96 6.07 0.95 1.91 1.33 55 
11 5.58 1.25 1.29 1.22 5.50 0.86 0.99 0.69 71 
16 10.00 2.24 2.09 1.98 6.67 1.05 1.66 1.16 110 
17 7.68 1.72 1.32 1.25 7.20 1.13 1.72 1.20 83 
21 8.48 1.90 1.88 1.78 5.60 0.88 1.63 1.13 82 
22 9.34 2.10 1.63 1.54 7.20 1.13 2.05 1.43 75 
24 7.79 1.75 1.76 1.67 5.60 0.88 1.61 1.12 73 
24 12.42 2.79 2.29 2.17 7.20 1.13 2.46 1.71 74 
25 7.06 1.58 1.60 1.52 6.67 1.05 1.98 1.38 86 
27 11.61 2.60 2.24 2.12 5.17 0.81 2.43 1.69 108 
30 12.33 2.77 2.81 2.66 7.10 1.12 2.24 1.56 79 
31 12.11 2.72 1.95 1.85 6.20 0.97 2.60 1.81 97 
32 11.55 2.59 2.12 2.01 7.00 1.10 2.62 1.82 111 
33 11.06 2.48 2.57 2.43 4.30 0.68 1.92 1.34 61 
36 9.51 2.13 1.87 1.77 6.10 0.96 2.31 1.61 72 
37 14.71 3.30 2.45 2.32 6.00 0.94 2.47 1.72 60 
38 12.72 2.85 2.49 2.36 6.30 0.99 2.50 1.74 107 
39 15.19 3.41 2.44 2.31 6.30 0.99 1.83 1.27 65 
40 12.98 2.91 2.16 2.05 4.00 0.63 3.14 2.19 62 
48 14.39 3.23 2.05 1.94 7.00 1.10 3.12 2.17 77 
48 11.81 2.65 2.01 1.90 5.80 0.91 2.78 1.94 78 
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ANNEX A.2 – Complete list of impact tests on mortar (cont.) 
 
Strain 
rate  
(s-1) 
Compressive  
Strength 
Young’s 
Modulus  
Strain at  
Peak Strength  
Fracture 
Energy  
Sp
ec
im
en
 (#
) 
σu 
(MPa) DIF 
E 
(GPa) DIF 
εu 
(mm/m) DIF 
Gc 
(N/mm) DIF 
Static 4.46 -- 1.10 -- 6.36 -- 1.44 -- REF. 
T
ar
ge
ts
 
48 13.89 3.12 2.59 2.45 5.36 0.84 2.58 1.80 98 
49 13.44 3.01 1.95 1.85 6.90 1.08 2.78 1.94 80 
50 12.82 2.88 2.56 2.43 5.00 0.79 1.78 1.24 68 
52 13.24 2.97 2.20 2.08 6.00 0.94 2.70 1.88 105 
53 15.34 3.44 2.55 2.42 6.00 0.94 2.97 2.07 85 
54 10.79 2.42 1.99 1.89 5.40 0.85 2.39 1.66 96 
59 14.16 3.18 2.39 2.26 7.86 1.24 3.42 2.38 84 
60 14.56 3.27 2.43 2.30 6.00 0.94 2.66 1.85 66 
61 13.70 3.07 2.69 2.55 5.10 0.80 2.91 2.03 106 
62 12.92 2.90 2.08 1.97 6.20 0.97 2.78 1.94 89 
63 13.57 3.04 2.54 2.41 7.73 1.21 3.53 2.46 109 
71 13.66 3.06 2.41 2.28 7.10 1.12 3.00 2.09 117 
74 18.32 4.11 3.30 3.13 7.40 1.16 4.09 2.85 90 
81 15.64 3.51 3.12 2.96 7.10 1.12 3.05 2.12 114 
86 15.41 3.46 2.83 2.68 7.00 1.10 3.49 2.43 101 
91 15.71 3.52 2.82 2.67 8.10 1.27 3.35 2.33 118 
98 14.13 3.17 2.69 2.55 7.00 1.10 3.07 2.14 88 
113 14.45 3.24 2.69 2.55 7.20 1.13 3.52 2.45 91 
129 17.83 4.00 3.11 2.95 8.60 1.35 3.12 2.17 115 
141 16.15 3.62 3.57 3.38 7.50 1.18 3.89 2.71 87 
157 19.48 4.37 2.99 2.83 8.70 1.37 4.06 2.83 100 
177 16.99 3.81 3.21 3.04 7.80 1.23 3.64 2.53 112 
193 19.53 4.38 3.25 3.08 6.00 0.94 5.20 3.62 102 
201 19.30 4.33 3.22 3.05 6.00 0.94 3.61 2.51 103 
218 20.51 4.60 3.84 3.64 5.60 0.88 3.68 2.56 113 
224 18.25 4.09 3.04 2.88 9.00 1.41 4.91 3.42 99 
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ANNEX A.2 – Complete list of impact tests on mortar (cont.) 
 
Strain 
rate  
(s-1) 
Compressive  
Strength 
Young’s 
Modulus  
Strain at  
Peak Strength  
Fracture 
Energy  
Sp
ec
im
en
 (#
) 
σu 
(MPa) DIF 
E 
(GPa) DIF 
εu 
(mm/m) DIF 
Gc 
(N/mm) DIF 
Static 4.46 -- 1.10 -- 6.36 -- 1.44 -- REF. 
St
ra
in
 G
au
ge
s 
6 6.22 1.39 1.31 1.19 6.72 1.06 1.66 1.15 119 
10 8.01 1.80 1.66 1.51 5.82 0.92 1.58 1.10 120 
23 9.54 2.14 1.93 1.75 6.61 1.04 2.03 1.41 122 
31 11.10 2.49 1.98 1.80 6.74 1.06 2.35 1.63 121 
37 13.52 3.03 2.53 2.30 5.48 0.86 2.87 1.99 124 
74 14.01 3.14 2.88 2.62 5.52 0.87 2.75 1.91 123 
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ANNEX B.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex B.1.1 – Schematic of the test setup. 
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Annex B.1.2 – Schematic of the test setup. 
 
 
Annex B.1.3 – Schematic of the test setup. 
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Annex B.1.4 – Steel support structure [mm]. 
 
 
Annex B.1.5 – Steel support structure [mm]. 
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Annex B.1.6 – Steel support structure, details [mm]. 
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ANNEX B.2  
 
Annex B.2.1 – Masonry construction details [mm]. 
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ANNEX B.3  
 
Annex B.3.1 – MURFOR RND Datasheet. 
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Annex B.3.2 – ARMANET Datasheet. 
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ANNEX C.1  
ANNEX C.1.1 – Full list of key infrastructure scores. 
# Railway Station C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C (%) 
1 Cascais Cais do Sodré 0.93 0.23 0.85 1.00 1.00 85 
2 Cascais Santos 0.58 0.23 0.27 0.40 1.00 51 
3 Cascais Alcântara-Mar 0.71 0.23 0.20 0.40 1.00 57 
4 Cascais Belém 0.57 0.23 0.12 0.55 1.00 51 
5 Cascais Algés 0.78 0.23 0.20 0.40 1.00 61 
6 Cascais Cruz Quebrada 0.52 0.23 0.12 0.40 1.00 46 
7 Cascais Caxias 0.59 0.23 0.20 0.40 1.00 51 
8 Cascais Paço de Arcos 0.76 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.30 47 
9 Cascais Santo Amaro 0.56 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.30 36 
10 Cascais Oeiras 0.78 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.30 48 
11 Cascais Carcavelos 0.76 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.30 47 
12 Cascais Parede 0.76 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.37 50 
13 Cascais São Pedro do Estoril 0.55 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.37 39 
14 Cascais São João do Estoril 0.75 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.37 49 
15 Cascais Estoril 0.68 0.88 0.20 0.15 0.37 54 
16 Cascais Monte Estoril 0.43 0.23 0.12 0.15 0.37 32 
17 Cascais Cascais 0.78 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.37 51 
18 Cintura Alcântara-Terra 0.61 0.23 0.35 0.40 1.00 54 
19 Cintura Campolide 0.78 0.23 0.20 0.40 1.00 61 
20 Cintura Sete Rios 0.85 0.23 0.60 0.85 1.00 75 
21 Cintura Entrecampos 0.98 0.45 0.60 0.85 1.00 84 
22 Cintura Roma-Areeiro 0.76 0.23 0.60 0.55 1.00 67 
23 Cintura Chelas 0.18 0.23 0.12 0.40 1.00 29 
24 Cintura Marvila 0.26 0.23 0.12 0.40 1.00 33 
25 Norte Lisboa Santa Apolónia 0.77 0.88 0.60 1.00 1.00 82 
26 Norte Braço de Prata 0.53 0.33 0.12 0.40 1.00 48 
27 Norte Lisboa Oriente 0.83 0.88 0.60 1.00 1.00 85 
28 Norte Moscavide 0.54 0.23 0.35 0.00 0.36 39 
29 Norte Sacavém - Bobadela Sul 0.46 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.36 31 
30 Norte Bobadela 0.43 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.36 30 
31 Norte Santa Iria 0.47 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.36 32 
32 Norte Póvoa 0.77 0.88 0.20 0.30 0.24 59 
33 Norte Alverca 0.75 0.43 0.20 0.00 0.24 49 
34 Norte Alhandra 0.55 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.24 35 
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ANNEX C.1.1 – Full list of key infrastructure scores (cont.). 
# Railway Station C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C (%) 
35 Norte Vila Franca de Xira 0.75 0.65 0.20 0.15 0.24 54 
36 Norte Castanheira do Ribatejo 0.51 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.24 33 
37 Norte Carregado 0.34 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.06 24 
38 Norte Vila Nova da Raínha 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.02 14 
39 Norte Espadanal de Azambuja 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.02 13 
40 Norte Azambuja 0.64 0.33 0.12 0.00 0.02 38 
41 Norte Virtudes 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.02 6 
42 Oeste Mira Sintra - Meleças 0.50 0.43 0.12 0.15 0.68 41 
43 Oeste Telhal 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.68 12 
44 Oeste Sabugo 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.68 16 
45 Oeste Pedra furada 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.68 13 
46 Oeste Mafra 0.01 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.12 8 
47 Oeste Alcainça-Moinhos 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.12 6 
48 Oeste Malveira 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.12 21 
49 Oeste Jerumelo 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.12 6 
50 Oeste Sapataria 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.00 4 
51 Oeste Pero Negro 0.11 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.00 10 
52 Oeste Zibreira 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.00 4 
53 Oeste Feliteira 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.00 3 
54 Oeste Dois Portos 0.03 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.13 7 
55 Oeste Runa 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.13 5 
56 Oeste Torres Vedras 0.31 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.13 22 
57 Oeste Ramalhal 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.13 7 
58 Sintra Lisboa Rossio 1.00 0.23 0.60 1.00 1.00 85 
59 Sintra Benfica 0.80 0.23 0.35 0.55 1.00 65 
60 Sintra Santa Cruz/Damaia 0.78 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.31 51 
61 Sintra Reboleira 0.77 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.31 50 
62 Sintra Amadora 0.89 0.23 0.20 0.60 0.31 62 
63 Sintra Queluz-Belas 0.81 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.68 56 
64 Sintra Monte Abraão 0.79 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.68 55 
65 Sintra Massamá-Barcarena 0.83 0.23 0.12 0.15 0.68 55 
66 Sintra Agualva-Cacém 0.92 0.43 0.12 0.60 0.68 69 
67 Sintra Rio de Mouro 0.80 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.68 55 
68 Sintra Mercês 0.77 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.68 54 
69 Sintra Algueirão-Mem Martins 0.80 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.68 55 
70 Sintra Portela de Sintra 0.74 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.68 52 
71 Sintra Sintra 0.66 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.68 48 
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